Cuba: In spite of everything.

Cuba has resisted imperialist aggression for over 60 years while achieving massive social successes. But how? In what ways does this aggression manifest itself? What achievements has Cuban socialism brought about, and what mistakes? A sober, detailed examination of the history of the Cuban Revolution and the development of socialist Cuba.

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★ Before you read!

This post is deliberately written so that the individual sections can be read more or less independently from each other. The table of contents is less about providing an overall overview and more about helping you decide which topics interest you most. The post examines Cuba’s history in detail. If that feels too extensive and you’d rather go straight to the embargo, democracy in Cuba, José Martí, or the achievements and crises of Cuban socialism – just click through! Of course, you can also read the text in its entirety. Either way: enjoy!

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“The passion that some of our liberals feel, the day after the revolution, the passion and concern they feel for the fascists, the civil rights and civil liberties of those fascists who are dumping and destroying and murdering people before. Now the revolution has gotta be perfect, it’s gotta be flawless. Well that isn’t my criteria, my criteria is what happens to those people who couldn’t read? What happens to those babies that couldn’t eat, that died of hunger? And “That’s why I support revolution. The revolution that feeds the children gets my support. Not blindly, not unqualified. (Michael Parenti)[1]

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Part 1: From Colony to Beet Republic

1. Colony and José Martí

Since 1895, the Spanish colony of Cuba had been waging a war of independence against its Spanish rulers. In the decades prior, Spain had lost the Dominican Republic and several other colonies to independence – at the time of the Cuban War of Independence, only Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines remained under full Spanish rule.

Even as Spain was still trying to preserve the Dominican Republic, resistance to Madrid’s reign of terror was growing in Cuba: For Spain, Cuba served as the most important sugar and tobacco exporter among the colonies – on the plantations where the majority of Cubans worked, slavery, tied to social and economic apartheid, was the norm.

The island’s whites and Afro-Cubans were both exposed to the colonial rulers and their administrators based in Madrid, but were also separated from each other by slavery, the right to property, and (limited) opportunities for education.

The literary figure, poet, revolutionary and later national hero José Julián grew up under these conditions.
From his early youth, Martí wrote poems and essays in support of Cuba’s independence and was active on the side of Cuban freedom fighters during the “Ten Years’ War,” in which Cuban plantation owners attempted to gain independence from Spain.

In 1869, at the age of 16, he published his first magazine, “La Patria Libre,” which he dedicated to “Cuba’s independence” and denounced the brutality of Spanish rule. For his political writings, he was arrested by the Spanish colonial rulers, sentenced to forced labor, and subsequently deported to Spain.

Martí continued his education in Spain and worked tirelessly for Cuban independence; in Spain, he wrote immensely popular political essays and poems that emphasized the ideals of freedom, democracy, and social justice.

In exile, Martí became a key organizer of the Cuban exile community, particularly in New York, where he founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party (“Partido Revolucionario Cubano”), which was largely responsible for planning the next armed uprising, the Cuban War of Independence, which began in 1895.

Awareness of the US threat

In his famous letter to the Mexican lawyer and close friend of Martí, Manuel Mercado, at the beginning of the War of Independence, Martí wrote:

“I am in daily danger of giving my life for my country and duty for I understand that duty and have the courage to carry it out-the duty of preventing the United States from spreading through the Antilles as Cuba gains its independence, and from empowering with that additional strength our lands of America. All I have done so far, and all I will do, is for this purpose. I have had to work quietly and somewhat indirectly, because to achieve certain objectives, they must be kept under cover; to proclaim them for what they are would raise such difficulties that “The objectives could not be achieved.”[2]

Martí and his comrades were therefore already aware at the beginning of the independence efforts that the United States would not allow Cuba to maintain its independence if it were to free itself from Spain.

As early as 1854, the USA published the “Ostend Manifesto” expressing its desire to buy Cuba from Spain:

“Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition.”[3]

By harassing and later waging war on Mexico a few decades earlier, the USA had already threatened Mexico’s new independence from Spain and had forced itself to gain massive land and sea territories (including present-day California, Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico).

Cubans had already attempted in vain to end their independence from Spain and the associated social misery with the Ten Years’ War (see above) and the “Little War” (“Guerra Chiquita,” 1879-1880). In the years between 1878 and 1895, known in Cuba as the “Fruitful Truce,” Cuba’s poor, slaves, and workers rose up in 300 more uprisings and conspiracies—vain but fruitful.[4]

The social conditions for a revolutionary break during these years were as follows:

“…of the approximately 1.6 million inhabitants that Cuba had at the beginning of this war, about 200,000 were Spaniards, 500,000 Black and Afro-Cubans, about 800,000 white Cubans or Creoles, and an undetermined number of Chinese, Jamaicans, Haitians, and others. The Spaniards, with some notable exceptions, especially among the clergy, remained loyal to Spain and rejected the Cuban revolution. The Blacks, with isolated exceptions, enthusiastically united in supporting the rebels, as they had been promised the abolition of slavery and sensed that the rebellion against Spain would ultimately triumph… They hoped that under the new regime they would have living conditions similar to those in the neighboring Republic of Haiti… They dreamed of a free Cuba…” (Mgar)[5]

1.1 “Get out of here!”

On February 24, 1895, insurgents gathered in Matanzas, Granma, Guantánamo, Holguín and Baire (the uprising is known in Cuba as the “Cry of Baire”) under the unification of the Cuban Revolutionary Party founded by José Martí in exile.

Martí, along with other revolutionaries such as Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, took over the coordination between the individual factions involved in the uprisings, but were by no means the only, let alone the only significant, insurgents – the Cuban cry for independence was carried by the workers, slaves and poor of Cuba.

The “Montecristi Manifesto,” written by Martí and Gomez as the official declaration of war and leadership plan of the Revolutionary Party, propagated the following to the insurgents:

“This war will not be a cradle of tyranny or of disorder, which is alien to the proven moderation of the Cuban spirit. Those who promote it, and who can still raise their voices and speak, affirm in its name, before the patria [homeland], their freedom from all hatred, their fraternal indulgence toward timid or mistakesn Cubans, their radical respect for the dignity of man, which is the catalyst of combat and the cement of the republic, and their certainty that this war can be conducted in a way that contains the redemption that inspires it, and the ongoing relationships in which a people must live among others, alongside the reality of what war is.”[6]

The core of the document was anti-racism, which was to be fully developed in the revolutionary struggle:

“The revolution, with all its martyrs and generous subordinate warriors, denies indignantly, as the long experience of those in exile and those on the island during the truce denies, the slanderous notion of a threat by the Negro race, which has been wickedly employed to the benefit of those who benefit from the Spanish regime to stir up fear of the revolution.”[7]

Under the military leadership of Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, the revolutionary army pursued a strategy of rapidly expanding the front, targeting the economic foundations of Spanish rule, particularly sugar production, without resorting to indiscriminate destruction.

The war quickly took on a national dimension, and Spain’s grip on the colony was massive: mass relocations, destruction of crops, and a repressive apparatus that routinely tortured and executed.

After Martí’s death in May 1895 and Maceo’s in 1896, the military conflict escalated further. Spain was increasingly economically and politically exhausted, while Cuban troops continued the war despite limited resources.

With the policy of “reconcentración” (reconcentration), General Valeriano Weyler, who was responsible for Cuba, transported around 400,000 peasants to concentration camps starting in 1896. This was done to deprive the Cuban resistance of support among the peasantry and to disrupt the rebels’ food supply. At least 10% of all Cubans, or approximately 225,000 people, died in the “reconcentrations.”[8]Some sources say up to 400,000. The “Cuban Holocaust”[9]is considered a precursor to the Shoah through his systematic starvation of the Cuban population:

“Cuban historians argued early on that the mass deaths in Cuba’s fortified villages occupied by Spanish troops prefigured the suffering of European concentration camp inmates during the World Wars. Together with the British concentration camps during the South African War (1899-1902), the reconcentración in Cuba is now widely considered the origin of modern concentration camps.” (idw)[10]

2. Change of power: US capital is here

For the United States, the “Reconcentrados” offered a way to convince the American civilian population to intervene in the war.

The United States intervention began with the explosion of the US warship “Maine” in the harbor of Havana on February 15, 1898, in which 259 American sailors lost their lives.

The USA blamed Spain for the disaster and declared war on them a few weeks later. The American government under President McKinley pursued both economic and strategic interests: Cuba was an important sugar and tobacco producer and was geographically well-located for US expansion plans in the Caribbean.

In addition, many of the plantations (approx. 16%[11]), which were targeted by the rebels, Americans who exerted massive domestic pressure on the US government to intervene in the war.

The tabloid press coverage had already set the course for war domestically:

“William Randolph Hearst [largest American media tycoon and pioneer of the tabloid press] understood that a war with Cuba would not only sell his papers, but also move him into a position of national prominence. From Cuba, Hearst’s star reporters wrote stories designed to tug at the heartstrings of Americans. Horrific tales described the situation in Cuba – female prisoners, executions, valiant rebels fighting, and starving women and children figured in many of the stories that filled The newspapers. But it was the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor that gave Hearst his big story – war. After the sinking of the Maine, the Hearst newspapers, with no evidence, unequivocally blamed the Spanish, and soon US public opinion demanded intervention. (Hugh Rockoff)[12]

In addition to the media campaign justifying an intervention in Cuba, the intervention was a conscious decision to expand the American sphere of influence – this sounds obvious today, but it was not at the time:

“During the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, Theodore Roosevelt in the Navy Department and his allies in Congress, especially Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, saw the ability of the United States to project its naval power by building ships, constructing an isthmus canal, and acquiring colonies and naval bases, as crucial to American prosperity in an increasingly imperialist world.” (Hugh Rockoff)[13]

With the intervention in Cuba, the United States was now in an open war with Spain, which would take place not only in Cuba but also in Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam.

Lenin described the Spanish-American War as the “most important milestone of imperialism as a period”, that is, as the caesura of the beginning of “open imperialism” as the highest phase of capitalism[14].
And this realization was so obvious that even most bourgeois historical narratives today recognize it:

“The economic influence of the United States in Cuba was enormous. Many sugar and tobacco plantations, as well as iron ore mines, were under American control. The constant fighting and battles hampered the once flourishing trade relations between the United States and Cuba. By the end of 1896, imports from Cuba had fallen by $34 million compared to 1894. The United States no longer wanted to watch as its economic interests in Cuba seemed to continue to stagnate and threatened to decline.”[15]

However, the fighting did not begin immediately in Cuba, but rather in May with the naval battle in Manila Bay, where the outdated Spanish Pacific fleet was defeated.

In June 1898, American troops finally landed on the Cuban mainland and launched an offensive against the Spanish colonial forces. The US forces were far superior to the Spanish troops in terms of both technical equipment, logistics, and morale. On July 3, 1898, the Spanish Atlantic Fleet was decisively defeated in the naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba, which severely weakened the Spanish will to defend the island. Parallel to the naval battles, the American troops captured strategically important territories on the Cuban mainland.

The military superiority of the United States and the weakness of Spain, which was politically and economically weakened, led to a rapid end to the fighting. The war ended with the Treaty of Paris in December 1898, in which Spain ceded its control over Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States.

The concern of Martí’s revolutionaries that the United States would not allow freedom to any Caribbean state so conveniently located proved to be correct.

2.1 Beetroot Republic

The following may sound almost absurd from today’s perspective, for various reasons, but it is actually true:

Cuba’s intervention was so controversial in the US Congress that the previously expansionist movement around Henry Teller would not agree to the invasion without first stating that…

“We [the US] have no intention of conquering this island,” and we “must make that clear to the world so that no European government can claim that we are doing this for the purpose of self-aggrandizement or to increase our territorial possessions.”[16]

Thus, the “Teller Amendment” was created as an addendum to the war authorization; it clearly stated that the United States would not annex Cuba. The US thereby deliberately portrayed itself as a liberator and not as a new colonial power (at the same time, it annexed the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico).

As William R. Adams and James W. Cortada correctly note in their essay “The Teller Amendment: Idealism Or Realism,” the Teller Amendment was not an expression of sudden anti-imperialism by some U.S. representatives, but rather very precise lobbying by the (no joke) turnip-root lobby:

“Although America’s stake in Cuban sugar was considerable and constantly expanding, mainland sugar beet producers opposed any suggestion of annexation because this would bring Cuban sugar within the tariff wall. If Cuba joined the United States, reasoned domestic producers, the island would prove stiff competition to the sugar beet farmers. Sugar beet interests, politically more powerful than the cane sugar producers in the United States, maintained a large lobby in Washington as well as in key state capitals during the critical period of 1895-1898.28 In states such as Colorado, Louisiana, and Florida, sugar lobbyists were able to force politicians to consider seriously blocking Cuban annexation.”[17]

Thus, the United States occupied Cuba until 1902 (purely out of necessity), and developed a form of political and economic dependence that formally maintained the appearance of national sovereignty, but was in fact characterized by a profound integration into the structures of North American capital.

Building dependency

Economically, the dominance of the United States over the seemingly sovereign Cuban Republic was reflected in the rapid expansion of American investments, which led to a massive concentration of capital, particularly in the infrastructure sector and sugar production, forcing formerly independent Cuban producers into the role of dependent tenants or wage laborers.

The introduction of the so-called “centrales” as highly capitalized production centers in the sugar sector was the main driver of this development, since their high fixed costs and constant demand for raw materials could only be managed with the availability of large amounts of capital, which accelerated the displacement of smaller producers and fundamentally changed the island’s ownership structures.

