2. “Your turn, Doctor
2. “Your turn, Doctor”
The Syrian civil war, whose interests are represented there, and how Rojava was able to establish itself.
This is part 2 of the series “Syria & Everything revolving around Rojava”.
In 2011, it was no surprise when graffiti hostile to Assad by some youths in Daraa, and their subsequent torture, carried the spirit of revolution to the other states of the Arab Spring into Syria.
By 2012, the “Syria Revolution,” which largely focused on bourgeois (yet progressive) democratic and social state concerns, brought hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets.
The subsequent civil war caused about 500,000 deaths and the largest refugee movement since the Rwandan genocide.
The Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, the party of the Democratic Union (PYD), initially pursued a tactic during the beginning of the Syrian revolution aimed primarily at avoiding direct conflict with Assad’s Syria.
It is suspected that this conflict-avoidant relationship of the PYD with Assad was the reason for the unexpected withdrawal of Syrian troops from Kurdish areas in North Syria in 2012.
By avoiding confrontation with Assad, the PYD was able to prepare grassroots democratic council structures for self-administration in Kurdish areas years earlier, although these remained initially covert.
The subsequent power vacuum in West Kurdistan (North Syria), combined with the PYD’s prior establishment as a popular Kurdish party in North Syria, enabled the PYD to de facto take power in July 2012.
The secret council structures in North Syria could now be made public due to Assad’s army’s withdrawal.
The further tactic of “Not stepping on anyone’s toes for now” allowed the Kurdish regions to experience relatively few clashes compared to the rest of the country, and to maintain conflict-free pragmatic relations with both Assad and the Syrian opposition.
At the end of 2011, the TEV-DEM (Zaw’o d’Kensho Demoqraṭoyo, Movement for a Democratic Society) was founded to support the further organization of the Kurdish population in North Syria.
The withdrawal of Assad’s troops gave Kurdish self-administration structures the opportunity from mid-2012 to gain control over three geographically separated areas: the cantons of Kobanê, Efrîn, and Cizîrê.
Although these areas were not connected, TEV-DEM succeeded in establishing self-governance structures in all three cantons and creating a coordinated foundation.
TEV-DEM managed to maintain infrastructure related to food supply and electricity, and to expand council structures in towns and villages.
In summer 2012, the first serious clashes occurred between the Kurdish areas and Turkey, as Turkish-financed rebels attempted, among other things, to infiltrate opposition Kurdish parties in North Syria to undermine the project of self-governance.
In response, the PYD temporarily centralized power and officially founded the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defense Units, YPG), which from then on was tasked with defending Kurdish autonomy.
The YPG’s formation was part of a de facto non-aggression pact with the Syrian government, which aimed to welcome the YPG as a friendly militia.
However, the YPG was never a party-affiliated army and functioned from the beginning as an internally democratic, party-independent organization outside the PYD.
Alongside the YPG, in 2012, the Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women’s Defense Units, YPJ) was established.
The proportion of women within the YPG is about 40%, totaling roughly 50,000 fighters.
The creation of a subordinate combat unit exclusively for women is based on the concept introduced in Part 1, viewing women as bearers of an extraordinarily endangered role in the face of capitalist and fascist aggression.
Participating is everything
The Syrian revolution saw all regional forces engaged in a struggle for dominance over Syria’s future.
Iran and Russia supported Assad, while the USA, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported the opposition.
In 2016, Turkey intervened militarily against the formation of Rojava.
The major imperialist powers of the world viewed Syria as a geopolitical playground for resource-rich regional dominance.
More than other conflicts in the region, the Syrian civil war was shaped by internal and external contradictions, a fact reflected in the often confusing alliances:
Assad has been and continues to be heavily supported by Russia and Iran, along with their allied groups.
Russia has conducted airstrikes since 2015, supplied weapons, and secured strategic bases, while Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Shiite militias, and logistical support backed Assad.
Hezbollah has fought alongside Assad since 2013 but primarily pursues its own interests of securing weapons supplies in its fight against Israel.
The opposition, initially represented by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), was supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan. Turkey later intervened directly, mainly to suppress Kurdish autonomy in Rojava and secure its geopolitical interests in North Syria.
The USA supported opposition groups and later focused on fighting ISIS by backing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the YPG.
The SDF was founded in 2015 in response to the ISIS threat and comprises the People’s Protection Units, Sunni-Arab forces, the Christian Assyrian-Aramaic Military Council of the Suryoye, and the Kurdish-Turkman Katāʾib Shams asch-Shimāl.
