Rulers and Murderers in the Name of God
Rulers and Murderers in the Name of God
Al-Dscholani, once the leader of al-Qaida in Syria, was appointed as the “President of the Transition Phase“.
Under his regime, the boundaries between terrorist organization and state become blurred.
The massacres against the Alawite population in Latakia and the autocratic constitution demonstrate that al-Dscholani’s Syria is not a step forward for the Syrian people, and the ruling HTS of course does not seek a peaceful, pluralistic Syria.
This is a guest article by Amir Schumo:
Amir is a Kurd from Northeast Syria (today’s Rojava) and organized demonstrations against Assad during the Syrian revolution. He has been politically active since then.
Schumo came to Germany in 2015; parts of his family are still in Syria.
For the region of Syria and surroundings, Schumo is an expert and provides, alongside personal stories and anecdotes, an in-depth overview of recent events in the region and their significance.
For various articles on Syria, Schumo has already contributed his expertise and anecdotes.
When we published our last article “Syria: al-Qaida in a Tie“, the de facto ruler al-Dscholani was appointed by the transitional government as “President for the Transition Phase“.
Yes, my intention is to call him al-Dscholani and not “Ahmed al-Sharaa,” because I still see him as that terrorist, leader of the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaida.
The UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, has called on the de facto regime to form an inclusive and non-sectarian transitional government.
This is the first problem, because these demands do not match the vocabulary of the de facto regime, which is trying to establish this new authority.
The steps the de facto regime has taken in recent months, such as relocating the Salafist government from Idlib to Damascus or commissioning HTS to form a “transitional government,” show how HTS immediately began acting as a full-fledged government, disregarding the objections of the Syrians: it has revised curricula, shut down the judiciary, dismissed employees, and set the country’s economic system—based on the private sector and foreign investments.
Al-Dscholani acts with the powers of an elected president.
He has appointed high military ranks to foreign jihadists within his terrorist organization HTS and placed leaders in the new army without democratic legitimacy, even without elections within his ranks.
Jolani appointed, among others, Anas Khattab, head of the general security service of HTS, as chief of the Syrian General Intelligence.
Khattab was tasked with creating a new intelligence agency for the state— the boundaries between terrorist organization HTS and the state continue to blur rapidly.
Massacre of the Alawites
The Alawites are a religious minority in Syria, making up about twelve percent of the Syrian population.
The majority of Alawites live in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus—over 50 years, the Alawite family al-Assad ruled Syria.
The suffering of the Syrian population under Assad, especially since 2011, has caused widespread societal resentment towards the Alawites in general—after the fall of the Assad regime, Alawites have become targets of much of the hatred towards Assad.
However, the religious-based hatred of Alawites extends far beyond Assad; Alawites have been persecuted, tortured, and murdered by ISIS and Al-Nusra Front (now HTS) because of their Shia traditions.
During the massacre in Latakia province in 2013 alone, jihadists from Al-Nusra and ISIS murdered hundreds of Alawite civilians—in the same province, the current events repeated.
On March 6, 2025, remaining forces of the Assad regime launched a military attack on al-Dscholani’s security forces, leading to the takeover of several strategic areas in Idlib province in northwestern Syria—including the towns of Jisr al-Shughur and Maarat al-Numan.
Following the attack, Islamist rulers under al-Dscholani called for Jihad against “the Alawites”:
The next day, Islamist rulers and their supporters moved their troop columns into the Latakia coastal region.
These groups recruited from all over Syria, except from areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Rojava.
Latakia itself is known within Syria as a relatively open region.
It has a population of about 700,000 residents, with approximately 70% belonging to the Alawite faith.
After their arrival in the region, the HTS mob began raids officially aimed at arresting supporters of the former Assad regime.
In many cases, members of the Alawite minority were directly executed on the street.
“We were just a mass of people trying to escape certain death.” Women screamed around them, children cried. Shots rang out everywhere, and fires broke out. (zdfheute)
The head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights told ARD: “Before the massacres, there was a jihad call. (…) It was like a battlefield.
There are video recordings where it is said: ‘We came to kill the Alawites.’ They did not say: ‘We came to kill Assad supporters.’ This shows that it is an ethnic cleansing. It must not go unpunished.”
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports up to 1,383 civilian victims of the massacres.
