Merz is coming
Merz is coming
Following the most unpopular government in the history of the Federal Republic, the most reactionary chancellor this country has ever had is taking office. Merz’s policies are just as outdated as they are incompatible with the interests of this state. This is further exemplified by the feeble attempts to smooth out the contradictions of German capitalism.
Reminder: The words marked in red are links to relevant critique articles.
The collapse of the traffic light government had long been foreseeable, but the dismissal of Lindner accelerated it surprisingly quickly.
With the embarrassingly romantic plan for the FDP’s fall, internally called “D-Day,” they apparently had already actively planned for breaking with the red-green coalition partners:
Stopping the pay transparency law, abolishing the solidarity surcharge (which helps me against the AfD in the East), fewer climate goals, lower taxes for corporations, fewer market regulations (except for Chinese cars, of course).
Lindner actually managed to be too liberal for the Greens and the SPD.
Lindner’s hope that “they won’t be able to see the faces anymore” left nothing standing in the way; the coalition was over. [1]
The collapse of the most unpopular government the Federal Republic has ever had gifts the people earlier than expected with an election – so at the beginning, just a few lines about this “election” itself:
The term “democracy,” which is Greek for “rule of the people,” is also defined by the German government as follows: “This form of government exercises sovereignty through the people”:
The government is appointed by the people, and the “sovereignty” derives from the people – that is what bourgeois democracy claims.
In representative democracy, which is preferred for bourgeois rule, there is an intermediary – the representatives – between the people and the exercise of power, which is the whole point of the system.
The representatives, who are primarily subordinate to the constitution, serve as a buffer between the will and interests of the people and the state that claims to represent them.
In bourgeois democracy, the people are empowered to elect “representatives” in parliament from among the permitted parties.
The approval of a party depends on whether the Federal Returning Officer considers it founded in the Basic Law; this official is traditionally the President of the Federal Statistical Office, who is not elected by the people but appointed internally.
If a party is “anti-democratic,” which includes being consistently Marxist, it must generally be assumed that it will not be allowed to run or will be banned if it reaches a certain size.
Alternatively, if the Federal Returning Officer considers the party too insignificant, it may be allowed to run – after all, it makes no real difference (which is why, for example, the DKP is tolerated).
“Anti-democratic” here specifically means any political orientation incompatible with the “free democratic basic order”, i.e., the core structure of the Federal Republic, which includes basic rights such as the right of corporations to property (of the means of production).
From this conclusion—that any party seeking fundamental change cannot legally come to power—it follows that bourgeois democracy is not “people’s rule,” but a ruling structure that does not allow for profound change.
One might argue that the Basic Law can be amended with a 2/3 majority – but not the right to property (Art. 14), which is unchangeable. Moreover, it would be impossible for a system-hostile force to even enter the Bundestag in the first place.
Those representatives, who are legitimized every four years through elections, can only decide to a limited extent on issues like taxation, national debt, or migration policy – but even these powers have been largely transferred to the autocratic European Union, i.e., the undemocratic European Commission since 1992.
Decisions about tariffs, whether in the current important e-mobility debate with China, or competition rules for Germany vis-à-vis other European countries, ultimately aren’t made by Germany itself.
The two biggest concerns for people in Germany are rising living costs (a term that’s downright frightening) and unaffordable housing; two issues that bourgeois politics cannot address without fundamental property reforms.
If traffic light politicians meet monthly with real estate lobbyists and the rise in living costs is just seen as a “symptom of crisis,” it’s no wonder that the AfD’s rise is not surprising.
The bourgeois democracy, which fundamentally protects property, is also not “threatened” by right-wing extremist forces; these “antidemocratic” forces were actually born from it.
By safeguarding the fundamental mechanisms of this system, which are rooted in the contradiction between rich and poor, West and East, capital and labor, bourgeois democrats cannot claim that opposition to their system is surprising.
How can this “democracy” be the rule of the people if all electoral options pursue essentially the same agenda?