US support for the YPG was initially aimed at securing North Syria’s dependence on US imperialism, allowing the USA to expand its influence within Kurdistan.
It is clear that American support for Kurdish forces was not driven by any emancipatory intentions:
The YPG (or SDF) merely served as ground troops for the US-led air coalition fighting ISIS.
Additionally, US intervention aimed to prevent any land connection between Iran and its allies, Assad and Hezbollah.
The USA was willing to allow the YPG to conquer significant parts of Syria and establish the Rojava state.
Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and ISIS received partial funding from private networks in the Gulf states; the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS) also received support from Turkey.
Israel attacked positions of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria to curb their influence, especially regarding support for Palestinian resistance.
France, the UK, and Germany participated in the anti-ISIS coalition—almost absurd, considering that the “Coalition of the Willing” intervention in Iraq ten years earlier had created the power vacuum that allowed ISIS to emerge.
The Islamic State
Within the Syrian opposition, Islamist movements gained importance from the beginning of the civil war.
With Turkish support, Al-Nusra Front (the Syrian al-Qaeda) emerged as a more or less independent force and launched attacks on the city of Serêkaniyê in late 2012.
The successful resistance of the YPG against Islamist forces in Serêkaniyê was their first of its kind and strengthened the YPG as a legitimate defense army for the people in the newly established Rojava.
In 2013, the Al-Nusra Front merged with ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq), and adopted the new name “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL or ISIS).
ISIS was able to seize several major cities through radical actions and incredible violence within the fragile state framework, including Raqqa, Al-Bab, and Jārābulus—all in Rojava.
The rapidly collapsing Syrian monopoly on violence allowed ISIS to take over large parts of Syria and Rojava with incredible speed.
By October 2014, ISIS controlled about half of the entire Syrian and Kurdish territory (after declaring the caliphate in 2014, it was called “IS”).
By January 2015, ISIS’s assets amounted to roughly two billion dollars, with daily revenues of several million US dollars (up to around 3 million dollars daily from selling Kurdish oil before the oil fields were bombed).
The Battle of Kobanê
In September 2014, ISIS launched its large-scale attack on Kobanê, East-Rojava.
The “Battle of Kobanê” remains one of the largest and most coordinated ISIS offensives to date.
During the battle, the YPG gained support from the Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga, the Free Syrian Army, and the US-led anti-ISIS coalition.
The USA, driven by geopolitical interests and international solidarity efforts with Kobanê, supported Rojava with airstrikes.
Turkey prohibited the Syrian air force from supporting Kobanê’s defense, claiming it would have shot down any Syrian support in alliance with Israel. [1]
Turkey’s policy during the battle aimed to see ISIS destroy Kurdish autonomy and resolve the Kurdish issue.
During the battle, ISIS terrorists were treated in Turkish hospitals and later allowed back into Syria to continue fighting.
Turkey also forbade Kurds from traveling from Turkish territory to defend Rojava.
At this time, Germany was not participating in the anti-ISIS coalition; the Left Party called for “forcing Turkey to fully close its borders to ISIS terrorists and dismantling support networks within the country.”
By early 2015, the YPG had recaptured roughly 80% of Kobanê; on January 26, 2015, Kurdish forces declared the battle of Kobanê over.
The victory demonstrated the new Kurdish self-administration’s ability to mobilize mass support and defend itself, proving it could sustain Kurdish self-governance.
After defeating ISIS in Kobanê, the international coalition continued working with Kurdish forces to liberate further cities from ISIS’s “Caliphate.”
The SDF liberated cities like Manbij and Raqqa, which led to the complete dismantling of ISIS’s territorial control in Syria by March 2019.
Following the victory in Kobanê, the Kurdish Autonomous Regions in North Syria officially proclaimed the Federally Democratic Rojava, or Rojava (West Kurdistan).
Fascist Aggression
The hope that ISIS could solve the Kurdish problem in Rojava for Turkey proved false after the liberation of Kobanê.
The YPG (and the SDF) proved to be the key force to stop ISIS fascism above Hama.
The guerrilla tactics of the YPG, combined with immense international solidarity, donations, and personnel support, made them the only force capable of defeating ISIS despite being outnumbered in many battles.
The fighting morale of the Kurds and others fighting under the banner of Rojava stems not only from their Kurdish emancipation but also from their identity as people, as women.
