3. Assad has fallen!
3. Assad has fallen!
After 13 years of war and 53 years of Assad(s); Syria has fallen. What happens now?
This is part 3 of the series “Syria & everything revolves around Rojava”.
On November 27, 2024, Hayʾat Tahrir asch-Scham (HTS) began its offensive from the Idlib province towards the millions-strong city of Aleppo. The Syrian civil war suddenly reignited, even outside Rojava.
The border region of Idlib is under de facto Turkish control and has so far been used as a refuge for Islamist and fascist forces threatened by Assad or Rojava’s forces.
One of these forces is HTS, which was born in 2017 as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in Syria.
HTS separated from Al-Qaeda in 2017 after internal power struggles and consolidated its control over the Idlib government area by 2020 (with Turkish permission).
Unlike, for example, the Taliban, which follow the Deobandi tradition ideologically, HTS’s ideology is based on the Salafist interpretation of Islam.
The ISIS (IS) also pursues a similar Salafist interpretation of Islam, but actively aimed to establish a global caliphate, whereas HTS, like the Taliban, aims only for a Syrian emirate.
In less than two months, HTS managed to, for the first time in 53 years, overthrow the Syrian state apparatus under Al-Assad.
Last Saturday, HTS succeeded in capturing the strategically decisive city of Homs, thereby controlling its northern flank against Damascus.
From Nawa, south of Damascus, further rebel forces were reportedly heading toward the city overnight from Saturday to Sunday.
At around 2 a.m. Syrian time, HTS reported that its forces were beginning to enter Damascus.
A few minutes later, they announced freeing all prisoners from the Sednaya prison, including IS fighters.
Within just one hour, HTS took control of the Syrian state television and radio.
The path to this was apparently (so far) without significant resistance; many security forces seemingly did not attempt to resist HTS, possibly because they no longer had an interest in Assad’s rule.
At 3 a.m. Syrian time, Reuters claimed that Assad had left Damascus by plane, destination unknown; HTS confirmed the claim half an hour later.
At the same time, soldiers of the Syrian army were leaving the Ministry of Defense.
Shortly afterward, Damascus and the Syrian state fell into HTS’s hands.
How did it all happen so quickly?
The incredibly rapid advance of HTS is based on the support they received from Turkey, both financially and militarily.
Turkey uses HTS as a broad political and military instrument to protect its interests as a NATO partner and as a global geopolitical power.
The establishment of a pro-Turkish government means a solid alliance for Turkey against the Kurdish self-administration in Rojava.
Hakan Fidan, the Turkish Foreign Minister, emphasized in a press conference this morning his hope for a “productive cooperation against terrorists” (Al Jazeera), meaning: the possibility to attack and seize all of northern Syria from multiple sides.
The question remains, however, how Damascus fell so unbelievably fast.
David Des Roches, professor at the East South Asia Center for Security Studies, told Al Jazeera:
“Since the intervention of Iranian and Russian forces in 2014, there have been repeated reports that the Syrian Arab regime forces were poorly led and more interested in bribing civilians than fighting.” The actual fighting was mainly carried out by Iranian-led proxies supported by Russian air support (…) When the Russian air force was pulled out, as has happened, and Iranian-led proxies are no longer able to participate in the fighting, a demoralized, poorly led, poorly equipped, and thoroughly corrupt institution remains (…) “Under these circumstances, people simply are not willing to take risks.”
It seems indeed that Damascus security forces no longer had the interest in fighting, which is why the takeover, at least in Damascus, proceeded more or less bloodlessly so far.
What now?
If Russia and Iran fully withdraw from Syria, it would mean a significant weakening of one of the most important resistance partners for the people in Lebanon and Palestine: Hezbollah.
Recent Israeli attacks on Syria targeted military infrastructure, Hezbollah fighters, and their residential areas.
The Israeli military aims to prevent Hezbollah from rearming.
For Hezbollah to rearm, which has been severely weakened by the fighting against the occupation in Lebanon, they need the Syrian route through which they can transport weapons from Iran.
In preparation for any developments in Syria, Israel has intensified its bombings in Syria and Lebanon in recent days to tactically exploit Hezbollah’s moment of weakness (caused by the situation in Syria).
The shifting balance of power, should Assad’s rule truly end permanently, poses a challenge for Iran and its allies: they might face a pro-Turkish (and thus pro-Western) government in Syria.
For the civilian Syrian population, the change of power could mean short-term calm.
But (!) the shift towards more Turkish influence also means that internal contradictions within Syria might not decrease, and in some regions, the power vacuum could lead to a resurgence of ISIS.
Russia and especially Iran will not simply give up their interests in the region; it is very possible that Russia and Iran, if the HTS government threatens their interests (most likely because it is Turkish-financed), will launch ground and air offensives against the new Damascus rulers.
The question then is how far HTS has been able to mobilize the (former) Syrian army to defend against Russia and Iran by that time.
The most obvious situation to understand is for Rojava.
Hakan Fidan has already confirmed that cooperation with HTS (which they themselves financed) is tied to cooperation against “Daesh (ISIS) and PKK (which does not exist in Rojava).”
The self-administration in North and East Syria declared a state of emergency this morning to defend against Islamists.
At this very moment, Turkey, with the support of HTS’s allied Syrian National Army (SNA), is trying to seize Manbij east of Aleppo.
Diverse infiltration attempts by the SNA in the north, west, and south of Minbic have been repelled by local defense units.