Part 4: Violence and Displacement (1990 to 2005)

7. May 2025 Matthias Winter 8 min read

Part 4: Violence and Displacement (1990 to 2005)

Amanullah Khan, chairman of the JKLF operating in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Parallel to the massacres of the Kashmiri civilian population, Islamist groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen and later Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed began a systematic campaign against the Hindu minority of the Kashmiri Pandits in the valley in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

There were targeted killings, rapes, intimidation and threats – loudspeakers in mosques broadcast warnings that Hindus should leave the valley “without their women.”
Newspapers like Aftab published threats from militant groups demanding that all Hindus immediately leave Kashmir.
In the following months, an estimated 300 Hindu men and women were murdered and some raped. The violence culminated in a pogrom-like climate that led to a mass exodus on January 19, 1990. Around 65,000 Pandit families fled in fear of escalating violence.

Many Pandit communities resettled in makeshift refugee camps around Jammu or Delhi – often under catastrophic conditions. The Indian state failed to ensure the protection of the minority or implement effective measures for a safe return. Decades later (as of 2016), only 2,000 to 3,000 Pandits lived in the Kashmir Valley.

At the same time, further massacres by Indian security forces against demonstrators and bystanders – such as the Bijbehara massacre in October 1993, in which 43 (not 51) unarmed civilians were shot by paramilitary BSF – led to growing radicalization among segments of the Kashmiri youth. Many young people subsequently joined Islamist underground groups.

The 1990s saw a rise in disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture and sexual violence by Indian army and police units. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) documented thousands of such cases and accused Indian authorities of systematic human rights violations.

End of Armed Resistance

Mass killings and repression against all fundamentally oppositional and resistant groups led in the early 1990s to the virtual end of armed resistance by many organizations.
At the same time, Pakistan increasingly withdrew financial and logistical support for those Kashmiri independence movements that advocated not for accession to Pakistan but for a fully independent Kashmir.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), previously one of the most important secular independence movements, officially renounced armed resistance in 1994, after a large portion of its fighters had been killed, imprisoned, or disarmed.
The de facto victory of the Indian state over the JKLF was partly enabled by cooperation from pro-Pakistani Islamist groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen, which in several instances collaborated with Indian security forces to eliminate the JKLF.

The abandonment of armed struggle led to a split within the JKLF: one faction continued operating from Pakistan-administered Kashmir and upheld the militant strategy, while the faction in Indian-controlled territory turned to nonviolent means.

In 2002, Amanullah Khan, chairman of the JKLF operating in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, told Reuters that Pakistan-supported militant groups were partly responsible for the marginalization of the JKLF:
“I have been saying for two to three years that (non-Kashmiri militants) have turned the Kashmiri freedom struggle into terrorism.”

After years of direct central administration and military control, a regional government was reinstated in 1996.
Farooq Abdullah returned as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and formed a government under the Indian National Congress party.

Despite the official return to civilian government, the state of emergency effectively continued – Indian security forces continued to operate with broad impunity under laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA). Large parts of the population were politically disillusioned and alienated.
Voter turnout was low, and many districts were effectively excluded from free elections due to boycott calls, fear of repression, or militant intimidation.

Kargil

The situation in Kashmir remained largely unchanged until 1999.
New Delhi made isolated attempts to stabilize the situation through aid programs, economic incentives and infrastructure measures and to counter further militarization of the local resistance movement. However, these measures were perceived by large parts of the Kashmiri population as inadequate and merely cosmetic, as they offered no substantive political perspective and did not address fundamental demands for self-determination, co-determination or an end to military repression. Discontent over continued repression, the presence of over 500,000 soldiers and the widespread impunity of the security forces persisted.

In the winter of 1998/99, Pakistani soldiers and paramilitary fighters secretly infiltrated the Kargil region on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) under the code name “Operation Badr.” They occupied strategically important high-altitude positions in an area that is usually vacated in winter. The aim of the operation was to pressure India into internationalizing the Kashmir issue and possibly force a renewed discussion about a plebiscite under the 1948 UN resolution. Pakistan hoped that by then, the mood of the Kashmiri population had turned clearly against India and in favor of accession to Pakistan.

India responded with a large-scale military counteroffensive (“Operation Vijay”) and was able to recapture almost all occupied positions within a few months of heavy fighting. The war lasted from May to July 1999 and claimed over 1,000 lives, mainly soldiers on both sides.

The Kargil War was internationally viewed as particularly alarming, as both states had officially conducted nuclear tests for the first time in 1998 – it was thus the first military conflict between two nuclear powers.
The United States, under President Bill Clinton, exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. Washington made it clear that it saw the infiltration as an act of aggression and urged Pakistan to fully withdraw behind the Line of Control. International pressure, especially from the USA and G8 states, as well as the military situation, eventually led Pakistan to withdraw – which was seen domestically as a defeat for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Amarnath

In 2008, the state government of Jammu and Kashmir under Ghulam Nabi Azad (Indian National Congress) decided to transfer around 40 hectares of land in the Kashmir Valley to the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board to set up temporary shelters for Hindu pilgrims during the annual Amarnath pilgrimage.

This decision triggered massive protests in the Muslim-majority population of the valley. Many Kashmiris saw it as an attack on the region’s demographic and cultural composition as well as its special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. There were growing fears among the population that this could be a first step toward permanent settlement of Hindus from other parts of India in the Kashmir Valley.
As the International Crisis Group summarized in 2010:
“There is an overwhelming perception in Kashmir that land transfer to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board will undermine their special status under Article 370 of the Constitution and is a ploy to settle outsiders in the Valley.” [6]

The announcement sparked one of the largest protest waves in Kashmir’s history. With the involvement of the JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front), which had reunited in 2005 and renounced armed resistance, up to 500,000 people demonstrated simultaneously against the land transfer.
As Arundhati Roy summarized:
“To many people in the valley this dramatic increase in numbers was seen as an aggressive political statement by an increasingly Hindu-fundamentalist Indian state. […] It triggered an apprehension that it was the beginning of an elaborate plan to build Israeli-style settlements, and change the demography of the valley.” [7]

The Indian security forces responded with massive violence: tear gas, batons, rubber bullets and even live ammunition were used. Between June and August 2008, 38 to 40 people were killed and over 1,000 injured.

On July 1, 2008, the government was forced to revoke the decision to transfer the land. This led to massive counter-protests in the predominantly Hindu region of Jammu, where Muslim traders and truck drivers were targeted. Violent riots ensued, during which over 70 Muslim homes were set on fire. Exact casualty figures are not documented.

In response to the escalation, the Indian government increased the number of stationed soldiers in the state of Jammu and Kashmir to over 500,000 – with a total population of around 12 million at the time. The resulting blockade of the main road between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley led to acute shortages in the valley, especially of medicine, food and fuel.