The political support for this economic transformation found its institutional expression in the enforced adoption of the “Platt Amendment” (1901), which not only secured the US’s ability to intervene militarily in Cuba, but also ensured that any foreign policy orientation or financial commitment of the island state remained compatible with Washington’s interests:

“Cuba was under US military occupation until 1902, after which it became formally independent. However, through an amendment to the constitution, Washington secured the right to intervene on the island at any time—which it did extensively in the following years. Cuban presidents were puppets, and the economy, based on the sugar monoculture, was dependent on trade with the US.” (SZ)[18]

In the first election, the American Tomás Estrada Palma (living in America) won the presidency – he was not particularly popular, there was just no other candidate: his opponent, the folk hero General Bartolomé Masó, left the presidential race in protest against the Platt Amendment and Cuba’s pseudo-autonomy.[19]

3. Bambule and the Long Way to Batista

The leasing of Guantánamo, the clarification of the ownership of Isla de Pinos in 1925, and the renewed US intervention from 1906 to 1909 made it clear that the supposedly sovereign state order always existed within the framework of structures that corresponded to the interests of North American capital and its strategic security policy.

The succession of early Cuban presidents—Gómez, Menocal, Zayas, and Machado—was closely linked to the role of sugar exports, whose fluctuations determined political course and bound the power of local elites into a permanent relationship of dependency. The peasant class on the sugar plantations was largely composed of former slaves who continued to live in dependent relationships and were largely ignored politically.

Inspired by the ideas of José Martí, the “Partido Independiente de Color” (PIC, “Independent Party of Colored People”) was founded in 1908 by Black veterans of the Revolutionary War. Reform efforts to achieve legal equality for the PIC were largely ignored politically, to the point that the PIC turned to the United States for assistance through the Platt Amendment. The arch-reactionary US President Taft denied the request.

Starting in 1912, the PIC revolted for the rights of Afro-Cubans: Around 3,000 PIC rebels, some armed by Haitian solidarity activists, launched coordinated attacks against the Cuban army. In response, President Gómez alerted the United States, which deployed thousands of U.S. Marines to the black neighborhoods of Santa Clara and Oriente to protect the property of U.S. investors.

The almost ironic official final report on the suppression of the PIC revolt by the US Marines summarized the events as follows:

“Results: Though the rebels threatened to make life difficult for the American owners of property in Cuba, hoping that it would bring in the American military, nothing of consequence really happened. With the death in action of Estenoz [major leader of the PIC], the Negro forces broke up into small factions and were defeated, most eventually returning to their homes, no better off than before. The Marines were on hand to protect American-owned property, which they accomplished as usual.”[20]

The uprising involved approximately 10,000 Afro-Cubans; the number of deaths is difficult to confirm; the Cuban army, in cooperation with the US Marines, spoke of 16, while local estimates ranged between 5,000 and 6,000.[21]However, the events in eastern Cuba had deeper roots. Cuban historian Louis A. Pérez describes it as follows:

“What occurred in eastern Cuba in 1912 was only marginally related to the armed movement organized by the Partido Independiente de Color. The Independiente protest set in motion a larger protest. The political spark ignited the social conflagration, and the countryside was set ablaze. Disorders quickly assumed the proportions of a peasant jacquerie: an outburst of rage and the release of a powerful destructive fury directed generally at the sources and symbols of oppression. As is often the case with peasant movements, the uprising possessed a formless and desultory character. It was a popular outburst, born of social distress and directed not at government but at local social groups and specific conditions of abuse.”[22]

3.1 Reform and revenge

With the collapse of the financial system following the collapse of sugar prices in the early 1920s, the fragility of the sugar-based economic model became apparent. Although President Machado attempted to create stability with infrastructure projects, he was unable to remedy the fragility of the dependent economic model. Increased reliance on US loans tied Cuba more closely to US interests and, through massive cuts to social spending, fueled popular discontent.

As Machado continued to cling to power after the end of his term, the ongoing tensions eventually led to massive general strikes organized by the Cuban Communist Party.

Public opinion turned decisively against Machado – the largest Cuban newspaper, Bohemia Magazine, wrote on August 6, 1933: “As long as you occupy the Palace, the Palace will be seen by the people as a symbol of misery, blood and mourning. When you abandon it definitively, the Palace will recover the prestige that corresponds to the First Magistrate of the Nation… Abandon the Presidency, General.”[23]

Machado’s overthrow was supported by both the Communist International (Third International) and the United States. The latter was concerned about larger revolutionary movements that, due to Machado’s massive unpopularity, could endanger American capital interests in Cuba.

Fooled! The 100-day Grau government.

It was a bad turn for the United States when the following government, led by medical professor Grau San Martín, which was made up of the revolutionaries of 1933, actually began to pursue workers’ and peasants’ policies in the autumn of 1933.

Although reformist, women were granted the right to vote, the Platt Amendment was repealed, Cuban electricity was nationalized, the eight-hour workday and minimum wage were made mandatory for businesses, agrarian reforms were announced, and a “Cuban quota” for foreign capitalists was established, requiring employers to employ at least 50% Cuban citizens. At the same time, the government deported tens of thousands of Haitians living in Cuba to Haiti in an effort to appeal to the racist sentiment of large segments of the Cuban population.

Fidel Castro later wrote:

“The so-called revolution of 1933 was a movement of struggle and rebellious-ness against injustice and abuse. It called for the nationalization of the electric company and other foreign enterprises, and for the nationalization of employment [but] Tens of thousands of Haitians were mercilessly deported to Haiti. According to our revolutionary ideas, that was an inhuman thing to do.”[24]

The United States was happy about the socio-economically progressive policies of the revolutionaries under Grau – no, of course not: After only 100 days, the Grau government was overthrown by the United States, with the help of a young, successful officer named Fulgencio Batista y Zaldíva.

Batista had previously managed to put himself at the head of the military overnight in the chaos of the 1933 revolution – thus, in the 100 days of the Grau government, he expanded his influence at an absurd speed to such an extent that it quickly became clear to the United States that it was the young puppet master Batista they would have to rely on in the future:

“When the Revolutionary Committee called a general strike against dictator Machado in the fall of 1933, he placed himself at the head of the movement—with a trick: On the evening of September 3, he telephoned the noncommissioned officers on duty, whom he had previously won over to his side, across the country with the slogan: “The sergeants take command.” His men then locked the barracks and denied the officers access the next morning. The army was leaderless—and mutinied under Batista’s leadership.” (Spiegel)[25]

After Grau’s disempowerment, Batista acted as a nominally invisible but de facto dominant actor, forming a client network with the military and elite circles based on control of key resources and repressive institutions.

Richard Gott describes the years 1934 to 1939 as a socio-economic counter-revolution against the reforms of the Grau government.[26]Through his military and police monopoly on the use of force, Batista ensured the maintenance and intensification of the US-capitalist power constellation by eliminating opposition forces and suppressing any emancipatory mobilization. The political oligarchy secured its power through a mixture of corruption, patronage, and repression.

Official government leadership during this period was a constant carousel: Between 1934 and 1940, seven governments changed hands in rapid succession. But all were under the control of Batista, who directed events from behind the scenes:

“Batista manipulated events behind the scenes during the civilian governments of the 1930s – seven followed in quick succession from 1934 to 1940 – before finally submitting himself for election, successfully, in October 1940.” (Richard Gott)[27]

The massive expansion of the repressive apparatus led to a wave of revolutionary excitement in the countryside: workers took over sugar factories, formed workers’ militias, and imprisoned managers. Intense class confrontations also unfolded in the cities: In Havana, open street fighting broke out between revolutionaries—often communists and anarchists—and reactionaries of the fascist “ABC” party. Afro-Cuban uprisings were also part of everyday life.

A US report summarized the situation as follows:

“Within less than a month the number of mills under labor control was estimated at thirty-six. Soviets were reported to have been organized at Mabay, Jaronú, Senado, Santa Lucia, and other centrales. At various points mill managers were held prisoners by the workers. Labor guards were formed, armed with clubs, sticks and a few revolvers, a red armband serving as uniform. Workers fraternized with the soldiers and police. […] Relief committees supplied food to the strikers and their families, and in some cases became subsistence commissions for the whole population of the strike area. At various points these committees allocated parcels of land to be cultivated by the field workers.”[28]

The revolutionary movements had strong international connections. Many Cuban anarchists and communists joined the fight against Franco in the Spanish Civil War. In Cuba itself, the “Solidaridad Internacional Antifascista” provided financial support to the Spanish antifascists.

3.2 “One favorable development”: The 1940 Constitution

Large sections of the workers in the maritime sector, railways, tobacco, and catering industries were organized in anarcho-syndicalist unions, which became increasingly Marxist-Leninist in orientation after the October Revolution. In this environment, the Communist Party of Cuba (PSP) also gained importance.

At the end of the 1930s, Batista, without his own popular base, decided to form a political alliance with the communists:

“At the end of the 1930s, Batista was a military man lacking a popular base. So he decided to create a political coalition with the help of the Partido Comunista Cubano. And the PCC entered into a pact with Batista. In exchange for its services and its support in the next presidential election, the PCC was handed the recently created Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC Cuban Confederation of Workers). […] Thus, for the first time in Cuba, there was a marriage of unionism and the state.” (Frank Fernández)[29]

The Constitution of 1940

In the context of these social struggles, the 1940 Constitution was created, which the Cuban historian and anarchist Frank Fernández described as “one favorable development under Batista”.[30]It banned racial segregation for the first time, strengthened the role of the state in the economy and education, and formally repealed the Platt Amendment – ​​the US right of intervention.

But its impact remained limited. While the constitution did open up scope for new organizations…

“The guarantees of the 1940 Constitution permitted them to legally create an organization of this type, and it was thus that they agreed to dissolve the two principal Cuban anarchist organizations, the SIA and FGAC, and create a new, unified group, the Asociación Libertaria de Cuba (ALC), a sizable organization with a membership in the thousands.” (Frank Fernández)[31]

In practice, however, property and power relations remained unchallenged – large landowners and US sugar companies continued to dominate, and land reforms remained half-hearted. Afro-Cubans remained marginalized despite the ban on segregation, apartheid practices persisted, and strategies of “whitening”—that is, the “whitening” of the Cuban population—continued to weaken their social position.[32]

The political culture also remained dominated by corruption and patronage. Even governments with revolutionary promises—such as the renewed government of Grau San Martín (1944-1948)—failed to implement profound reforms.

Carlos Prío Socarrá’s government (1948-1952) brought the disappointment of the second Grau government to a climax: Prío’s tenure is considered the culmination of “gangsterismo,” the intertwining of organized crime and politics, characterized by street battles between rival, often state-funded gangs and almost absurd corruption (his brother, Antonio Prío, was intent on amassing a fortune from the importation of various drugs, which was facilitated by the support of the chief of the Cuban police).[33]

4. Gangsterismo

The close economic dependence on the United States persisted throughout the Grau-Príos years (1944-1952): American corporations controlled large parts of the sugar industry, and diplomatic pressure and military cooperation prevented structural change. The labor movement faced increasing institutionalization, repression, and co-optation, while social improvements failed to materialize. During the onset of the Cold War, the political organization of the opposition was overshadowed by growing anti-communism, which persuaded the United States to provide massive funding to reactionary forces.[34]

This financing was channeled, among other things, through anti-communist unions, which regularly carried out attacks on communist unions – these shootings were a godsend for Batista’s propaganda; the “lawlessness” and “gangsterismo” under President Prío became fertile ground for Batista’s total, unresisted takeover of power in March 1952:

“Batista’s new regime was widely welcomed. After a perfunctory attempt to preserve the constitutional niceties, and to repeat his experience of the 1930s by finding a figleaf president, Batista appointed himself as chief of state. He invoked the name of Martí in his first public speech and associated himself with the popular aspiration for progress and democracy, and for peace and justice; it was an impeccable performance.” (Richard Gott)[35]

Two security officers died during the coup – no one was arrested; why should they have been? President Prío’s calls for a general strike were either ignored or, in the case of the CTC anarchists, even welcomed by Batista:

“Banks, offices, government departments, did not open, soldiers standing outside doors to prevent office workers from arriving. Batista’s ends were indeed served by this action of the CTC more than hindered. Newspapers were not distributed. The ‘workers’ palace’, the Communist headquarters, the Ortodoxo and Autentico headquarters in all cities were all guarded and men were turned politely but firmly away. (Thomas Hugh)[36]

Before sunrise, he had the high-ranking military officers stationed at Camp Columbia arrested and seized control of Havana before dawn. President Prío fled to the Mexican embassy and found asylum there.[37]

The United States, initially astonished, recognized Batista’s rule within a few days – they already knew him quite well:
In return for recognition, Batista had to promise the United States to take tougher action against Cuban communists and anarchists – no problem for Batista: To show the United States how serious he was, Batista later founded the “Office for the Suppression of Communist Activities” (BRAC), with US Ambassador Arthur Gardner later calling himself its “father”:

“Allen Dulles, the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had a long conversation with Batista about this time, being ‘not unfavorably impressed’: the US, according to Allen Dulles, helped Batista’s intelligence organization, although quite soon it declined in quality, and for the next two years ‘most of the money’ meant for the BRAC ‘never reached the proper destination’.” (Thomas Hugh)[38]

In his first public speech, he linked himself to the popular aspirations for “progress, democracy, peace, and social justice” and invoked Martí’s name. At the same time, the new government increased the salaries of the police and army, while congressmen and senators continued to receive their salaries.

If the average Cuban had slept through the coup, he would probably not have even noticed that the regime was now different.

The military junta presented itself as a guarantor of an orderly state, preventing a regime of gangsterismo and corruption that had destroyed the institutions, created disorder and reinforced the sinister plans of the previous government to illegitimately extend its term in office.

Although Batista declared his loyalty to the social-democratic constitution of 1940, he simultaneously suspended constitutional guarantees such as the right to strike. In April 1952, he promulgated a new constitutional law, the “Government Statutes,” which comprised a total of 275 articles and was intended to preserve the “democratic and progressive essence” of the 1940 constitution:

“Much of the constitution of 1940 was suspended, but most people, with the exception of the Ortodoxos, like Castro and his friends, gave the new government the benefit of the doubt. European and Latin American countries granted swift diplomatic recognition, followed […] by the United States.” (Richard Gott)[39]

In practice, fundamental rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, were automatically suspended for 45-day periods at any time. Traditional political parties were suspended, with the obvious understanding that any reorganization would only take place under Batista’s terms.

