Part 7: On the Role of the Party

Part 7: On the Role of the Party

The most common arguments from the far-left and market dogmatists to deny the CPC’s communist
character are based on misunderstandings or ignorance regarding the explained PDRUÖ.
Democratic centralism, criticism and self-criticism, management over production (within the framework of the
PDRUÖ), all these factors are present in the CPC, i.e., the PRC.
To claim that China has turned into a capitalist state demonstrates a lack of understanding of
socialism itself.
Socialism is not a fixed entity: The core of socialism, which is dialectical materialism, specifically means that socialism
in a semi-feudal country like China in 1949 follows a different path than Marx envisioned in 1848 for the industrialized Germany.
If one subscribes to Trotskyist criticism of state capitalism, or the left-liberal critique of
Totalitarianism, then yes – China is a state-capitalist dictatorship.
But: “Have they ever seen a revolution, gentlemen? A revolution is certainly the most
authoritarian thing there is, an act where part of the population imposes its will on the other
part through guns, bayonets, and cannons—very authoritarian means; and the party
that has won must maintain its rule through the terror that its weapons inspire in the reactionaries.”

For the far-left and the left-liberals, every revolution and every form of socialism is good, except for the ones that
really happen.
Isn’t that the most idealistic idea of all?
How can a Marxist call themselves such and then fail to understand that the
relations of production cannot develop differently than the means of production?
I have not yet heard a single argument against the CPC that does not originate from Eurocentrism,
ignorance, or idealism.
And I am not talking about critique; the CPC is open to criticism in all possible aspects!
But that is also encouraged: all 98.04 million CPC members are called upon to express criticism
and self-criticism of both themselves, the party, and their fellow party members – criticism
and self-criticism are statutes of the party and are practiced at all levels.
But private companies seem to have the upper hand – no!
The entire (!) land in China is state-owned, as well as all key sectors of the economy
(energy, construction, infrastructure, telecommunications, raw materials, mining, and large parts of
industry). In 2015, among the 500 largest companies worldwide, 97 were Chinese conglomerates –
82 of which were state-owned!
On the one hand, the Chinese state always holds majority shares in every state-owned holding and thus
not only has formal ownership rights but also the power to set long-term frameworks for individual companies.
Initially, the leadership of these state-owned enterprises was inconsistent due to various state
interest groups (from the central government to local authorities).
However, this situation changed in 2003 with the founding of the “State Assets Management and
Control Commission” (SASAC), which is directly subordinate to the State Council and has centralized control over
all state assets.

All strategic decisions of state-owned enterprises, from closures to mergers,
business orientation, and appointments of leadership, must be approved by SASAC.
While the state plays a key role in decision-making, operational leadership of state-owned enterprises
lies in the hands of party officials.
In all state enterprises, there are party groups responsible for staffing management.
Every leadership decision must first be approved by the party group, which works closely
with the next higher party level.
70% of foreign companies and 52% of domestic private companies also tolerate
party collectives within their operations; why? Because the CPC, through its state corporations, possesses most
economic power in the PRC, and with the approval of party cadres for control over production,
even private companies are certified for state contracts.
The first party secretary of a state enterprise is always also the CEO.
It is important to note that state-owned companies, contrary to earlier false claims,
are not “sold” at low prices to individual managers in a trustee-like manner (or even
“given away”).
Instead, they are subject to dual control, both by the state as the largest shareholder via SASAC and by party cadres in operational leadership.
However, these positions are not lifetime appointments but are rotated regularly
to counteract corruption risks.
Since 2017, i.e., after the end of the first phase of socialist construction, state-owned
companies are also required to return 30% of their profits directly to the state to advance the development of social systems for the second phase of socialist development.

Graphic: Development of the Gini coefficient in China, 2004-2021

The further expansion of social systems already leads to massive improvements in social inequality.
During the 1990s, i.e., during the initially chaotic economic policies under Jiang Zemin and the contradictions arising from
the further unleashing of the market, social inequality reached its highest point since the founding of the PRC.
However, since around 2008, the CPC has managed not only to halt the rising trend of the Gini coefficient but also to
rapidly reduce it from 2008 onward.

Conclusion: As Left as Never Before

The question of whether China is socialist can only be answered through examination and analysis of the development of
Chinese socialism; we have now (roughly) done this and have worked out
why the answer to the question about the Chinese system is socialism!
If one does not recognize China as a socialist country, one is either unfamiliar with the works of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin; a market dogmatist; or unable to understand why socialism, given the material conditions in a semi-feudal underdeveloped state
develops differently than Marx envisioned for highly developed Germany in 1848.
The contradiction between the development of the means of production and the relations of production is the
core contradiction during socialist construction, which has been addressed from the ground up in China since the PRC’s founding.
Marxists from Marx through Lenin and Stalin to Rosa Luxemburg agreed (albeit not perfectly, but as is known, Marxists rarely do); the law of value is necessary in the context of socialist construction alongside planned economy, since
objective valuation of value is only possible under conditions where the socialist principle of “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” already applies.
So if one recognizes Lenin’s USSR during the NEP as socialist, accepts Marx’s critique of the Gotha Program as socialist, and genuinely cares about human liberation,
one stands in solidarity with the Chinese path and its achievements.