The women of the YPJ carried out the most radical women’s liberation project since women’s suffrage; their enemy was not only Turkey and ISIS, but their struggle served to free women from their triple oppression: exploitation, male dominance, and radical religion.
In 2016, Turkey saw it as necessary to illegally intervene (under Article 51) in the conflict to suppress Kurdish liberation.
In August 2016, Turkish forces, in cooperation with allied Syrian rebels, crossed into Syria with the goal of expelling ISIS from the border region and securing control over border areas.
The “Euphrates Shield” operation began with the capture of the city of Jārābulus, aiming for Turkey to preempt the SDF.
Days earlier, the SDF had liberated Manbij from ISIS and started pushing ISIS back toward Jārābulus, where ISIS was to be defeated.
For Turkey, controlling Jārābulus would mean Rojava’s territory would be a continuous strip of land, centralizing its defense against ISIS and Turkey.
In the following weeks, additional border areas were seized, with open clashes between Turkish forces and the YPG. Turkish troops and allies advanced further south, capturing strategic cities like al-Bab (with around 100,000 inhabitants).
Since the Euphrates Shield operation, Turkey has regularly bombed civilian areas in Rojava to prevent the development of Kurdish self-governance structures.
In January 2018, Turkey’s strategic interest in its first intervention in Syria became clear:
While Operation Euphrates Shield cut the direct link between Manbij and Efrîn for the SDF, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch, an offensive in North Syria targeting the heart of Efrîn’s self-administration.
In October 2019, Operation Peace Spring occupied areas between Serêkaniyê and Gire Spi in Rojava, leading to the flight of over 200,000 people and the death of about 450 civilians.
The hypocrisy of US support for Rojava was exposed in 2019 when the Trump administration decided to withdraw US troops from Rojava.
From the beginning, US support was never meant to be permanent: the US provided only limited troops for training the YPG and its Arab allies, never supplying the necessary equipment for independent defense.
The US only saw the YPG as a partner as long as they remained politically and militarily dependent.
This was evident when Turkey’s army overran the Kurdish canton of Efrîn during Operation Olive Branch (see above); the US did not support the Kurds against Turkish aggression because Efrîn had no strategic value in containing Iranian influence in Syria.
The ongoing Turkish aggression against Rojava manifests through continuous bombing of civilian infrastructure, attempts to seize more territories, and systematic destruction of livelihoods.
To destroy Kurdish self-governance, Turkey allows ISIS fighters to pass through its borders and facilitates millions of dollars in money transfers between ISIS networks in Turkey and Syria.
The horror faced by the people of Rojava, especially due to Turkish aggression, is similar to the situation in Palestine.
In October 2023, Turkey, in cooperation with jihadist forces from Idlib, launched nearly 600 air and ground attacks, destroying about 80% of Rojava’s infrastructure.
In the following months, around 5 million people in Rojava were left without water or electricity, while artillery shelling continued.
The Turkish state justifies this by falsely linking the self-governance project to PKK attacks: the bombardments are legitimized through the fabricated claim that PKK fighters, supposedly from Rojava, carried out attacks (without evidence).
The attacks against Rojava have also expanded against Iraqi Kurdistan, under the pretext that PKK networks exist there as well.
Turkey justifies its genocidal plans in Rojava in the same way Israel justifies its genocide in Palestine.
Long-lasting attacks on civilian infrastructure serve both cases to thin out the population, with the hope that the remaining people will sooner or later surrender and that the territories will be subordinated to capital interests.
Any openly genocidal attack is legitimized by the existence of past PKK attacks, just as Israel justifies bombing hospitals based on the possible presence of Hamas fighters.
In the schools of the already occupied Kurdish regions, Kurdish is no longer taught; instead, Turkish and Arabic are taught.
Public buildings in occupied Afrin now bear Turkish inscriptions, and Kurdish celebrations are banned.
The reason Turkey does not simply launch a large-scale offensive to occupy all of Rojava is that allied states (including Germany) tend to accept drone and bomb attacks in silence rather than full-scale ground invasions:
“They are more tolerated by the international community than large invasions and occupations (…) Most media do not even report such attacks. This is partly due to the drone warfare concept developed by former US President Barack Obama. (…) Like in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan, the US sells drones as a humane alternative within so-called counterterrorism operations.
However, Turkey makes no distinction between combatants and civilians. (…) With this concept, any target can be characterized as legitimate (…) Making it harder to investigate and possibly prosecute these attacks as war crimes.”
(Dilar Dirik, Jacobin)
[1] https://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/29092014