Part 2: Terror and the Cuban Revolution

1. “History will absolve me”

The young lawyer Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz, who had just opened a law firm in Havana, planned to run in the 1952 parliamentary elections for the reformist “Orthodox Party” (Partido Ortodoxo), which represented the main opposition to Prío in the upcoming election. Batista’s coup thwarted Castro’s plans.

Castro, like many other Orthodox Christians on the island, was early on disillusioned with Batista’s references to Batista Martí and rhetoric about sovereignty. The fact that Batista’s early rejection came from Cuba’s Orthodox Christians was connected to the fundamental political and religious concerns of Cuba’s Orthodox Christians at the time: The Partido Ortodoxo saw corruption, ties to US capital, and gangsterismo under Prío as reasons for rejecting him, but not constitutional democracy itself, which they saw, particularly with the 1940 Constitution, as a way to free Cuba from its scourges. For the island’s Orthodox Christians, the abolition of that constitution was therefore not just the abolition of a fundamentally progressive document, but also the abolition of the possibility of improving the lives of Cubans through democratic participation – an idealistic contradiction (why should US capital tolerate its abolition?), which nevertheless paved the ground for the coming resistance.

After Batista seized power, Castro and a group of around 160 young men and some women spent months organizing weapons and training to resist the abolition of the 1940 Constitution on the basis of the right of resistance enshrined in that Constitution.[40]

The re-coup plotters split into several task forces and attempted to capture not only the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, but also the Civil Hospital and the Palace of Justice there. Castro’s rebels were poorly armed, encountered a thousand well-equipped soldiers, and quickly failed.

In the following days, more than seventy of the insurgents were captured and many executed, while Fidel and his brother Raúl Castro were eventually imprisoned.[41]

The group’s motives lay in their rejection of Batista, whom they accused of corruption and tyranny, and in their goal of restoring the 1940 constitution that Batista had suspended. Castro viewed the uprising as a continuation of José Martí’s legacy and declared violence necessary to prevent Batista’s state restructuring.

The consequences of the failed attack had a lasting and rapid impact on Batista’s rule; bloody repression against any critics of the regime, in which prisoners were systematically shot and torture was institutionalized, left the population shaken and severely restricted civil liberties, even for those who were politically disinterested.

Despite the defeat, Castro transformed himself into a political symbol through the trial and his defense speech, “History will absolve me.” Thus, the Moncada attack, although militarily unsuccessful, became the starting point of a dynamic that established Castro as the legitimate leader of a new generation of oppositionists.

In his defense speech, which Fidel truly used to defend his revolutionary ideals, he spoke after a capable analysis of Cuban material conditions, as follows:

“There remains a more serious problem for the Tribunal to resolve: the crime of the seventy murders [the executed rebels of the Moncada attack, see above], that is, the greatest massacre known to us. The culprits are at large and armed, so they represent a constant threat to the lives of our citizens. If the full weight of the law does not fall upon them, out of cowardice or because the Tribunal prevents it and does not recede as one, then I feel sorry for your honor and lament the unprecedented stain that will fall upon the administration of justice. As for myself, I know that imprisonment will be harsher than ever before for a man, aggravated by threats, by vile and cowardly anger, but I do not fear it, just as I do not fear the wrath of the wretched tyrant who robbed my seventy brothers of their lives. Condemn me; it means nothing; history will acquit me.”[42]

1.1 Concentration camps and torture

From the Moncada attack onwards, the excessive violence of the Batista regime took on a completely new dimension:

Even unavoidable injuries from accidents were used as a pretext for arrests and ill-treatment to nip any resistance in the bud, while on July 26, 1953, the Cabinet, without much discussion, passed a decree repealing Article 26 of the Prison Statute, thereby relieving prison guards of responsibility for prisoners’ lives, further eroding the legal basis for the arbitrary actions of the security forces.

Just a few weeks later, on August 6, 1953, Batista passed a stricter public order law by direct decree that silenced any opposition press and effectively brought journalism in Cuba to a near-standstill, while constitutional guarantees were routinely suspended.

In addition, Batista, with the help of the “Office for the Suppression of Communist Activities” (BRAC.), issued a decree in 1954 that allowed workers to be dismissed if they were suspected of being “communists.”

The regime reactivated the historic “Voluntarios” (see above) under the name “Los Tigres” and introduced them under the leadership of Rolando Masferrer as a paramilitary force to extend the state’s harshest repression, while at the same time applying the strategy of “reconcentrating” peasant families from rural areas, which was reminiscent of General Weyler’s 19th-century concentration camp methods and aimed at depriving the rebels of any support from the miserable peasant class.

The displaced farmers were forcibly removed from their homes, with those found in the evacuated areas often being immediately shot or bombed from the air.

“Taking a leaf from Weyler’s book, Batista’s men began ‘re-concentrating* the peasants on the lower slopes of the Sierra Maestra, clearing them from their fields and homes to prevent them making common cause with the guerrillas. Anyone found in the cleared area would be shot on sight. In a twentieth-century development of an old strategy, they could be bombed from the air.” (Richard Gott)[43]

The wave of repression was further exacerbated by constant arrests, with numerous people being imprisoned and often executed for arson in sugarcane fields or on (mostly arbitrary) suspicion of bomb attacks.

In addition, the state ordered the closure of secondary schools and banned the midterm congressional elections scheduled for 1957, thus reducing popular political participation to zero. In light of the countless atrocities documented after the Moncada attack, confidence in Batista’s promise to punish those responsible for torture dwindled, as the police grew into a virtually autonomous and uncontrollable apparatus of violence.[44]

1.2 Granma and the concentration of the guerrillas

Shortly before (1955), the young Argentine doctor Ernesto “Che” Guevara met Fidel Castro, who convinced Che to move his revolutionary ambitions from Argentina to Cuba – he joined Castro’s group and within a few months grew from a field doctor to the first guerrilla after Castro.

In the same year, Castro and his followers founded the “July 26th Movement”, named after the date of the attack on the Moncada barracks, and, in addition to a number of new arrivals, received financial support from exiled former president Prío (see above) and the US mafia, who wanted to use the financing of the movement to ensure that, should it be successful, they would continue to tolerate their casinos, nightclubs and drug trafficking on the island.[45]

In December 1956, Castro landed in eastern Cuba with about 80 followers, who had previously received weapons and training in Mexico, on the yacht “Granma,” which had been bought with Prío’s money – where they were already awaited by Batista’s troops:

“Fighter planes flew low toward the 20-meter-long boat, bombing the rebels and bombarding them with volleys of gunfire. The few who survived the attack and dragged themselves barefoot to the beach were hunted down by alerted army patrols. Several rebels died in the carnage, while the survivors fled to the jungle-covered mountains of the Sierra Maestra.” (Spiegel)[46]

The number of guerrilla losses during the “Granma Operation” is unclear, but undoubtedly significant:

“There may at one moment in early December have been only twelve men in the Sierra around Fidel Castro, as invariably argued since, no doubt to suggest Christ-like parallels […] Camilo Cienfuegos in an interview published in Revolution, 4 January 1959, spoke of ‘only eight men being left’ after Alegria de Pio [disastrous battle during the Operation]. Ameijeiras in another interview published 8 January 1959 said, ‘of the eighty-two men who embarked on the Granma there remained not twelve – as Batista said – but nine’“ (Thomas Hugh)[47]

The intensification of repression through the ban on the 1957 midterm elections and the closure of schools contributed to the massive rise in popularity of the revolutionary opposition, especially among students and peasants.

Castro’s guerrillas steadily expanded their influence despite the massive losses from the Granma debacle. With targeted attacks on police and military posts as well as strategic propaganda, the movement increasingly gained support among the population, especially among peasants who suffered under Batista’s “reconcentration” policy.

2. Eve of the Revolution

Batista continued to enjoy considerable support among the black and Afro-Cuban population because he skillfully exploited his own Afro-Cuban origins, openly cultivated Afro-Cuban traditions, and, above all, integrated blacks disproportionately into the army and police.

Although Castro attempted to win over Black revolutionaries, his followers were often defamed by Black soldiers as “white,” in the sense of betraying the Black cause, and Batista was seen as a “friend of the Blacks” – the tone of Batista’s support drew a clear social and structural boundary between the various population groups over time:

“Another reason for the lack of black support [for Castro] was the emotional and political investment that many blacks had made in the dictator. Batista was a mulatto [colonial term for people with one white and one black parent], a lower-class figure in origin, much despised and ridiculed by the traditional white ruling elite. Blacks could identify with him: he too was barred from exclusive whites-only clubs; he participated openly in the rites of Santeria; and he gave support to the indiginous ceremonies popular with Afro-Cubans. Batista’s role as an outsider, an opponent of the traditional white political system that had never done much to support the blacks, made him something of a role model for many poor blacks. The percentage of blacks in Batista’s army and police force was well above the national” (Richard Gott)[48]

2.1 Support and change of mood

Nevertheless, the social climate in Cuba changed significantly from the second half of the 1950s onwards.
The wage and job cuts imposed by the government and employers met with resistance, while the union leadership around Eusebio Mujal, suspected of corruption, collaborated with the regime and thus contributed to the formation of informal structures among workers to defend their interests, particularly in the east of the island.

Increasingly large sections of the working class recognized the hopelessness of reformist solutions and developed new forms of action: While the July 26 Movement considered armed insurrection as its strategy, the Communist Party relied on mass mobilization; in this mix, the “movimiento obrero beligerante” (The Beliger Worker Movement) emerged, combining trade union organization and sabotage.

As a result of the Granma operation, the state escalated repression to a new level: with torture, death squads, and massive violence, especially in the east of the country, which led to a decline in strikes but did not break the workers’ resistance.

Rather, sectors of the textile and railway industries showed a resurgence in their self-confidence, and the Communist Party’s campaigns demanding demands, such as wage increases, met with broad support.

As a result, the focus shifted from open industrial action to forms of sabotage and covert support for the guerrillas:

“As 1957 progressed, the predominant political and social question became the continued existence of the dictatorship. This change in priorities from the economic to the political, combined with the growing realization that small-scale industrial action was becoming impractical in the face of repression, resulted in increased workplace sabotage and clandestine aid to the rebels, while the frequency of local or sector-based strikes decreased through 1957 and early 1958. As part of this process, the MR-26-7 set up a committee, chaired by Ñico Torres, to organize the spread of clandestine revolutionary working-class organizations from Guantánamo and Santiago to the rest of the island, and at the same time building a support network for the rebels in the hills.” (Stephen Cushion)[49]

The Cuban elite and the middle class continued to stand united behind the regime. Batista was seen as a guarantor of order and stability, supported by significant economic interests, especially the sugar industry and the banking sector, as well as by foreign actors and influential social circles, particularly the US Mafia, which developed Cuba into a casino and prostitution hub for American businessmen in the 1950s.

The United States also persisted in maintaining a semblance of normality: American businessmen continued to travel to Cuba, and as late as March 1957, US Navy Admiral Arleigh Burke visited Batista to offer strategic advice in the face of what appeared to be an increasingly hopeless situation.

Nevertheless, skepticism about Batista’s ability to break the labor movement also spread in Washington:

“Liberal American opinion, exemplified by the New York Times and progressive elements within the CIA, had looked favorably on Castro, while the Eisenhower government, as much from inertia as from conservatism or anti-Comniunism, had contentedly gone on supporting Batista, although with a growing lack of conviction. While continuing to supply weapons, it never provided enough to allow Batista a military victory, nor indeed would his army and airforce have been technically equipped to cope with an influx of more sophisticated weapons.” (Richard Gott)[50]

Smallest Biggest Evil

For Batista, it was precisely the small number of rebels around Castro, never larger than 2000[51], the biggest problem in combating them.
His army of 40,000 was inefficient, the police weak, volunteer support nonexistent, and the officer corps blocked by Tabernilla and other corrupt generals.

Furthermore, the small number of rebels prevented Batista from taking a harsh approach in the mountainous Sierra Maestra region, where the guerrillas were based, without refuting his own propaganda (among the few who still believed it). Batista’s regime proved incapable of effectively countering a well-established revolutionary movement with peasant support.

Nevertheless, by mid-1957, it was not necessarily doomed—guerrillas had existed in other countries for decades without victory. The decisive factor in Batista’s downfall was not only the Sierra, but above all the fighting in Havana, Santiago, and Washington, where the role remained contradictory given the dwindling trust in Batista:

“After just two years in the mountains, Castro had dominated his rivals elsewhere and was on the verge of victory. He had been fortunate in his field commanders, a mere bunch of amateurs two years earlier. Guevara, Cienfuegos and his brother Raúl had all shown exceptional qualities of leadership and strategic vision and were rewarded by the affection and loyalty of their men. Castro had also been fortunate, or perhaps skilful, in ensuring that United States policy towards his guerrilla band had remained divided and uncertain.” (Richard Gott)[52]

2.2 General strike and popular front

As the armed conflict progressed, marked by Castro’s escalating guerrilla campaign in the Sierra Maestra and the ever-increasing number of attacks and acts of sabotage against state organs and economic institutions, the majority of the population joined Castro’s emerging victorious side as Batista’s military defeat became increasingly obvious and inevitable.

