Colonial Peace

734 days of genocide, likely hundreds of thousands dead and an obliterated Gaza later, Donald Trump announces: “War is over”. The 20-point plan cements all the contradictions that first led to October 7 – this colonial peace could hardly be more absurd.

734 days, likely hundreds of thousands dead and a Gaza razed to the ground later; “War is over”[1], at least according to US President Donald Trump on his way to his speech in the Knesset.

The 20-point “peace plan” of the US government was signed by Israel on the night of October 10, after the United States (also via Qatar) had put pressure on the Israeli government that they too should now agree to the US plan for Gaza. Israel had repeatedly tried to sabotage peace developments, including with the internationally unlawful bombing of some Hamas officials in Qatar who were just discussing the previous peace draft.

For Netanyahu in particular, the genocide recently served the radical domestic truce; Netanyahu, who incidentally faces a career-ending corruption verdict[2], was able to secure his political rule, at least temporarily, by continuing the Gaza campaign, and calm the massive protests against his disastrous economic policy with the argument that he was at least protecting Israeli sovereignty:

“And so, Netanyahu has two main tasks. The first is to prolong the war, allowing him to continue using it as an excuse to avoid accountability. The second is to prevent the breakup of his government, while somehow setting himself up for another successful election, which must happen before October 2026.”[3] (Justin Salhani)

The United States was also happy to go along with it; for its arms manufacturers, the Gaza campaign meant only the same added value known from Ukraine, and Israel’s relative regional supremacy is fundamentally in the interest of American and European capital. Israel’s role as a proxy nation gained particular importance due to the growing aggression between Iranian and American interests in the region, not least through the welcomed internationally unlawful strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June of this year.

This more or less uncompromising arming and diplomatic support of Israel, combined with the easily accessible documentation of the horror in Gaza itself, had domestic political consequences in every supporting state. To reduce the risk of broader Palestine solidarity movements, possibly an alienation between the people and the government, European states reacted with growing rhetorical rejection of Israel’s warfare, virtual “arms export stops” and finally the low-risk recognition of a Palestinian state, tied to cooperation with “the puppet”[4] Mahmoud Abbas – a self-purpose.

In the United States, the development was somewhat different: On the one hand, the legitimization for the continued support of the genocide was facilitated by the anti-Muslim status quo of the majority society, which has solidified since September 11 and the subsequent American wars of annihilation. On the other hand, American capital interests in the Israel region are far greater than European ones – cemented by the massive influence of Israeli lobbying on US politics.

Nevertheless, the outrage over the support of the Israeli genocide also affected parts of the American majority society. Particularly problematic for the ruling Republican Party is the split in the ‘MAGA’ movement between classic representatives of US foreign policy and the ‘New Right’ around Nick Fuentes and Candace Owens. As a result, overall societal support for Israel’s ‘War in Gaza’ sank to a historic low. A study published in September by the New York Times found that for the first time more Americans side with the Palestinians (35%) than with Israel (34%) – only registered voters were polled.[5]

Colonial Peace

Now the last surviving Israeli prisoners of war in Gaza have been handed over to the International Red Cross. In return, Israel committed to releasing around 2000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees in the coming weeks – which of course does not include the highly popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti; more on that later.

The withdrawal of Israeli soldiers is happening by sectors, from which the soldiers withdraw separately in different phases of the agreement. The withdrawal so far up to the “Yellow Line”, approx. Khan Rafah to Jabalia) was accompanied by systematic arson by the withdrawing soldiers:

“One soldier from the Kfir Brigade shared an image of himself in front of a fire, writing, “On Friday, just before departure. Burning food so that it won’t reach the Gazans, may their names be erased.” Another captioned a photo of the burning sanitation facility, calling it “[one] last memory.””[6]

The complete withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from Gaza and the disarmament of Hamas are only supposed to take place in a later phase of the agreement. Nevertheless, it is now possible again, albeit restricted, for people in Gaza to return to the remains of their houses and apartments, which were recently inaccessible as part of the Israeli ‘no-go zones’. Furthermore, the United Nations is permitted again to bring aid supplies to Gaza – yesterday 170,000 tons of aid were transported from their warehouses in Egypt and Jordan into the area.

The reconstruction of Gaza, which Trump himself called a “demolition site”[7], i.e., the reconstruction of the 92% of all residential buildings that were destroyed, the roads, infrastructure, and medical facilities, will take “generations” according to UN Special Rapporteur Balakrishnan Rajagopal.[8] Whether this reconstruction will also be managed by the private American-Israeli “Gaza Humanitarian Fund” is still unclear.

After the “transition period with no clear time limits”, the plan envisages the establishment of an “interim government”, without Hamas. This interim government is to be administered by a “technocratic Palestinian committee”, consisting of “Palestinians and international experts”[9] – this interim government is to be steered by a “Peace Council”, led by Trump and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Under the direct control of the “Peace Council” is the financing of Gaza’s reconstruction, which in turn is to be carried out via the “Trump Plan for Economic Development” – in short, the complete sell-out of Gaza to Western capital. [10]

This “transition period” is neither defined in time nor tied to concrete conditions. Thus, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is supposed to undergo comprehensive, but likewise undefined, reforms in order to be able to take control of Gaza. Those who read our contributions regularly will be familiar with our criticism of the PA: The PA, especially under Mahmoud Abbas, is significantly responsible for the strengthening of reactionary forces in Palestinian politics. Through its direct cooperation with Israel, the European Union, and the United States, it was a driving force behind the division of Palestine into Gaza and the West Bank in the 2006 elections. This assessment is by no means controversial – Dana El Kurd writes in the Guardian:

“And while the most serious threat to the Palestinian people clearly comes from the Israeli occupation and its international supporters – with plans to “conquer” Gaza now approved by Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet – what these events make clear is that the threat also comes from within. It is time for the Palestinian leadership to answer to the people.”