Planned Massacres Under Al-Dscholani’s Regime
Despite strict directives from HTS banning the recording and publication of videos, several visual documents of the massacres have reached the public.
One of these recordings shows an HTS fighter demonstratively speaking about the killing of an Alawite, using the derogatory term “Al Nusayryah” and proudly announcing an beheading.
Another video documents an execution in the open street where security forces under Abu Mohammed al-Dscholani shoot a civilian.
On March 13, 2025, al-Dscholani issued a direct threat to the Alawite population in a voice message and announced further massacres.
Existing evidence suggests that these acts of violence were planned at the highest political and military levels.
At the same time, the regime of al-Dscholani sent targeted signals to other ethnic and religious minorities, including Kurds and Druze, to preempt their resistance.
The implicit message was that any opposition could lead to similar repressions.
Agreement as a Way Out?
After many condemnations by international actors such as the UN Security Council and the USA (Foreign Minister Marco Rubio), “al-Dscholani sought a way out of the crisis“:
On March 10, 2025, an unexpected agreement was concluded between al-Dscholani’s regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF):
This involved a meeting between Abu Mohammed al-Dscholani, the de facto ruler, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the SDF.
The meeting took place at the People’s Palace in Damascus.
The agreement includes eight core clauses that define the fundamental principles and framework of the arrangement, transcribed as follows:
The agreement aims to protect the rights of all Syrians and ensures their political participation by enabling them to actively engage in political life and be represented according to their merits.
It explicitly recognizes the role of the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian population.
Their rights are explicitly acknowledged, and a ceasefire between the Syrian army and the SDF is codified.
Another focus of the agreement is the integration of civil and military institutions in Rojava into the state administration.
This particularly concerns strategic infrastructure such as border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields.
Furthermore, the agreement ensures that displaced persons can return safely under special protection.
The state commits to actively combat remaining threats, especially the last remnants of the Assad regime.
At the same time, calls for division or hatred are explicitly rejected to prevent societal discord.
The implementation and adherence to the measures are overseen by executive committees responsible for monitoring the process.
They ensure that all measures are completed by the end of the year. (RIC)
The agreement bears similarities to the status of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq and represents a significant advancement for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Rojava region.
It fulfills all central demands and conditions previously rejected by Abu Mohammed al-Dscholani and his supporters in Turkey.
The core component of the agreement is the integration of Kurdish armed forces into the Syrian state structures.
However, the SDF remains an independent military unit within the national armed forces.
Its secular and non-Arab identity, as well as its rejection of political Islam, remain intact.
This ideological difference was one of the main reasons why al-Dscholani previously refused cooperation with the SDF.
Moreover, the agreement prevents further advances of al-Dscholani’s militias into SDF-controlled territories.
This officially recognizes the SDF as a legitimate military force within Syria.
Many observers also suspect that al-Dscholani is strategically using the agreement to distract from massacres against the Alawite population and to portray himself propagandistically as a mediator and peacemaker.
Ruler in the Name of God
The new Syrian constitution
On March 13, 2025, al-Dscholani signed a constitutional declaration establishing a five-year transitional period for the country.
Following the signing, al-Dscholani expressed his hopes regarding Syria’s political future.
He emphasized that this step could represent a new beginning for the country and stated:
“We hope this will open a new chapter in Syria’s history.
Our goal is to replace ignorance with knowledge and suffering with mercy.”
He also highlighted that the declaration sends a positive signal to the Syrian people by enabling reconstruction and growth.
The constitutional declaration comprises four chapters with a total of 53 articles.
It defines the fundamental principles of state governance during the transitional period and specifies the responsibilities of transitional President al-Dscholani in the areas of executive, legislation, and judiciary.
The declaration also outlines how Syria should be shaped over the next five years, defining this period as the transitional phase.
On the surface, the document appears typical of a constitution in structure and content, regulating the political and legal foundations of a state.
However, a closer look at the specific clauses, texts, and powers assigned to al-Dscholani quickly reveals that he exercises nearly complete control over the state in practice.
A particularly striking feature is the inconsistency within the constitutional declaration.
This inconsistency becomes especially apparent in relation to the “principle of separation of powers”:
While the declaration emphasizes this principle at the beginning, several subsequent texts indirectly contradict this fundamental requirement.