In addition to the obvious military defeat, the eccentric violence pushed the majority of Cubans, of all ethnic and cultural backgrounds, towards the opposition – arbitrary police executions, mass “disappearances” of any opposition members, and arbitrary deportations of entire villages to the concentration camps of “Los Tigres” (see above):

“Whatever the wider doubts about the exact state of the economic and societal crisis in Cuba in the 1950s, the repression of the Batista years was a reality that provoked cries of revenge as well as demands for a better future. The struggle against the dictator, for most activists in the July 26 Movement, was motivated as much by a desire to get rid of a foul oppressor as by hopes of a better society to come. This was why Castro initially received such wide support across the deep divisions in Cuban society. When visiting Princeton in April 1959, Castro attributed the success of the Revolution to the widespread tear and hatred of Batista’s secret police’ […].” (Richard Gott)[53]

Failed general strike

On the morning of April 9, 1958, an unnamed fighter of the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) called for a “revolutionary general strike” on Cuban radio:

“Attention Cubans, this is the 26th of July Movement calling to a Revolutionary General Strike! Today is the day of freedom, the day of the Revolutionary General Strike. Forward, Cubans, as from this moment the final struggle begins in all of Cuba that will only end with the overthrow of the dictatorship! Workers, students, professionals, bosses, join the revolutionary general strike, from this moment.”[54]

Preliminary discussions for the general strike began after students had led a successful education strike a few months earlier – Faustino Pérez, third in the M-26-7, thus saw the time ripe for a general strike that would complete the revolution.

Preparations for the strike, namely the planned takeover of the unified trade union CTC, procurement of weapons and logistics, and consultation with relevant employee representatives in key industries, were made in advance – the rebels were ready.[55]

Nevertheless, the general strike failed miserably: preparations and communication were lacking in Havana, many workers were surprised by the sudden call and did not feel responsible for the action.

The M-26-7 had little experience in union work, pursued a military perspective on strikes, and ignored class-based demands such as those raised by the Communist Party. Instead of relying on the workers’ own initiative, they relied excessively on sabotage and armed action, overestimated their own strength, and ultimately failed due to the regime’s military superiority.

In addition, the distrust of the anti-communist members of the MR-26-7 toward the PSP led to a lack of unity in the opposition; joint strike committees were not formed, and the PSP was excluded from most planning.

Batista reacted as expected; police and army shot at the protesting civilians without consideration, and prominent activists of the MR-26-7, namely Antonio Sánchez, were executed. Batista’s police chief explicitly ordered that no “wounded or prisoners” be taken.[56]

Nevertheless, the failure of 1958 gave rise to the realization that closer cooperation between MR-26-7 and PSP was necessary, which laid the foundation for later successes.[57]

3. Strategic realignment and victory

The failed April 1958 strike marked a turning point for the Cuban revolution and forced the rebels to fundamentally reorient their strategy. It became clear to both the Movimiento MR-26-7 and the PSP that their previous tactics were insufficient and that relations between the two needed to be readjusted.

Faustino Pérez, who had overall responsibility for the strike, later explained that the success of the August 1957 strike had produced a false assessment of the balance of power and thus contributed significantly to its failure. The April strike demonstrated that the “guiding will of the center” could not be effective without the broad participation of the masses.[58]

At a meeting in Los Altos de Mompié in the Sierra Maestra on May 3, 1958, the revolutionary leadership drew the necessary conclusions from this failure. First, they established guerrilla warfare as the primary form of resistance; second, the rebels decided to deepen their collaboration with the Communist Party within the labor movement. The rapprochement between MR-26-7 and PSP ultimately culminated in the founding of the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU), which organized two major workers’ congresses in the rebel-held areas. These congresses gave the movement additional legitimacy among workers and paved the way for a general strike, to be held at the beginning of the next sugar harvest in January 1959, to achieve the greatest possible economic impact.

At the same time, the rebels achieved far-reaching military successes. They repulsed Batista’s large-scale “summer offensive” by August 1958, which not only boosted opposition morale but also confirmed the MR-26-7 as the leading force in the fight against the regime. Raúl Castro opened a second front in the Sierra Cristal in March 1958, while Juan Almeida also held a third front north of Santiago for the first time.[59]

Guevara advanced into the central province of Las Villas, and Camilo Cienfuegos was deployed to the western province of Pinar del Río. These military advances, combined with growing popular confidence, led to increasing numbers of workers pledging their active support to the rebels. By the end of 1958, David Salvador estimated the membership of the MR-26-7’s “Workers’ Section” at 15,000.[60]

3.1 Batista’s escape

Batista’s unexpected and sudden escape on January 1, 1959, necessitated swift action: to forestall an impending military coup, Fidel Castro called a general strike prematurely.

This was by no means a spontaneous action, but the result of careful preparation and a high level of organizational strength within the labor movement (see above). The strike successfully prevented a coup attempt, secured Havana, and finally paved the way for the victory of the revolution.

At the same time, it revealed the overwhelming popularity of the rebel triumph and forced the army leaders to quickly abandon their plans and leave their posts.

Steve Cushion summarizes the path to this point in his work “A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution” as follows:

“From Batista’s coup in March 1952 until the fraudulent elections of November 1954, little changed from the days of Batista’s predecessor, President Carlos Prío Socarrás. The fall in the price of sugar caused a crisis in the economy, and from the end of 1954 until the end of 1956, there was a concerted effort by the government and the employers to increase productivity by reducing workers’ wages and decreasing staffing levels. This was achieved by a combination of collaboration with the trade union bureaucracy and relatively low levels of state repression, with police habitually beating workers with clubs and dousing them with fire hoses but with very few deaths. The arrival of the Granma and the start of the rebel insurgency was a crisis for the regime, whose approach changed in early 1957 as the forces of the state began to confront the armed guerrillas in the mountains. From this point in time, the regime used death squads, routine torture, and “disappearances” in an attempt to make organized resistance cower to its rule. April 1958 proved to be a crisis point for the rebels as their attempt at a general strike failed disastrously. This crisis caused both the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (MR-26-7, Revolutionary Movement 26 of July) and the communist Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Popular Socialist Party) to rethink their tactics and their relationship with each other. It also gave increased confidence to the government and, during the summer and autumn of 1958, Batista launched a full-scale military attack on the rebels in their mountain strongholds. “The failure to destroy the rebel army was the regime’s final crisis and created a situation in which a successful general strike would force the dictator from office.”[61]

From a balcony in Santiago, Castro announced the victory of the revolution the following day: “The Revolution begins now […] This time it will not be like 1898, when the North Americans came and made themselves masters of our country. This time, fortunately, the Revolution will truly come to power”.[62]

A few hours later, Castro had dinner with the US consulate and his wife[63]What was discussed at this meal is not known – but it is quite clear that at the time of the revolution the United States still hoped that it could continue to represent its interests on the Caribbean island – how one would have liked to have been a fly on the wall.  

Part 3: Socialist State of Cuba

The Cuban Revolution began with the aim of achieving political independence and social justice. It drew on a broad spectrum of ideas, encompassing both reformist and radically transformative currents.

While some supporters simply called for an end to corruption and authoritarian rule and a return to constitutional order, others pushed for profound social changes that challenged the very foundations of civil society.

In the early years, a strongly voluntaristic ethos characterized development: redistribution measures such as land reform and rationing were combined with comprehensive popular mobilization, for example through the nationwide literacy campaign, the establishment of mass organizations, and the fundamental reform of the health care system:

“The July 26th Movement began its experiment at governance on January 1st, 1959, with an enormous popular support and legitimacy. Its diverse supporters, though, had very different ideas about what kind of new system should replace the old. Some wanted merely an end to Batista’s corrupt rule and a restoration of constitutional order, with little fundamental social change. Others saw a more revolutionary opportunity in the collapse of the old order and the overwhelming popular mandate behind the new government. Could a revolution overcome dependency, poverty, and underdevelopment? “Could it create a new society, and a new man?” (Aviva Chomsky)[64]

Within the first months after the revolution, it increasingly moved toward a line of national self-determination and economic control. The MR-26-7 and the communist PSP grew closer and eventually merged in 1965 to form the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC).

Within this process, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, starting in 1959, initially as President of the National Bank and later as Minister of Industry, took on the task of developing an independent economic strategy. The goal was to overcome Cuba’s historical dependence on sugar exports and to create a new, independent economic basis through industrialization.

The 1970s saw a deeper institutionalization following the Soviet model. Cuba joined COMECON in 1972, introduced five-year plans in 1975, and oriented itself toward a centralized planning model that was seen as an instrument of economic modernization. The first PCC party congress in 1975 and the 1976 constitution, which established a system of “people’s power” (see below), consolidated the socialist state structure.

1. Battlefield mentality and victory

The United States met these developments with open hostility. Its concerns were less about the political forms in Havana than about the economic interests of American investors and the role model the Cuban revolution could have for the region:

“In the early years of the Revolution the issues of Soviet influence, human rights, or military threat to the United States rarely surface in US diplomatic correspondence. Instead, what the State Department and the diplomats on the ground worried about what kind of economic model Cuba was going to pursue, and in particular, how US businesses in Cuba would be affected. Further, they were quite concerned about how the Cuban example might inspire other Latin American countries to attempt similar economic transformations to the detriment of US investors.” (Aviva Chomsky)[65]

In Washington, there were fears that other Latin American societies might see Cuba as a model for independent development and thereby question the permeability of their markets to US capital and the United States’ access to strategic raw materials.

Within just a few months of Batista’s overthrow, the United States decided to actively oppose the new government. The United States’ openly aggressive stance created a climate of constant threat on the island, which strengthened the revolutionary leadership’s mobilization and accelerated the domestic course of revolutionary radicalization.

The portrayal of the revolution by the US press, which branded the post-revolutionary processes as a “bloodbath” (a revolution is not a banquet), in turn contributed to polarization and consolidated the logic of confrontation.

Counterrevolution

The Latin American historian Aviva Chomsky describes the social climate of the Cuban working class in the first decade after the revolution as a “battlefield mentality”[66], in which the immense pressure on the Cuban revolution became manifest.

After the agrarian reform of 1959, in which the size of farms was limited to approximately 1.3 hectares and the rest was expropriated and redistributed, the United States entered into its first verbally open conflict with the Cuban revolution.

Many of the large sugar plantations, where de jure slave labor was still prevalent before the revolution, belonged to US corporations, which complained to their foreign ministry following the agrarian reform:

“The State Department contended that “agrarian reform laws caused great consternation in US Government and American sugar circles.” Thirty of the 34 US-owned sugar mills sent representatives to meet with the US Ambassador the following day, protesting that their businesses would be severely affected by the reform.” (Aviva Chomsky)[67]

After failed attempts to cooperate with “moderate” forces in Cuba, i.e. counter-revolutionaries, the United States decided that the revolution had to be stopped as quickly as possible.

The strategies developed by the CIA ranged from the sabotage of key production sectors, particularly the sugar industry, which represented the core of national value creation and at the same time the most important export product, to open military intervention.

1.1 Bay of Pigs fiasco

The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which JFK advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger described as the “major fiasco” in the history of American foreign policy, was the absolute turning point for the course and direction of the Cuban revolution:

The plan called for 1,300 Cuban exiles to land at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), located between Havana and Trinidad, and to hold the local airstrip only long enough for the “government in exile” of pro-American Cubans, hand-picked by US officials, to fly in from Miami. This government would then kill Castro and seize control of Cuba. The American investors would thus get their plantations back, the revolution would be broken, and all’s well that ends well. If this plan sounds absurd and somewhat stupid, that’s because it was absurd and rather stupid:

In the week before the landing, CIA-funded counterrevolutionary forces in Cuba intensified their attacks: a sugar factory was destroyed in Pinar del Río and the El Encanto department store was blown up in downtown Havana.

On April 15, two small aircraft also attacked Camp Columbia and air bases in Havana and Santiago, destroying most of the Cuban air force and killing several civilians.

These events made the imminent invasion clear to Castro and the revolutionary leadership. In a eulogy for the victims, he declared for the first time the explicitly “socialist” character of the revolution and contrasted the successes of the Soviet Union, embodied by Yuri Gagarin’s flight into space, with the behavior of the United States, which, he emphasized, “bombed the facilities of a country that barely possessed an air force.”[68]

When the ground invasion began on April 17, 1961, the CIA-organized exile troops landed on the beaches of Playa Girón and Playa Larga, where local militias took over the main defense. Castro mobilized the few remaining aircraft of his air force, while the exiled troops came under fire from improvised training aircraft and “Sea Furies” with rockets.

Castro moved his headquarters from Havana to the Australia sugar factory, from where he directed the countermeasures. Within three days, the invasion was crushed: Of the 1,500 Cuban exiles who participated, over 100 were killed, and around 1,200 were taken prisoner. Many commanders were officers from Batista’s army, some of whom had once been students of General José Ramón Fernández, who was now fighting for the revolution.[69]

The victory significantly strengthened the popularity of the revolution, but at the same time made the government more suspicious of internal opposition and led to increased foreign policy security, particularly through rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In December 1961, Fidel Castro openly declared his Marxist-Leninist position, thus definitively situating Cuba geopolitically against the United States. The defeat of the invasion was celebrated internationally as the “first defeat of Yankee imperialism in Latin America” ​​and led directly to the Kennedy administration’s development of “Operation Mongoose,” a large-scale covert operation to destabilize and overthrow the regime, which we will explain in detail later:

“From a larger Latin American perspective, the Bay of Pigs is just one in a long, dreary list of US invasions and occupations of their countries, largely unknown in the United States itself. These include, since 1898, the numerous troop landings in Cuba; the lengthy occupations of Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala; counterinsurgencies and “low intensity conflicts” in Central America in the 1980s; and so on. The only thing that makes the Bay of Pigs unique is that the invasion did not succeed.” (Aviva Chomsky)[70]

1.2. Consolidation of the revolution

The Bay of Pigs victory not only represented a military rebuff to US intervention, but also marked a decisive moment in the consolidation of the revolution and the strengthening of Cuban nationalism. Broad sections of the population experienced this success as proof that the revolution was not only capable of asserting itself, but also represented a viable alternative to decades of dependence on the United States.