On the Upcoming Election
From what we know about bourgeois elections, it is fundamentally irrelevant to the vast majority of society which coalition results from the new vote, but we’ll look at the options nonetheless.
Across all Sunday polls, the Union (CDU/CSU) consistently secures 31-36% of the vote as the strongest force.
The second strongest, the AfD, holds steady at 18-19.5%. Following are the SPD with 14-18%, the Greens with 12-14%, the BSW with 4-8%, and the FDP and Left with 3-5% each.
If one believes the crumbling “firewall,” and no party actually forms a coalition with the AfD, the following coalitions are possible, each having been formed at least once before:
CDU-SPD-Greens (also called “Kenia” coalition), CDU-SPD-FDP (“Germany” coalition), CDU-FDP-Greens (“Jamaica” coalition), CDU-Greens, and most likely, another CDU-SPD “Grand Coalition” (“GroKo”).
The new electoral law, adopted in 2023 for the “reduction of the Bundestag,” means that both overhang and compensatory mandates will be abolished in the future – as a result, candidates who win their constituency with the first vote (the vote cast directly for a candidate) will no longer automatically enter the Bundestag.
This does not apply to the three direct mandates that the Left Party managed to secure in 2021; for this reason, the Left plans the admittedly charming “Silver Lock Campaign,” aiming to bring Gysi, Ramelow, and Bartsch, the most popular faces of the fractured party, into the Bundestag proportionally to their second vote share (which will likely fall below the 5% threshold).
What is realistic?
Based on Sunday polls and rumors of early coalition negotiations, it appears that the “Grand Coalition” with SPD and Union will enter its fifth term in spring.
Friedrich Merz, who previously earned his millions on the board of BlackRock, would thus become Chancellor of the Federal Republic. Under a Merz cabinet, for the vast majority of people in Germany, nothing fundamentally will change, except perhaps for the worse: Welfare cuts will accelerate due to planned reductions in public debt (or maintaining the debt brake) and direct cuts to social budgets, taxes for top earners and corporations will be lowered, and resentment against migrants will be further stoked. Merz’s foreign policy stance suggests that Germany’s position in the trade war against China will be strengthened, causing consumer prices to rise further (since China is Germany’s most important trading partner): Regarding the SPD’s platform, which advocates higher income taxes for top earners, inheritance tax reform, and a revival of wealth taxes, Merz states: Merz’s policies rely on the contradiction inherent in every highly developed capitalist state, on which social policy itself is based. This contradiction manifests in highly developed capitalist states by forcing the state to impose often unbearable tax burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises (large monopolies like Amazon can often evade taxes through financial and political capital ties) to sustain the social reproduction of labor, and to do everything possible to keep these companies domestic to maintain the “capital location” of the country. The result is an uncontrollable debt burden of the state, because this imbalance between capital and labor cannot be resolved organically. An additional consequence of the contradiction between capital and labor is that the state relies on foreign labor to fill the logical labor shortage. Regarding migrants, the debate still masks the emptiness behind it: “Germany does not need less immigration of low-skilled workers, but more immigration of both low-skilled and (…) highly skilled workers.” Today, there are 1.8 million unfilled jobs in Germany, with the number rising rapidly. “By 2035, due to demographic development, five million more Germans will retire than new workers will enter the workforce.” “Migration may come in waves, posing major challenges to municipalities and infrastructure, but it is not that too many people are coming to Germany. Given the enormous labor shortage, we need not only the 3.3 million people already in Germany as refugees or tolerated persons, but in the next ten years, we will need three times as many from abroad to even partially fill the labor gap.” (Marcel Fratscher, President of DIW, in Die Zeit) The capital naturally favors an influx of workers (like refugees working below their qualification level) for precarious jobs that domestic workers are overqualified for. On the other hand, the bourgeois politics, which represents capital, is interested in maintaining its power by inventing problems that aren’t really problems—such as the “problem” of lazy migrants. The long-term reproduction of labor is something capitalism cannot do on its own, not least because the insecurity it creates leads to demographic issues like Germany’s current situation. The conclusion from all this is sobering: nothing will change.