It would also not be surprising if the PA itself ensured that Marwan Barghuthi, the most popular politician in Palestine, was not part of the prisoner exchange – in an election, which is probably envisaged in those vague reform promises, the massively unpopular Abbas would stand no chance against Barghuthi, who in turn might have ended the complete subordination of the PA to non-Palestinian interests. The PA election in 2021, for which Barghuthi wanted to run from prison, was simply canceled by Abbas:

“In 2021, 84% of the representative Palestinian population stated that Mahmoud Abbas was not capable (or “worthy” according to the PSR survey) of continuing to hold the office of President of Palestine. 54%, on the other hand, stated that Hamas was the more capable, preferred ruling force.”[11]

An election poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research from May of this year yielded the following:

“If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would be 64%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among the participants in the elections stands at 50%, followed by Khalid Mishal (35%) and Abbas (11%)”[12]

In the same survey, only 40% (“46% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank”) of Palestinians supported the return of PA rule to Gaza, even after reforms. Even Hamas, which had to accept a significant decline in satisfaction in recent months, still recorded 57% satisfaction (“67% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip”) after nearly two years of genocide.[13]

So much for population satisfaction – another topic is Hamas itself. Why should it disarm? Not only do only 18% of Palestinians support the disarmament of Hamas, for the organization itself this would also be a fatal mistake. According to the plan, Hamas would be left without any prospect of political participation, while Gaza would be subjected to complete foreign determination. The consequences of foreign determination in the West Bank can be seen from the differences in the data from Gaza: Not only is support for Hamas in the West Bank much higher than in Gaza, but October 7 itself is still considered ‘correct’ by 59% in the West Bank, but only by 38% in Gaza.[14]

To be concrete: Any reform of the PA under the leadership of the involved non-Palestinian capital interests is incapable of reforming the PA in such a way that it regains legitimacy among the Palestinian population – because any reform that would do that would contradict the interests of the involved “peace councilors”. It might then be possible for this PA to gain international recognition for its territory as a Palestinian state – but who cares? An incompetent state subject does not differ from an incompetent subject in a only partially recognized state; a state of Palestine is not an end in itself.

These conclusions will also be very clear to the Israeli war cabinet, as the existence of Hamas (and co.) is an important instrument of legitimation for the state of Israel itself. Fighting Hamas runs completely counter to Israel’s national interests; as we know from Haaretz revelations, among other things, about the Israeli killing of its own soldiers on October 7[15] and the killing of “hundreds” of Israeli civilians by the Israeli army[16]. The Israeli domestic truce works by maintaining the external enemy, to create an inorganic social cohesion despite sharpened internal political contradictions.

Thus, if this plan is actually adhered to, it will turn out as it did after Oslo and Jericho, only now with possibly hundreds of thousands of dead fathers, mothers, children, and siblings. The people in Palestine have endured two years of genocide – and yet large parts of Palestinians hold on to organizations that explicitly advertise the struggle for national self-determination. Why should that change now, when the subordination of Gaza is probably entering its most absurd phase ever?

The only difference to Gaza before October 7 is that every single person in Gaza has now lost a friend, a wife, son or daughter, mother, father or sister – with a clear understanding of who killed them.

And it was precisely the structural void – the absence of any credible progress towards self-determination, sovereignty, or even a feasible two-state solution – that brought about the rise of Hamas in the first place. The political implosion of the PLO, its factual submission to Israeli and Western interests through the takeover by Mahmoud Abbas, and its permanent inability to achieve concrete results in the sense of Palestinian self-determination led to a profound loss of trust among large parts of the population.

The political frustration over this decades-long ineffectiveness of the PLO’s secular-diplomatic line was not only fertile ground for the turn towards Islamist-connotated forms of resistance – it was constitutive for the societal legitimization of Hamas.

If this frustration is now, after the de facto defeat of Hamas and the violent repression of an entire territory, neither heard nor politically answered, it multiplies. The systematic elimination of any form of collective self-representation and resistance – whether secular or Islamist, progressive or reactionary – leaves no room for a peaceful transformation, but produces a new generation of disenfranchised people who emerge radicalized from the experience of powerlessness, destruction, and betrayal.

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn409y125v3o

[2] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/9/benjamin-netanyahus-corruption-trial-what-you-need-to-know

[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/8/clearly-an-excuse-does-netanyahu-really-want-hamas-gone

[4] https://kritikpunkt.com//de/2025/06/11/das-puzzlestueck-mahmoud-abbas/

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/29/polls/israel-gaza-war-us-poll.html

[6] https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/new-report-details-extensive-israeli-arson-in-gaza-after-cea

[7] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn409y125v3o

[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/11/another-nakba-un-expert-says-gaza-recovery-will-take-generations

[9] https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/friedensplan-usa-gazastreifen-israel-100.html

[10] https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/friedensplan-usa-gazastreifen-israel-100.html

[11] https://kritikpunkt.com//de/2025/06/11/das-puzzlestueck-mahmoud-abbas/

[12] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/997

[13] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/997

[14] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/997

[15] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-07/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-ordered-hannibal-directive-on-october-7-to-prevent-hamas-taking-soldiers-captive/00000190-89a2-d776-a3b1-fdbe45520000

[16] https://electronicintifada.net/content/how-israel-killed-hundreds-its-own-people-7-october/49216