Groups within society that had previously relied on political or economic integration into Washington’s sphere of influence lost all social legitimacy and support.

In this context, the Second Declaration of Havana, published in February 1962, assumed central importance, as it explicitly placed the revolutionary process in a continental context, underscored the obligation to continue the revolution, and positioned Cuba symbolically and practically as the spearhead of Latin America’s anti-imperialist struggles:

“For many Latin Americans, the Bay of Pigs reinforced their ingrained belief that the United States could never be trusted; it showed that their northern neighbor was not as all-powerful as it had once seemed. The grip of geographic fatalism’, so long an embedded element in Latin Americas audook on the world, was broken. Political groups all over the continent now took Cuba seriously as a model and sought to follow the Cuban road, in the belief that the defeat of US imperialism was possible.” (Richard Gott)[71]

The rest of the world, which previously had little clear idea of ​​the actual support for the Castro government, now realized that the claims of the Cuban exile community were not true: the revolution was by no means doomed. Even with US support, the exiles had failed to transform their capital-based rejection of Castro into a broad, government-overthrowing movement.

Castro would stay. There is no concrete evidence of private discussions among the Soviet leadership, but they must have come to the same conclusion. While Castro had initially been viewed as an outsider, he now appeared as someone worth betting on.[72]

2. “Operation Mongoose”: Terror and Embargo

After the failed direct military invasion of the Bay of Pigs, about 400 CIA officials developed a plan to destabilize Cuba internally in order to break the revolution by separating its base:

“Four hundred CIA officers worked on Lansdale’s project in Washington and Miami. A presidential directive of November 1961, establishing the Mongoose project, declared that the United States would ‘help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and establish a new government with which the United States can live at peace. Lansdale presented an operational plan to the White House in January 1962 that called for ‘a six-phase effort to undermine Castro from within. His project was designed to conclude ‘with an open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime* in October 1962.” (Richard Gott)[73]

General Edward Lansdale, an experienced counterinsurgency specialist, took over the leadership of the project, which was under the close supervision of Robert Kennedy. A 1961 presidential decree stipulated that the project was to be completed by October 1962, after which an open insurrection would bring about the overthrow of the socialist regime by the end of 1962. Despite the deployment of over 400 CIA personnel in Washington and Miami, the results were initially modest:[74]

Even before the missile crisis, the president’s dissatisfaction with the slow progress became clear, the operation was officially (“in all but name”)[75]dissolved and transferred to a coordination committee.

In fact, however, the covert activities continued to intensify, which confirmed the impression of a continuing threat in Havana and contributed significantly to Castro’s decision to station Soviet missiles on Cuban territory:

“In April 1964 Johnson called for an end to sabotage raids. Johnson was later quoted as complaining that “we had been operating a damned Murder, Inc., in the Caribbean.” “Dean Rusk argued that sabotage had a “high noise level” and that it was too difficult to cover up US involvement. (Aviva Chomsky)[76]

Between 1960 and 1965, at least eight assassination plots against Castro can be proven, ranging from poisoned cigars and contaminated diving suits to collaboration with organized crime syndicates. The goal was to achieve political destabilization through the physical elimination of the revolutionary leader.

At the same time, extensive acts of sabotage were organized: sugar cane fields and refineries were set on fire, ships like the “La Coubre” were blown up in the port of Havana, and the El Encanto department store was burned down.[77]These interventions were intended not only to weaken the country’s material base but also to create a sense of permanent insecurity.

In Europe, too, attempts were made to subtly undermine Cuba’s economic infrastructure. Deliveries were sabotaged, machinery intended for export to Cuba was deliberately damaged or rendered unusable, and even ball-bearing manufacturers in Frankfurt received instructions to intentionally manufacture defective products.

In Miami, the CIA established a base of operations with a budget of millions, from where armed raids on oil refineries, industrial facilities and transport infrastructure were organized.

Exile groups such as Alpha 66 carried out attacks on hotels, merchant ships and Soviet military advisers, putting Cuba under both economic and military pressure.

Until October 1962, the strategy included repeated attempts to destroy the Matahambre copper mine:[78]

“The most important attempt was the failed attack at the Matahambre copper mine. A first attempt failed in late 1961 when technical problems prevented the boat carrying the commandos from arriving; the second attempt, in the summer of 1962, was met by a Cuban militia patrol and forced to flee. The third attempt, in October 1962, was also repelled by Cuban troops – on October 22nd, just as President Kennedy was announcing the presence of Soviet missiles on the island, and denying that Cuba could possibly have any need to defend itself from US aggression. One participant in the raid heard Kennedy’s speech from his boat off the shores of Pinar del Río, where he was waiting for two missing infiltrators to return.” (Aviva Chomsky)[79]

2.1 The embargo

The mainstay of US policy against Cuba was (and is) the embargo imposed in November 1960, which, in the guise of humanitarian responsibility, prohibited all shipments from the United States to Cuba, except for a few food and medicine items.

Aside from direct imports from the United States, the embargo still means that it is almost impossible for companies wishing to trade with Cuba to remain entirely outside the reach of the US authorities.

Any company that owns assets or business activities in the United States runs the risk of being subject to sanctions, including the confiscation of assets, if it does business with Cuba. In practice, this means that international corporations must regularly balance two markets: on the one hand, the United States with its hegemonic market and central role in the global financial system, and on the other, the small Caribbean island of Cuba with only eleven million inhabitants.

It is obvious and intentional that companies in this constellation almost without exception choose to access the US market:

Ships or aircraft docking in Cuba are barred from entering U.S. ports for a period of six months. Directors of such companies are barred from entering the U.S., and any assets are confiscated. Why would a company, regardless of its ownership structure, take the risk when the Cuban market is so small?

The US-dominated multilateral economic institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were similarly prevented from managing other trade opportunities by specific clauses of the embargo.[80]

It is still fundamentally possible for non-American companies to trade with Cuba despite the US embargo, even if this trade may be risky and complicated. Nevertheless, Spain and Canada are among Cuba’s most important trading partners today:

One example of how such trade is possible despite the restrictions is the “Havana Club Rum Company,” a joint venture between the French company Pernod Ricard and the Cuban company Cuba Ron SA. Cuban rum cannot be exported directly to the US market, which is why Bacardi produces rum for the US in Puerto Rico. Using US banks or US logistics for Cuban exports would be risky for Pernod Ricard, as the embargo could otherwise trigger secondary sanctions.

The risk of these “secondary sanctions” goes so far that airlines such as Air France or Iberia, which fly to Cuba, are not allowed to carry any aircraft parts from American companies on their aircraft.

Imagine this: A traditional Bavarian butcher, we’ll call him Markus, buys refrigeration compressors for his solar-powered cooling systems from Italy. The solar chips for these refrigeration compressors just happen to come from California. Our butcher then sells the chilled sausages to a market stall owner in Cuba. Markus’s butcher shop is now no longer allowed to transfer money in US dollars, is no longer allowed to transport his sausages by plane, which contains only a tiny US-made screw, and has to change the supplier of the sausage packaging because the color of that packaging is covered by a US patent.

Arch-reactionary media outlets, such as the libertarian Daily Economy, often attempt to attribute Cuba’s relative poverty to socialism, not the embargo; “the primary cause of Cuba’s poverty is its repressive socialist regime, with just 10 percent of the gap resulting from the trade embargo.” (Daily Economy)[81]

In these analyses (here using the example of the article cited above), the impact of secondary sanctions is almost always ignored: By relying exclusively on trade data and synthetic control groups, the authors override the reality of the capitalist global economy – the embargo not only acts as a bilateral barrier between Cuba and the USA, but exerts its real impact through the global financial and trade system, which is under US hegemony.

Banks, shipping companies, insurers and international corporations are withdrawing from trade with Cuba precisely because of economic rationality, namely the fear of repression by the strongest imperialist power.

The aim of the embargo was, and is, to worsen Cuba’s supply situation to such an extent that hunger, rationing, and economic setbacks created political discontent. Documents from this period openly speak of the desire to “keep bread out of the stores” in order to discredit the revolutionary process.

In addition to the economic consequences, the embargo also exacerbated diplomatic isolation, which culminated in Cuba’s exclusion from the Organization of American States in 1962 and increasingly isolated the revolutionary government on the international stage.

At the same time, encouraging emigration and targeted support for opposition groups served as a complementary means of weakening internal stability. The exodus was intended to paint a picture of a growing opposition, while dissident groups were provided with financial resources:

“The US government paid for the flights and provided a $100 dollar grant to each family. The total expenditure for the six-year period was $50 million and during that time 3,000 flights had brought more than a quarter of a million Cubans (260,561) into exile in the United States.68 By the end of the 1980s the total Cuban migration was close to a million, roughly 10 per cent of the population.” (Richard Gott)[82]

Throughout all these foreign policy attempts at isolation and starvation, the United States continued to routinely send sabotage teams to Cuba, which carried out terrorist attacks, assassination attempts, and acts of sabotage against key civilian industries—including the bombing of Cubana Flight 455 (1971), which killed 73 civilians. “Until September 11, 2001, the Cubana attack was the most devastating terrorist attack in aviation in the Western Hemisphere.” (LN)[83]

Since 1992, the UN General Assembly has introduced a resolution every year condemning the US embargo against Cuba. The overwhelming majority of member states regularly vote in favor (2023: 187 votes in favor, with only the US and Israel voting against).[84]Justification of the routine resolution: “The embargo contradicts fundamental principles of the UN Charter, in particular the prohibition of unilateral economic coercion and the obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states” (UN)[85].

The damage caused by the embargo, in pure monetary terms, amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion since its imposition (as of 2024) – roughly equivalent to Cuba’s GDP over 15 years.[86]

In the United Nations press release on the latest resolution against the embargo, the UN Press Center reports with Cuban Foreign Minister Parilla:

“Imperialism is warning the whole world that any nation daring to firmly defend its sovereignty and to build its own future will pay a price for that rebelliousness (…) The right to food is a human right,” he went on to say, adding that the accumulated cost of four months of economic blockade is equivalent to $1.6 billion. That amount would be enough to guarantee for an entire year the “delivery to all Cuban families a ration food basket”. With $12 million, Cuba could buy the insulin necessary to treat all its diabetic patients. The losses incurred by the blockade within a single day exceed that amount. “The United States government is perfectly aware of the direct and indirect impact that its policy has on the Cuban health system,” and the “consequences of incomplete treatments, delayed treatments and postponed surgeries,” he said.”[87]

2.2 Torricelli and Helms-Burton

Between 1960 and 1992, the embargo remained largely static and focused on directly blocking trade between US companies and Cuban state-owned enterprises.

The collapse of the socialist bloc, which until then had accounted for the vast majority of Cuban foreign trade, prompted the United States to significantly tighten the embargo with the Cuba Democracy Act (1992) and later the Helms-Burton Act (1996) in order to wear down Cuba in the context of the new world order.

The “Cuba Democracy Act,” also known as the “Torricelli Act,” strictly prohibited U.S. subsidiaries from trading with Cuba, introduced the “180-Day Rule,” which prohibited ships that had called at Cuban ports from entering U.S. ports for 180 days, prohibited U.S. citizens from sending money to their families in Cuba, and restricted the humanitarian exceptions that had previously allowed Cuba to obtain aid and medicines from U.S. companies.[88]

The initiator of the bill in the House of Representatives, Robert Torricelli, justified the tightening of the embargo with the aim of “[to] wreak havoc on that island”.[89]

A few years later, the Clinton administration finally tightened US policy towards Cuba with the Helms-Burton Act:

The law explicitly allowed U.S. citizens, including naturalized Cubans dispossessed after 1959, to sue for damages against foreign companies that used “confiscated property,” meaning virtually any piece of land, in Cuba. At the same time, it provided for visa denial and entry into the United States for managers and owners of these companies, as well as their family members.

The embargo, previously based on presidential decrees, was codified into law, preventing a president from unilaterally relaxing or lifting it. Sanctions against third countries were significantly expanded: foreign banks and companies trading with Cuba were openly threatened with exclusion from the US market, while at the same time, pressure on international financial institutions was increased to refuse to provide loans or assistance to Cuba.[90]

The Helms-Burton Act is not only completely illegal under international law, but also violates several US laws – in the legal drafting of the decree, Ariadna Cornelio Hitchman (et. al.) writes:

“From the point of view of American law, the act violates two core constitutional principles: the tri-partition of powers, by limiting the functions of the president in foreign policy and interfering with judicial powers; and the due-process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments […], rendering the Helms-Burton Act effectively unconstitutional. It also ignores the Doctrine of Act of State upheld by the Supreme Court, demonstrating a double standard for foreign countries […]. Additionally, the Helms-Burton Act contradicts principles of international law, including sovereign equality of States and self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter […].”[91]

The consequences for Cuba were devastating.

Between 1981 and 1984, Cuba recorded an average annual growth of 7.3 percent – a clear contrast to the general downward trend in Latin America, where gross domestic product fell by around 10 percent during this period.
Average per capita income rose to over $3,500 in 1986, while the regional average was about $2,200.

Life expectancy in the mid-1980s was around 74 to 75 years, child mortality under five years fell to about 20 per 1,000, and infant mortality was between six and eleven per 1,000 live births, less than, among others, the United States (15.19 at the beginning of the 1980s)[92].

With around 219 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants, Cuba already had one of the highest doctor densities in the world in 1986, and the country was also able to consolidate its progress in the field of education: illiteracy was only 3.8 percent at the end of the 1980s.

However, Cuba’s situation in the 1990s was to be fundamentally different from that in the 1980s – the “years of the fat cow” were over.

3. The disaster of the “special period”

With the collapse of the socialist bloc’s trade and aid relations, which had sustained the Cuban economy for three decades, Soviet and post-Soviet financing also collapsed: While it had averaged over five billion US dollars annually at the end of the 1980s, it fell to zero within a few years – an abrupt and almost complete decoupling from the previous international conditions of reproduction.