These discrepancies raise questions about the actual implementation of the separation of powers and the distribution of authority, as the declaration in practice suggests a concentration of power in the hands of the transitional president.
Separation of Powers, but al-Dscholani Appoints Everyone
Article 2 of the first chapter of the constitutional declaration states: “The state establishes a political system based on the separation of powers”, thus safeguarding the freedom and dignity of citizens.
This article refers to the classic separation of powers into three branches:
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, with authority supposed to rest in independent bodies.
The declaration, however, grants al-Dscholani broad, almost unchecked powers.
He retains the right to appoint ministers, determine one-third of the members of the People’s Assembly, and appoint members of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
He can especially declare a state of emergency and make appointments to the National Security Council.
These extensive powers in legislative, executive, and judicial areas contradict the principle of separation of powers as stated in Article 2, effectively undermining it and favoring a concentration of power in the hands of the transitional president.
Another notable element of the constitutional declaration is the lack of a mechanism for holding al-Dscholani accountable.
There are no provisions that ensure responsibility of the president or ministers towards other state bodies or the population.
According to statements from members of the drafting committee, al-Dscholani cannot be held accountable, nor can the ministers.
In addition to his role as president, al-Dscholani will also hold the offices of Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Chairman of the National Security Council.
Although Article 31 states that the president and ministers manage state affairs, implement laws, and oversee the government, this does not imply that al-Dscholani would also assume the role of Prime Minister, since he already has extensive executive powers as president.
Article 41 grants the president the right to declare a state of emergency, with the approval of the National Security Council.
Since al-Dscholani appoints its members himself, he has significant control and influence over decisions with potentially major impacts on the political system and citizens’ freedoms.
One of these powers is the veto right against laws passed by the legislative council, which can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the council.
Additionally, he can form a Supreme Committee, selecting two-thirds of the parliament members while directly appointing the remaining third.
Al-Dscholani also has extensive powers over the judiciary.
According to Article 47 of the constitutional declaration, he is authorized to appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court, giving him direct influence over the judiciary and making the justice system entirely under his control.
Another problematic point is the provision that the religion of the president does not need to be specified, but Islamic law (al-Shari’a) is considered the main source of legislation.
This disregards the principle of citizenship and equal opportunity, as it de facto creates a religious framework that can potentially be discriminatory (with the support of HTS, it is even certain).
The designation of Islamic law as the primary source of legislation also presents a problematic challenge for establishing a neutral, secular rule of law, as it elevates religious principles over universal legal norms and could threaten equal treatment of all citizens regardless of religion.
Al-Dscholani Sees Himself as the Caliph of the State of God
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, head of the Druze Unitarian community, described the government in Damascus as “extremist” and clarified that his community rejects any reconciliation or agreement with the current government.
This attitude reflects the rejection of many minorities and opposition groups towards Bashar al-Assad’s government and its continued authoritarian course.
The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political umbrella organization of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), condemned the new constitutional declaration as “illegitimate” and argued that it restores the centralized government system that existed under Bashar al-Assad.
General Mazloum Abdi of the SDF warned that the Islamic law (al-Shari’a) enshrined in the constitution as the main source of legislation would lead to further chaos and deepen political and social divisions.
Abdi and other SDF leaders see the new constitution as a step towards exclusion, not the urgently needed move towards ethnic and religious inclusion, which was hoped for with the agreement between the SDF and the transitional government.
A State in the Grip of a Terrorist
Al-Dscholani presents himself as a Caliph, as a ruler in the name of God, which bases his political legitimacy on a religious foundation.
However, his regime is increasingly characterized by violence, repression, and ethnic cleansing.
Given these circumstances, it is crucial that the international community no longer remains passive but takes a clear stance against human rights violations and authoritarian rule.
The massacres against the Alawites, the systematic suppression of the Kurds, and the increasing concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, labeled as a terrorist figure, pose a significant threat to stability across the Middle East.
These developments could destabilize not only Syria internally but also have regional repercussions, especially by fueling conflicts along ethnic and religious lines, with Israel and Turkey particularly benefiting from the Syrian developments.
Syria does not need a self-declared ruler legitimized in the name of God.
What the country desperately needs is peace, justice, and an inclusive government that represents all Syrians regardless of their religious or ethnic background.
Only through an inclusive political process that respects the rights and freedoms of all population groups can long-term stability and sustainable reconstruction be achieved.