Merz’s CDU, as the strongest coalition partner, together with Esken’s and Klingbeil’s SPD, would form the most reactionary government since Kurt Georg Kiesinger[2]
“Those investing in China today must assess the increased risks. Companies must also know early on that we wouldn’t be willing to rescue companies that have taken on too much risk in countries like China.” (Merz, April 2024)
“If that also means they want to burden the so-called high earners even more, then our answer is clear and firm: no. (…) The entire system doesn’t work.
We need people in the labor market, not on citizen’s income. (…)
We need a tax system that brings companies down to a competitive level.
We are no longer attractive because we have become a high-tax country for companies”
As the production level of a country, i.e., its GDP, rises to a certain point, the state must ensure a certain standard of living for the working society that pays for this production through their labor, because otherwise the reproduction of labor (i.e., people still working) breaks down.
If this relative standard of living falls compared to the level of production, the tolerance between workers and employers erodes.
Workers must be able to secure their livelihood and regenerate their labor power; when living standards decline relative to economic capacity—particularly when wealth is concentrated among few large corporations—the contradiction between people and ruling class intensifies.
To illustrate: when industrialization increased the production level but the living standards of workers remained the same, protests and strikes followed, leading to reforms like the Factory Acts, which regulated working hours and limited child labor.
How can this work? It can’t—the contradiction is inherent.
This contradiction is one aspect of the fundamental conflict between capital (the owners of factories, servers, etc.) and labor (the workers).
Or as Merz states:
“We need to create conditions that make investments increase the value of money. And we need to get a grip on social spending dynamics. Once we have the overall system under control, we can consider reforming the debt brake, but not abolishing it”
Translated: “Reproducing labor power costs too much, but too much debt is bad for the euro—something new is needed”—perhaps socialism?The Contradiction of the Foreigner
Once a certain level of societal development is reached—necessitating investment in the social state—the proportion of people willing to do “dirty work” in a capitalist country becomes too low to meet the demands for profit maximization – often falsely called “skilled labor shortage,” although only a small part of the needed workforce qualifies as “skilled.”
At the same time, capitalism internally needs a scapegoat to blame for this contradiction.
In Merz’s case (and the general status quo), these are welfare recipients and migrants, or: the poor and foreigners.
Regarding these groups, or any other group that might currently serve as the scapegoat (under Kiesinger and Brandt, it was Communists), societal resentment must be stoked regardless of whether the rulers truly believe what they say.
“We need people in the labor market, not on citizen’s income.”
For comparison, about 1.7 million people in Germany are welfare recipients and could work if they wanted to (the rest are children, teenagers, single parents, etc.).
More than half of them have serious health problems, but let’s set that aside. [3]
The costs for these individuals, who are openly discussed, amount to 12 billion euros (expected for 2025) – about 2.4% of the federal budget.
In comparison, the defense budget is 53.3 billion euros, or 153.3 billion including special reserves.
A large part of this 153.3 billion goes to private arms companies seeking profit, further deepening the contradiction between capital and labor—there’s no way for a capitalist state to do everything right!
(For a deeper understanding, see our article “Deportations and Refugees”)
Beyond skilled workers, sectors with low qualification levels (e.g., hospitality, construction, large parts of the service industry) are currently experiencing a labor shortage that far exceeds the “skilled labor” shortage.Point
As outlined in our article “The AfD will govern – promised,” a government involving the AfD is obvious under Merz, and then? Nothing will change either.
Germany’s foreign policy remains sharp and risky; during times of high tension in the South China Sea, conflicts between the United States and China over Taiwan could arise.
Internally, everything remains the same, with a downward trend.
Four years of Merz means policies that are even more radical than before—a politics of the rich, of the property owners, and against the working population here, aimed at the cheapest possible reproduction of labor.
Next: the AfD.