At the same time as the socialist bloc collapsed, the United States tightened the embargo to seize the moment to eradicate Cuban socialism (see above):

“The economic disaster that swept the country was the most dramatic and significant change since the island had first become a sugar-based economy in the wake of the revolution in Saint-Domingue in 1791. The island had received other jolts in earlier years – at the end of the independence war in the nineteenth century, during the world slump of the 1930s and at the time of the transformation to socialism in the 1960s – yet none could compare with its virtual collapse in the early 1990s.” (Richard Gott)[93]

The abrupt end of trade relations with Cuba between the post-Soviet states was not a law of nature that was obviously linked to the end of real socialism: Since the beginning of the glasnost policy, the United States had pressured Gorbachev to buy Cuban sugar at the world market price instead of the much higher friendly price in order to secure preferential deals with US companies.[94]

The Communist Party of Cuba had previously opposed the reform policies dictated by Moscow. At the PCC’s third congress (1986), the PCC decided not to join the reform course of European state socialism.[95]– for Cuba, a reform policy did not seem necessary either, Havana achieved far-reaching socialist successes until the end of the 1980s:

“In 1989, Cuba had the most collectivized, centralized, egalitarian, [but] externally dependent and Soviet-subsidized economy within the socialist camp” (ScienceDirect)[96]

The loss of this “big brother” led to an unprecedented economic collapse: trade collapsed by 80 percent, the economy probably even more than the officially reported 35 percent, import capacity shrank by 70 percent between 1989 and 1992, and the country suffered almost overnight from massive shortages of fuel, spare parts, and fertilizers, so that for the first time since the 19th century, Cuba was mentioned in the same breath as Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere:[97]

“Though unprepared for a calamity of this magnitude, the authorities rejected major economic reform, declaring instead the program of austerity and sacrifice known as the Special Period (período especial). In crisis, internally disrupted, and bereft of international partners, Cuban socialism now had to find new allies and adjust practices to face the competitive market realities and the tumultuous economic globalization of the last part of the twentieth century. Anticipation built. Viewing Cuba as the “Last bastion of revolutionary socialism, sympathizers applauded Cuba’s defiance of world trends.” (Mauricio A. Font)[98]

Faced with the collapse of trade relations and a lack of international partners, Cuba had to find new ways to adapt to the competitive conditions of the global market. The Fourth Congress of the PCC in 1991 approved initial measures: legalization of the US dollar, self-employment, farmers’ markets, the expansion of tourism, remittances from abroad, and joint ventures with foreign companies.

Following Lenin’s NEP, the share of state control in agriculture was reduced from 75 to 30 percent, and new cooperatives (UBPC) were granted permanent land use rights, autonomous decision-making powers, and the possibility of linking wages to productivity.[99]

Sugar production collapsed, while informal activities and small, privately run restaurants (“paladares”) proliferated. The state deliberately invited foreign investors into tourism and mining, while the population increasingly resorted to improvised, local survival strategies and the informal economy. As a result, sugar and agriculture lost their (absolutely) central role, and the service sector grew significantly.[100]

Cuban GDP shrank by 35 percent between 1989 and 1992, agricultural output by 47 percent, construction work by 74 percent, and productive capacity by 90 percent.[101]

The energy supply, which had previously relied on oil supplies from the Soviet Union, collapsed completely due to the impossibility of obtaining energy resources elsewhere, forced by the embargo.

Spare parts for machinery, chemicals for fertilizers, and medicines had to be procured on the world market – at exorbitant prices, as the supplying companies, on the one hand, factored in the risk of possible US sanctions and, on the other, exploited Cuba’s plight for their own profits.[102]

The social consequences of this transformation were significant, and income inequality, which had previously been well contained, exploded: While the ratio between the lowest and highest incomes had been around 5:1 before 1989, it grew to 829:1 in 1995 and reached a range of 12,500:1 in 2001, making the divide between those who had access to US dollars and the private sector and those who lived exclusively on state salaries obvious:[103]

“Cuban jokes reflected the economic distortions. A woman brought her husband, a renowned brain surgeon, into the psychiatric ward. “He’s hallucinating! He thinks that he got a job as a taxi driver and we’ve become rich! […] The government could no longer guarantee employment, even to young people who graduated with fine credentials. Before the 1990s, almost everyone who graduated received a job placement with their diploma. In 2001, only 72 percent did.” (Aviva Chomsky)[104]

In this context, phenomena that the revolution had overcome in the 1960s, such as prostitution and begging, resurfaced, reflecting a return to precarious survival strategies. Women were disproportionately affected, as they were forced to take on additional jobs to ensure the survival of their families, which revived old gender roles. Even among the younger generation, distance from the achievements of the revolution grew, perceived as less relevant to current contradictions, and there was a noticeable increase in cynicism and resignation.

In 1994, the US-sanctioned “migration crisis” reached a new level when the US government announced that Cubans attempting to enter Cuba without authorization (entry permits were de facto no longer being issued) would be taken to the US military base at Guantánamo Bay, where they—like Haitian migrants before them—were housed in makeshift camps. The goal of this artificially created “migration crisis” was to provoke a counterrevolution by those who were unable to leave the country due to the blockade of migration to the United States.

Average daily calorie intake fell by approximately 27% between 1990 and 1996[105]– Nevertheless, it is telling: Unlike, for example, in the DPRK, where the loss of the USSR as the most important trading partner brought with it massive famine, Cuba did not experience a massive crisis in the health sector or widespread famine – quite the opposite:

“Despite the economic collapse, Cuba’s child mortality rates actually dropped, and life expectancy inched up from 75 years in 1990 to 75.6 in 1999. Although an increase of six months may appear trivial, it would have been reasonable to expect a drop under the circumstances — something that did occur in ex-Communist European states like Russia, where life expectancy fell by 6 years between 1991 and 1994.” (Jacobin)[106]

Based on his research, Manuel Franco of Johns Hopkins University wrote in the Guardian in 2007:

“This is the first, and probably the only, natural experiment, born of unfortunate circumstances, where large effects on diabetes, cardiovascular disease and all-cause mortality have been related to sustained population-wide weight loss as a result of increased physical activity and reduced caloric intake.”[107]

Between 1997 and 2002, deaths from diabetes decreased by 51%, mortality from coronary heart disease by 35%, and stroke mortality by 20%.

The fact that a humanitarian crisis was avoided was based, on the one hand, on the fact that Cuba made its social security systems its top priority in the face of the crisis – the share of GDP spent on social and health spending rose by 29 percent between 1990 and 1994.[108]And secondly, the fact that the Cuban health and care system had already built up considerable resilience before the crisis, especially during the 1980s:

“Until the Special Period, the distribution system – along with other changes that increased food availability on and off the ration – contributed to a drastic shift in Cuba’s health profile. Instead of the malnutrition that had plagued the poor prior to the Revolution, the most common diet-related diseases became obesity, hypertension, heart disease, and diabetes. An informant explained to one health researcher what Cubans like to eat: “Meat!! We like to eat pork. Beans and rice of course. But here we cook the beans and rice with lard and oil too. Everything has to be fried – chicken, plantains, malanga, and potatoes. We eat lots of food with flour – bread, spaghetti, pizza, crackers… We use lots of salt and sugar in our food. And we don’t eat many vegetables or fruits. And then there is the alcohol and the sodas.”(Aviva Chomsky)[109]

3.1 New friends and a ray of hope

The first glimmers of hope from the disaster of the “Special Period” appeared in the mid-1990s: the number of international tourists rose from around 800,000 in 1993 to about 1.2 million in 1995, while income from joint ventures and foreign investments already accounted for about 15% of total exports between 1994 and 1996. Overall, real GDP is estimated to have grown by one to two percent per year between 1994 and 1996, marking the first phase of an economic recovery.

To generate foreign currency, Cuba began exporting its exceptionally resilient health sector; thus, Cuba began to extensively expand its “medical internationalism,” which is essentially free of charge for the receiving nation.

Thus, Cuba was able to gain not only foreign currency but also economic cooperation through its “doctor export”:

“This has become a key plank of Cuban foreign policy, directly challenging established notions of the medical profession and the function of development aid in the leading capitalist states. While Cuba does now receive payment for its medical assistance, its commitment to providing free healthcare abroad still endures: nearly half of the sixty-two countries that housed Cuban medical brigades in 2017 paid nothing for their services.” (Jacobin)[110]

For example, in Venezuela, where tens of thousands of Cuban doctors have been leading the “Barrio Adentro” mission since 1999 in exchange for cheap Venezuelan oil – an initiative by Hugo Chávez to provide free medical care to people in Venezuela’s poor neighborhoods – by 2012, the program had provided “500 million free medical consultations” (Amerika21).[111]

Venezuela thus became Cuba’s most important trading partner in the 1990s – the special trade relationship between the two countries is important in that without it, the end of the Cuban revolution might have been inevitable.

To Chavez’s (dubious![112]) death (2013) Fidel wrote:

“On the 5th of March, in the afternoon hours, died the best friend the Cuban people had in their history. We have the honor of having shared with the Bolivarian leader the same ideals of social justice and of support for the exploited”[113]

Richard Gott describes the relationship between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez as follows:

“He found a soulmate in neighboring Venezuela, establishing a close friendship with Colonel Hugo Chávez and sending 10,000 Cuban doctors to help out in the shanty towns. A guarantee of a regular supply to Cuba of Venezuelan oil was not the least of the advantages of this relationship.” (Richard Gott)[114]

In addition to Venezuela, Cuba expanded its trade relations with Iran, whose sanctions were also recently tightened:

“Looking further afield, he traveled in May 2001 to the home of Muslim fundamentalism in Tehran, to tell students at the university of his belief that ‘the imperialist king will fall’. He was assured by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that Iran and Cuba together could ‘overcome the United States’.” (Richard Gott)[115]

Besides Venezuela and China, Russia, Brazil, Canada and Spain are Cuba’s most important trading partners today.

With the new trading partners and reforms of the Special Period, the economy was able to recover from its downfall from 1995 onwards.

A little later (1998) the “Battle of Ideas” campaign began, the “largest mass mobilization ever to take place in Cuba”[116], which responded to the new contradictions of the (partial) liberalization of the Special Period:

“Fidel Castro lent his personal leadership and charisma to the insistence on the soundness of Cuban socialism—state control, emphasis on consciousness and ideas, and such forms of internationalism as barter transactions with Venezuela and other partners perceived as important political allies (Azicri, 2009). China and Vietnam had by then fully joined the embrace of market policies that fundamentally transformed socialism, but Cuban socialism would remain closely tied to the more traditional approach defended by its leaders.” (Mauricio A. Font)[117]

During this “battle of ideas,” nationwide, grassroots democratic discussions were held through the “Comités de Defensa de la Revolución” (see 4.1)), trade unions, and student federations on the wishes for the future development of the Cuban revolution, through whose decisions the reforms after the “Special Period” were decided (see 4.):

By 2001, in the spirit of “socialist reorientation”, 150 new “social plans” had been[118]enacted: Financial resources in the education sector were significantly expanded, teacher training was intensified, university lectures were broadcast on television and the number of students rose from 22% in 2000 to almost the entire age cohort by 2007.

Also in 2005, youth brigades were formed to combat the black market in fuel. The following year, similar brigades were mobilized to help expand and rehabilitate the country’s outdated energy supply system—a program that became known as the “Energy Revolution.”[119]

4. Democracy in Cuba

When Batista’s government was overthrown on January 1, 1959, not only did authoritarian rule collapse in Cuba, but a fundamental transformation of the political and social system also took place.

With the victory of the revolution, a new state emerged whose central goal was to transfer political and economic power to those who had previously been excluded, disenfranchised, and exploited: This marked a break with the old order, which was shaped not only by the domestic oligarchy but also significantly by the influence of US capital.

Fidel Castro summed up this change in his famous speech of April 16, 1961, when he declared that Cuba was not striving for a “democracy of the exploiters,” but rather a democracy “of the humble, by the humble, and for the humble.” This formulation reflects an understanding of democracy that is not based on the representation of formal equality in parliamentary structures, but rather on the active participation of the majority, which had previously been systematically excluded from social wealth.

Even before the new constitution came into force in 1976, a system had emerged in Cuba that went far beyond Western liberal forms of democracy. This system, known as “Poder Popular” (People’s Power), is based on a combination of elections, mass organizations, and continuous consultation.

While in capitalist democracies the participation of the population is usually limited to periodic electoral acts and political decisions are determined in the meantime by parliamentary committees, lobby groups and executives, Cuba developed a form of democracy that relies on permanent participation and collective decision-making. 

The electoral system itself is organized in three tiers. At the neighborhood level, regular assemblies are held (cf. CDR, see 4.1), in which residents discuss candidates deemed suitable based on their everyday practices, engagement, and proximity to the community. Each neighborhood can propose between two and eight candidates, who run in free and secret elections. A mandate requires at least 50 percent of the votes; otherwise, a runoff election takes place.

This is how the 169 local parliaments, which have a total of 14,500 members, are filled. The representatives serve unpaid, continue to work in their current jobs, and receive no additional salary or financial privileges. They are directly accountable to their constituents and can be recalled at any time if they lose confidence.

The next level is formed by the provincial parliaments and the National Assembly. Here, candidates are nominated partly by local assemblies and partly by the large mass organizations in which the majority of the population is organized: the trade unions, the women’s organization, the “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution” (see 4.1), the peasant associations, and student organizations.

These mass organizations have a dual function: They ensure that all social groups are represented, and they also serve as central sites for political education and discussion. They organize a social dialogue that goes far beyond elections and aims to enable as many people as possible to participate in the political process.[120]

The National Assembly, elected every five years, elects the Council of State and Ministers, as well as the head of state. It is endowed with extensive powers, including the ability to amend the constitution, adopt economic plans, and determine fundamental foreign policy issues. Its composition reflects broad representation of society: around 43 percent of the members are women, and one-third are not members of the Communist Party.[121]

This model gained particular importance during the “Special Period” (see 3.), which began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and plunged Cuba into a deep economic crisis. Between 1989 and 1993, economic output collapsed by more than a third, calorie intake fell dramatically, and at the same time, the United States tightened its blockade policy.

In this situation, the leadership decided not to implement fundamental reform measures without extensive consultations. Within the framework of the so-called “Workers’ Parliaments,” three million people in over 80,000 meetings discussed the necessary steps, including joint ventures with foreign capital, the approval of self-employment, and the reduction of subsidies. These debates made it clear that the political legitimacy of the Cuban system lay precisely in its ability to not only inform the population, even in times of crisis, but also to actively involve them in decision-making.

Democracy in Cuba thus understands itself as a process that involves not only institutional procedures but also the active shaping of social conditions by the majority. It is thus not conflict-free or static, but subject to constant change, which also includes adaptation to new conditions—be it through the constitutional debates of 2002, the economic updates of the 2010s, or the recent reforms under President Miguel Díaz-Canel.[122]

An ideal example of how Cuban democracy works is the 2019 constitutional reform: To draft this new constitution, which was intended to respond to Raul’s reforms and the tightened blockade under Trump, the National Assembly set up a separate commission, which published a first draft of the constitution by spring 2019:

“From August 13 to November 15, 2018, the draft constitution was discussed in approximately 135,000 meetings and forums across the island, and comments and proposed amendments were submitted. Cuban exiles abroad were also allowed to submit their proposals online.”[123]

At 135,000 assemblies, most of which were held in the CDR (see 4.1), around 90% of all Cubans participated in draft amendments, comprehensive criticisms, comments and adjustments, which were then voted on in the respective assembly.

“According to Arnaldo Tamayo, a member of the Cuban parliament for the municipality of Baracoa in the province of Guantánamo, the constitution will have more than 80 new articles. “Most of them relate to social rights and protections for the population, as well as social services,” Tamayo told Amerika21. It is important that the entire project be put up for debate, “so there are discussions with workers, peasants, students, women, and intellectuals.” In the course of this discussion process, it is very likely that the current draft text will be amended again, according to Tamayo, who became known as the first Latin American cosmonaut in 1978.”[124]

And indeed, several changes, including “the recognition of different forms of ownership, the strengthening of the autonomy of municipalities and term limits for leadership positions in the state apparatus”[125],as well as the opening of the constitution to “marriage for all” (which was decided shortly afterwards in an equally popular democratic process), were entered in the document.

When the final draft was finalized in February 2019 after almost four months of nationwide “public discussions,” it was put to a referendum, where…

“Around 6.8 million people, or 86.8 percent of voters […] supported the constitutional reform, according to the electoral commission in Havana.”[126]

4.1 CDR: “Revolution in every neighborhood!”

Perhaps the most significant and at the same time most misunderstood component of the Cuban revolution are the “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution” (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, CDR) – the institution that is perhaps more responsible than any other for the survival of Cuban socialism.

In this respect, they are not only an object of Cuban development, but also provide important insights into the failure of other socialist societies – and why Cuba survived.

The CDR is still considered the “heart of the revolution”; 8.5 million Cubans, or 92.6 percent of Cuban citizens with a minimum entry age of 14, are organized in one of the 779,000 committees.[127]

Founded immediately after the victory of the revolution, they served on the one hand as a means of revolutionary vigilance, and on the other hand, they took on central social tasks, such as organizing the first national vaccination campaign or supporting the literacy campaign:

“The Revolution called on everyone to participate in creating the new society. The CDR carried out the country’s first vaccination campaign, in 1962. They supported the implementation of the Literacy Campaign […] Groups of enthusiastic citizens went ahead and organized their own committees without much attention to procedural niceties. Like so many other institutions of the early years of the Revolution, the first CDR displayed more energy than order, more enthusiasm than discipline.” (Aviva Chomsky)[128]

One of the central tasks of the CDR is the political surveillance of the immediate neighborhood. Members carefully observe whether activities or behaviors occur that could potentially harm the Cuban revolution or the state and report suspicious incidents to the appropriate authorities of the local leadership.

However, the idea that the CDR are the “eyes and ears of the Communist Party of Cuba”, as stated in the corresponding Wikipedia entry, is far too simplistic, if not entirely incorrect.

It is true that the members of the CDR, those who actively and voluntarily commit themselves to the survival and development of the Cuban revolution, naturally keep an eye on opponents of that revolution—but nothing more. Defining the CDR as “surveillance institutions” is incorrect and based on anti-communist myths that the United States spread against Cuban popular democracy in the 1960s.

This “surveillance” is far more important in terms of (self-)awareness about neighborhood development, in order to work here, at the grassroots of the revolution. CDR member and expert Claudia Thalía Suárez Fernández wrote in this regard regarding the CDR’s role in combating drug-related crime in Granma:

“We CDRs have to deal with everything that affects a community, and illegality is part of that whole, so it’s our job to keep an eye on it as well. Take the issue of drugs, for example. There are people who are worried because we’re beginning to see a phenomenon that we weren’t aware of for a long time, or that was practically insignificant in our country compared to other regions of the world, but their concern is entirely justified, because drugs are a phenomenon that affects the entire world. We can’t allow someone to profit from such a vice at the expense of the safety, peace of mind, or health of our own family members. And where does the phenomenon of someone selling drugs occur? In a neighborhood, a block of flats, a community. So we are not uninvolved in this problem.”[129]

The CDRs play an active role in organizing community activities aimed at improving the living conditions and social development of the population, including blood drives, cleanliness campaigns, vaccination programs, and literacy courses.

The democratic dimension of the CDR is particularly evident in the involvement of members in neighborhood-level assemblies, where proposals for candidates for local political office are discussed and decided upon. These assemblies are open to the entire community and serve not only as a forum for discussion on local issues but also for the collective definition of common goals and activities.[130]

As specifically explained in Section 4, the CDR provide the space for grassroots democratic decision-making on key social reforms, such as the new 2019 constitution – but also provide space for neighborly exchange that goes far beyond politics.

Everyday life in a CDR

A typical day within a CDR often begins with assemblies or planning meetings, where the organization and execution of community activities are coordinated. Throughout the day, members engage in social services, such as providing neighborhood assistance to the elderly or providing security at public events.[131]

Regular meetings also provide a space for discussing current social and political issues and developing joint solutions. In the evenings or at scheduled times, members gather again to exchange experiences, reflect on the effectiveness of previous activities, and plan new projects:

“The CDR is a deeply political organization in a way that is underused [elsewhere] – in the sense that it is involved in real-world organizing and providing practical services to the local people […] The CDR, are explicitly political in the way the Black Panther Party’s breakfast program was a political act because it was a practical act of solidarity as well as the wellspring of profound revolutionary theory.” (Morning Star)[132]

In a Morning Star article, Lewis Hegwood describes his visit to a CDR celebration in spring 2022:

“As we saw that night, a CDR is many things: a CDR is a political engagement in a community, it is drinking, singing, eating and chatting with neighbors, it is a love of one’s community, a pride in one’s country and the help it gives to other countries, it is local kids shouting about football and superheroes, old men sounding off about politics, one guy at the back drinking slightly more than he should, and a community of talented musicians, organizers, caregivers and families.” (Morning Star)[133]

Following the example of the CDR, almost identical “Comités de Défense de la Révolution” were later founded in revolutionary Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara.

5. Current crisis

The Cuban economy is in a difficult situation despite its recent accession to the expanded BRICS alliance[134]in its most severe crisis since the 1990s: Since 2019, gross domestic product has fallen by a total of around eleven percent, with a further decline of 1.1 percent recorded in 2024 alone, while foreign exchange earnings collapsed by around thirty percent over the same period, significantly limiting the state’s ability to finance food, medicine, and fuel imports.[135]

This decline is particularly evident on the production side: agricultural production, livestock farming and mining have declined by over fifty percent within just a few years, while the manufacturing industry has seen a decline of almost a quarter.[136]

“The [Cuban economy] minister was quoted as saying that this year and last had been marked “by the intensified impact of the blockade, the fierce persecution of financial flows, and barriers to international transactions that have hindered payments to suppliers.” (Reuters)[137]

At the same time, financial instability was exacerbated by persistently high inflation and the devaluation of the Cuban peso, whose official exchange rate was still fixed by the government in 2024, but whose black market value fell to around 365 pesos per US dollar by spring 2025, massively undermining the purchasing power of the population and further complicating the import of urgently needed goods:

“Monreal believes that the impact of the category “food and non-alcoholic beverages” on total inflation was over 50% during most of 2023 and 2024, highlighting the vulnerability of the Cuban market to shortages and rising prices of basic goods.” (Cibercuba)[138]

Added to this is a profound energy crisis caused by the deterioration of outdated infrastructure and the decline in oil supplies from Venezuela and Mexico. While in previous years the two countries supplied Cuba with an average of 55,000 barrels of oil per day, this amount has fallen by more than 30 percent since 2023, leading to daily power deficits of over 1,200 megawatts in 2024 and blackouts of up to 18 hours.[139]

Although Russia has pledged to supply around 1.6 million tons of oil annually and to provide technical support for the expansion of energy and agricultural infrastructure, this assistance has so far not been sufficient to close the supply gaps.

Cuba’s dependence on imports further exacerbates its structural fragility, as more than sixty percent of its food and over half of its oil needs must be sourced from abroad, while at the same time, due to the embargo, it lacks hard currency. While close relations exist with BRICS countries such as China, Russia, and Brazil, their trade volumes predominantly fluctuate in the range of one to two billion US dollars annually, which, given the scale of the crisis, does not allow for substantial stabilization.

While BRICS membership opens up long-term prospects, for example through easier access to loans from the New Development Bank, the expansion of bilateral investments, or the possibility of conducting trade transactions in national currencies, these are processes that require longer-term implementation and therefore provide little immediate relief from the current crisis.

The combination of US sanctions, exacerbated by secondary sanctions against third-country companies (see 2.1), the absence of stable foreign exchange earnings, the dilapidated infrastructure and the structural deficits of the domestic economy means that BRICS accession has so far failed to bring about any noticeable improvement in the overall economic situation.

The tightening of the US embargo on medicines from third countries in January of this year has recently led to a drastic deterioration in healthcare:

“Only 30 percent of the basic range of medications is available, and pharmacies only have 32 percent of the required medications in stock. Antibiotics are particularly scarce. Health Minister Portal Miranda criticized the US economic blockade in this context, which makes it difficult to acquire medical products. Infant mortality rose to 8.2 per 1,000 live births (2024: 7.4). Maternal mortality climbed to 56.3 per 100,000 births (2024: 37.4).” (Cubaheute)[140]

The same tightening of the embargo that again made it impossible for US citizens to travel to Cuba led to a 6 percent decline in tourism, down to just 71 percent of the planned level.[141]

The decline in tourism, combined with the energy crisis, which Cuba’s National Assembly recently described as “Cuba’s most pressing problem,” had a dramatic impact on the transport sector in the first half of this year:

“By April, 894 million passengers had been transported nationwide, 32 percent fewer than planned and 114 million fewer than in the same period in 2024. The situation is particularly difficult for local bus services, which are 65 percent below target. There is no immediate relief in sight.” (Cubaheute)[142]

5.1 A way out of the crisis

The Cuban government is attempting to address the economic crisis primarily through a comprehensive macroeconomic stabilization program, which has been revised several times since the end of 2023 and aims to eliminate structural distortions:

“As Finance Minister Vladimir Regueiro Ale reported, efforts toward macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal consolidation are beginning to bear fruit: The budget deficit declined significantly last year – from 10.9 percent (2023) to 6.5 percent (2024) of GDP. The ratio of expenditures to revenues is moving toward a healthier balance, which has reduced the need for new debt and favored a decline in inflation.” (Cubaheute)[143]

Key elements include the expansion of partial dollarization with the goal of eventual de-dollarization, the creation of closed foreign exchange circuits, including in the agricultural sector, and the introduction of a flexible exchange rate to facilitate access to foreign currency for all economic actors. This will be accompanied by the expansion of cashless payment methods, while price caps for basic foodstuffs will be maintained.

At the same time, the attractiveness of foreign investment is to be increased through accelerated approval procedures, less bureaucracy and new opportunities such as “100 percent foreign tourism operations”.[144]increased, while in agriculture investors are to be granted real rights of use, including the employment of workers, for the first time.

At the institutional level, a far-reaching reform of company law and the strengthening of the autonomy of state-owned enterprises are planned, complemented by the establishment of a new institute for state-owned enterprises, a unified wage policy and the dismantling of bloated management structures.

At the same time, legal foundations for joint ventures between public and private actors will be created and approval processes for private companies will be decentralized, thereby expanding the scope of action of municipalities; they will also be able to establish new agro-industrial structures to secure food supplies and consolidate existing local development projects.[145]

Further measures include the full allocation of foreign exchange earnings from health services to the Ministry of Health, the selective use of financial instruments such as swap transactions, the expansion of opportunities to receive foreign remittances, and the reduction of social inequalities.

These economic steps are accompanied by a series of legal reforms, including the adoption of a new company law, a modern children and youth law, a first sports law, the reform of civil status law, and an update of the administrative offense law.

In terms of foreign policy,…

“The growing aggression of the US government […] requires a clear focus on the defense of independence, the revolution, and socialism,” Rodríguez said. He cited the US economic blockade, which has existed for over six decades, and the renewed designation of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism” by the Trump administration as key challenges. Both measures contribute significantly to “suffering and hardship in Cuban families.” One focus, Rodríguez said, is on opening up new opportunities for “exports, imports, investments, financial relations, and international cooperation.” The participation of Cuban delegations in international forums and bilateral visits serves to purposefully deepen economic ties. Cuba also wants to expand its leadership role in alliances in the Global South—especially the Group of 77 plus China and the Non-Aligned Movement. (Cubaheute)[146]

By July of this year, the reforms had already shown initial positive effects: budget consolidation and tax reforms have significantly reduced the deficit, contributing to a much more stable financial situation.

The increase in tax revenues and tighter control of expenditures have strengthened the public budget, and for the first time in over a decade (!) the state’s current account shows a positive balance.

6. Achievements of Cuba

As we have now explained, the material conditions in Cuba are and have been characterized by targeted and precise sabotage – virtually unchanged since 1960 and 1992, respectively. It is precisely because of socialism in Cuba that the massive consequences of sabotage, from embargo and isolation to terror, are cushioned for the people of Cuba.

No one claims that life in Cuba is better than the life of a middle-class German—and how could they? A state that reproduces itself without capital exports and exploitation of the global South, confronted by the most dramatic embargo in modern history and excluded from any possibility of global trade—all while the material conditions of its revolutionary transformation were not those of a colonial power, but those of a colonized power.

It is precisely for this reason, in the spirit of Rose Luxemburg, “despite everything,” that the Cuban system, with its adaptability, lived solidarity both internally and externally, and incredible resilience, represents such a significant milestone in social development.

The prime comparison is that between Cuba and Haiti – both share a colonial legacy of plantation farming, exploitation, and corrupt revolution – but while Haiti remained trapped in perpetual poverty through imperialism, interventions, and US-funded dictatorships (Duvalier), Cuba broke with this model at the cost of isolation. Today, the average woman in Haiti lives 13 years less than in Cuba, is 38% less literate, has a 119% higher probability of contracting HIV and a 1763% higher chance of dying from tuberculosis, and has barely one-fortieth the chance of finding a doctor for treatment as in Cuba:[147]

“I talked to a guy in Havana who says to me “All I used to see here in Havana, you call this drab and dull, we see it as a cleaner city. It’s true, the paint is peeling off the walls, but you don’t see kids begging in the streets anymore and you don’t see prostitutes.” Prostitution used to be one of the biggest industries. And today this man is going to night school. I can read, do you know what it means to be able to read? “Do you know what it means to be able not to read?” (Michael Parenti)[148]

The 1961 national literacy campaign, which mobilized some 250,000 people from the cities—including about 100,000 students—to teach the rural population to read and write, brought Cuba, at 99%, one of the highest literacy rates in the world and by far the highest in Latin America.

“Cuba has one of the highest doctor-per-capita ratios in the world, with approximately 8.4 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants. By comparison, the US has 2.6 and Italy 4.1. […] Cuba spends 23% of its national budget on health and 30% on education. At the same time, the country’s international medical aid services account for 46% of Cuban exports and 6% of GDP (in 2019 alone). This mechanism has brought outstanding success to the Caribbean island nation’s health sector.”[149]

With the revolution, the Black population, for the first time, gained universal access to education, employment, sports, and housing in formerly exclusive neighborhoods. Fidel Castro’s “Proclamation Against Discrimination” abolished institutional barriers and recognized Afro-Cuban culture as part of the national identity. Women benefited from the expansion of daycare centers and programs that integrated formerly marginalized women into productive roles. Afro-Cuban culture was democratized. The 1962 National Folklore Conjunto (National Folklore Conjunto) promoted Afro-Cuban music and dance, thus reviving local traditions previously considered “low.”

It is precisely socialism in Cuba that protects and protects the people from the otherwise fatal consequences of the embargo:

Only recently, during the massive economic crisis (see 5.), the minimum pension was doubled from 1528 to 3056 pesos – 438,572 Cuban pensioners benefit from this.[150]
At the same time, the export of medical services is being expanded further; currently, 24,000 Cuban doctors are deployed abroad – hundreds of millions of people worldwide have benefited from these missions without ever having to pay a cent.

It’s difficult not to romanticize Cuban development and dogmatize our positive attitude toward it. And with this article, we have made every effort not to do so, and to examine Cuban development and its conditions according to objective standards (to the extent that such standards exist). Therefore, we ask that you excuse the following as a romantic slip-up:

“There is often talk of human rights, but it is also necessary to speak of the rights of humanity. Why should some people walk around barefoot so that others can travel in luxurious automobiles? Why should some live for 35 years so that others can live for 70? Why should some be miserably poor so that others can be overly rich? I speak in the name of the children in the world who do not have a piece of bread. I speak in the name of the sick who do not have medicine. I speak on behalf of those whose right to life and human dignity has been denied. What is the use of man’s conscience? (Fidel Castro)

---

[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npkeecCErQc

[2]https://www.counterpunch.org/2006/05/19/letter-to-manuel-mercado/

[3]https://www.us-history.com/pages/h147.html

[4]https://tocororocubano.com/el-grito-de-baire-y-el-24-de-febrero-de-1895-inicio-de-la-guerra-necesaria/

[5]https://www.mgar.net/cuba/weyler2.htm

[6]https://hackneybooks.co.uk/books/337/562/MontecristiManifesto.html

[7]https://hackneybooks.co.uk/books/337/562/MontecristiManifesto.html

[8]https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/1898/Baltimore-Sun-3-24-1898-2.bmp

[9]https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/reconcentrado.htm

[10]https://idw-online.de/en/event37849

[11]Rockoff, Hugh. 2012. America’s Economic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War. New Approaches to Economic and Social History. New York: Routledge, 83.

[12]https://www.pbs.org/crucible/frames/_journalism.html

[13]Rockoff, Hugh. 2012. America’s Economic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War. New Approaches to Economic and Social History. New York: Routledge, 16.

[14] http://kpd-ml.org/doc/lenin/LW22.pdf, p.349

[15]https://www.grin.com/document/95601?srsltid=AfmBOor2btdcOEhizcB2aRxc44iPWMgKXswEz2sHU57ev2N_P-gQN8TQ

[16]https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2019/12/Spring-1973-Adams-and-Cortada.pdf

[17]https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2019/12/Spring-1973-Adams-and-Cortada.pdf

[18]https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kuba-und-die-usa-woher-die-feindschaft-zwischen-kuba-und-den-usa-kommt-1.2917128

[19]https://web.archive.org/web/20100516062344/http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/bartolome_maso.html

[20]https://books.google.co.th/books?id=LRmj4wHv-kIC&pg=PA98&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

[21]http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/race/RaceWar1.htm

[22]http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/race/RaceWar1.htm

[23]https://original-ufdc.uflib.ufl.edu/UF00029010/01960

[24]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 141.

[25]https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/kuba-despot-batista-freiheitskaempfer-mit-folterkammer-a-947510.html

[26]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 142.

[27]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 141.

[28] https://teresa.cce.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/In-Place-Part-Five.pdf

[29]Fernandez, Frank. 2001. Cuban Anarchism: The History of a Movement. Tucson, AZ: Sharp Press, 94.

[30]Fernandez, Frank. 2001. Cuban Anarchism: The History of a Movement. Tucson, AZ: Sharp Press, 94.

[31]Fernandez, Frank. 2001. Cuban Anarchism: The History of a Movement. Tucson, AZ: Sharp Press, 95.

[32]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 145.

[33]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 760.

[34]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 855.

[35]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 146.

[36]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 783.

[37]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 146.

[38]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 855.

[39]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 146.

[40]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 140 ff., 144 ff.

[41]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 149.

[42]https://amerika21.de/dokument/265054/castro-geschichte-wird-mich-freisprechen

[43]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 156.

[44]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 150 ff., 157 ff.

[45]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 140 ff., 111 ff.

[46]https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/kuba-despot-batista-freiheitskaempfer-mit-folterkammer-a-947510.html

[47]Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper & Row, 901.

[48]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 173.

[49]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 103.

[50]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 164.

[51]https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/kuba-despot-batista-freiheitskaempfer-mit-folterkammer-a-947510.html

[52]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 167 f.

[53]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 166.

[54]http://www.cubanews.acn.cu/cuba/17026-the-strike-of-april-9-brought-final-victory-closer

[55]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 147 ff.

[56]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 131.

[57]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 147 ff.

[58]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 147 ff.

[59]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 328 ff.

[60]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 150.

[61]Cushion, Stephen. 2016. A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 15.

[62]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 165.

[63]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 164.

[64]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 37.

[65]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 34.

[66]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 106.

[67]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 54.

[68]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 193.

[69]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 50 ff.

[70]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 53.

[71]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 191.

[72]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 191.

[73]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 194.

[74]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 195.

[75]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 64.

[76]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 64.

[77]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 58.

[78]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 58 ff.

[79]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 60.

[80]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 197.

[81]https://thedailyeconomy.org/article/socialism-not-the-embargo-explains-nearly-all-of-cubas-poverty/

[82]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 214.

[83]https://lateinamerika-nachrichten.de/artikel/kubas-staatsfeind-nr-1/

[84]https://amerika21.de/2023/11/266656/un-fordert-ende-der-us-edgblockade

[85]https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12650.doc.htm

[86]https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12650.doc.htm

[87]https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12650.doc.htm

[88]https://www.baltimoresun.com/1994/08/30/the-politics-behind-clintons-cuba-policy/

[89]https://www.baltimoresun.com/1994/08/30/the-politics-behind-clintons-cuba-policy/

[90]https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/intejcubastud.16.1.0058

[91]https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/intejcubastud.16.1.0058

[92]https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/752863/umfrage/kindersterblichkeit-in-den-usa/

[93]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 284.

[94]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 287 ff.

[95]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 36.

[96]https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X98000205

[97]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 36.

[98]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 36

[99]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 32.

[100]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 36.

[101]https://jacobin.com/2021/01/we-are-cuba-review-socialism-soviet-union

[102]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 138 ff.

[103]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 121.

[104]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 121.

[105]Data vary by study; https://www.academia.edu/965534/THINGS_BECAME_SCARCE_FOOD_AVAILABILITY_AND_ACCESSIBILITY_IN_SANTIAGO_de_CUBA_THEN_AND_NOW

[106]https://jacobin.com/2021/01/we-are-cuba-review-socialism-soviet-union

[107]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/27/cuba.international

[108]https://jacobin.com/2021/01/we-are-cuba-review-socialism-soviet-union

[109]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 138 ff.

[110]https://jacobin.com/2021/01/we-are-cuba-review-socialism-soviet-union

[111]https://amerika21.de/meldung/2012/04/51893/neun-jahre-barrio-adentro

[112]https://amerika21.de/analyse/153105/seltsamer-tod-chavez

[113]https://www.reuters.com/article/world/with-death-of-chavez-castro-says-cuba-has-lost-its-best-friend-idUSBRE92A0FU/

[114]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 338.

[115]God, Richard. 2005. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 338.

[116]http://www.cubanews.acn.cu/cuba/19704-battle-of-ideas-the-largest-mass-mobilization-ever-to-take-place-in-cuba

[117]Font, Mauricio A., and Carlos Riobó, eds. 2013. Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society, and Globalization. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 36.

[118]https://cubasi.cu/en/news/cuba-and-permanent-battle-ideas

[119]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 153.

[120]https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/cuba-democracy

[121]https://www.sdaj.org/2021/07/26/kubas-politisches-system/

[122]Information from the section:
https://www.sdaj.org/2021/07/26/kubas-politisches-system/
https://www.liberationschool.org/ch-14-workers-democracy-in-cuba/
https://amerika21.de/dokument/204765/kubas-revolutionaere-demokratie
https://lateinamerika-nachrichten.de/artikel/ein-ja-zu-mehr-vielfalt/

[123]https://www.kas.de/de/laenderberichte/detail/-/content/verfassungsreform-in-kuba

[124]https://amerika21.de/2018/08/209951/kuba-verfassung-reform-lesung

[125]https://amerika21.de/2019/04/225063/kuba-neue-verfassung

[126]https://www.dw.com/de/klare-majorheit-f%C3%BCr-neue-verfassung-in-kuba/a-47687827

[127]https://www.granma.co.cu/2013/03/14/pdf/todas.pdf

[128]Chomsky, Aviva. 2010. A History of the Cuban Revolution. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 42.

[129]https://de.granma.cu/cuba/2024-05-08/womit-beschaftigen-sich-die-komitees-zur-verteidigung-der-revolution-heute

[130] https://de.granma.cu/cuba/2024-05-08/womit-beschaftigen-sich-die-komitees-zur-verteidigung-der-revolution-heute

[131] https://cubaheute.de/2012/09/13/erneuerung-der-CDR-eine-politische-aufgabe-in-kuba/

[132]https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/cuba-committees-defence-revolution-up-close

[133]https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/cuba-committees-defence-revolution-up-close

[134]https://worldcrunch.com/business-finance/cuba-joins-brics-trump/

[135]https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-07-17-u1-e135253-s27061-nid307205-escenario-desolador-gobierno-admite-economia-cubana

[136]https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cuban-economy-continues-five-year-decline-economy-minister-says-2025-07-14/?

[137]https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cuban-economy-continues-five-year-decline-economy-minister-says-2025-07-14/?

[138]https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-02-24-u1-e199370-s27061-nid297697-inflacion-dispara-cuba-2025?utm_

[139]https://horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu/news/cuba-ten-consecutive-years-macroeconomic-deterioration/

[140]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[141]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[142]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[143]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[144]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[145]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[146]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/

[147]https://www.laenderdaten.info/laendervergleich.php?country1=CUB&country2=HTI

[148]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNu13KEfqN8&t=744s

[149]https://www.vietnam.vn/de/thay-gi-o-quoc-gia-co-he-thong-y-te-tot-nhat-the-gioi

[150]https://cubaheute.de/2025/07/18/erneute-waehrungsreform-kuba-parlament-zur-lage-der-nation/