Why Marxists Need Foucault:

Or, How to Stop Worrying About Postmodernism and Love the ‘Game of Truth’

This is an exclusive guest article by Julian R. Vale.

Click the footnotes for various explanations and clarifications.

Some classical Marxists have spilled much ink lamenting the splintering of yesteryear’s proletarian¹ solidarity into today’s nearly innumerable “identity politics.” That is, we spend our time on individualized intersectional² activism related to gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, religion and so forth and are both disunified and unable to coherently fight for collective liberation and emancipation from our various oppressors (Harcourt 328). For the orthodox Marxist, the most powerful oppressor is the capitalist class of billionaires and millionaires subjugating the most numerous group: working people (Callinicos, Kouvelakis, and Pradella 3-5). Marxist writers even sometimes insist the alleged source of the fracture stems from the so called “postmodern”³ movement (Callinicos et. al 346). For example, Jean-Paul Sartre charged Michel Foucault as most culpable for the split among the left, even calling him “the last barricade the bourgeoise can still erect against Marx” (Kippes).

While there is a grain of truth to that anti-Foucauldian proposition, inheritors of the Foucauldian tradition on the “postmodern” left need not reject class politics as the basis of organization and eventual liberation⁴. Even more, the Frenchman’s conceptual innovations offer Marxists and Post-Marxists on the left powerful tools to increase class consciousness⁵ and perhaps enlist the most unlikely of reactionaries and conservatives in the socialist struggle.

These last two points, the first relating to Foucauldians and the second to the Marxist left, were made by Robert Kippes in “Why the Left Needs Foucault.” Here in this article, I will build on Kippes argument and Lorenzini’s interpretation of Foucault. My main claim is that Foucault’s distinction between “games of truth” and “regimes of truth” helps Marxists to understand what must be done to persuade left-wing liberals and even conservatives to take up the Marxist revolutionary struggle. My argument is not that Marxists (or frankly, anyone with foundationalist commitments) should embrace Foucauldian anti-foundationalism wholesale, nor is it that the two entire theories are compatible. Rather, my claim is that Marxists can appropriate Foucault’s concepts tactically. If I am successful in substantiating this claim, the reader will be persuaded that Foucault is not a necessary enemy to Marxists and that class consciousness can be possible in today’s fractured environment.

Foucault’s Refusal of Ideology and the Power of Truth

Foucault consistently expressed suspicion towards the notion of ideology, particularly as developed in Althusserian Marxism (On the Government of the Living 76). For Foucault, the key philosophical question was not error, illusion, or alienated consciousness, but truth itself (Truth and Power 75). He sought to understand how certain claims come to be accepted as true and the mechanisms by which this happens (Oksala 120). This led him to analyze the historical formation of specific forms of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, which he saw as inextricably linked (Harcourt 93). He takes selective inspiration from Nietzsche who declared:

 “I am not a man; I am dynamite!” – an image that suggests that in overcoming ascetic ideals he was destroying himself as well. Despite the influence of Nietzsche and his own interests in self-overcoming, when referring to his own work Foucault preferred the less explosive metaphor of the toolkit. Foucault invited his readers – after all, in order to use him we must read him – to pick up what they found usable and ignore or discard the rest ” (Gutting 378)

In his later work, Foucault explicitly introduced the distinction between “games of truth” and “regimes of truth” (Lorenzini 33-37). A game of truth refers to the rules and procedures that govern the production of true and false statements within a specific domain. This pertains to the epistemic acceptance of truth; the internal logic and formal structure that autonomously establish the distinction between true and false statements. For example, the rules of scientific methodology, or formal logic, constitute a game of truth.

A regime of truth, however, is different. It determines the obligations of individuals with regard to the procedures of manifesting truth. While the game pertains to epistemic acceptance, the regime pertains to practical submission to truth. It reveals the complex interaction between truth and power within the procedures used to govern human beings. Foucault’s key insight here is the “therefore” that links the “it is true” (established by the game of truth) to the “I submit” (the individual’s practical submission). This link is not necessary; it is historical, cultural, and ethico-political. Regimes of truth are the apparatuses that separate the true from the false and give legitimacy to social, political, and economic systems and ways of being. They are “indexed to subjectivity,” meaning they require the individual to not just obey, but to manifest and submit to truth in a way that constitutes who they are (Lorenzini 31).

To be absolutely clear, a strict Foucauldian cannot accept the classical Marxist notion of a pre-constituted revolutionary subject—namely, the proletariat—as a privileged bearer of historical truth. For Foucault, the subject is not the ground of critique, but its product (“Afterword: The Subject and Power” 210). Class consciousness, therefore, is not discovered but constructed. Neither is it unveiled but forged through the reconfiguration of regimes of truth. There are foundational incompatibilities between Foucault and Marxism, but my point is the tension can be productive for Marxists. Why?

Regardless of whether one rejects or accepts a transcendental revolutionary subject, the Marxist goal of building collective class consciousness requires persuading individuals across diverse social locations that their interests align with the revolutionary struggle against capital. My contention is that this involves more than simply presenting economic facts or demonstrating the “falsity” of their current beliefs. Foucault’s analysis suggests that people are not simply duped by false ideas; they are constituted as subjects who operate within specific regimes of truth that shape their understanding of reality, themselves, and their obligations.

For example, a liberal supporter of the US Presidential Candidate Kamala Harris may be committed to a regime of truth that prioritizes institutional reform, respect for constitutional democracy, and intersectional representation as a vehicle for justice. Their “therefore I submit” might be articulated as: “Because meaningful change occurs through democratic processes and inclusive leadership, I support reform-minded candidates within the system.” This belief is often grounded in a genuine sense of moral responsibility and historical awareness—especially the recognition that increased representation for women and people of color in leadership positions marks real progress against long-standing exclusion and marginalization.

A Marxist organizer informed by Foucault’s tools would respect the value placed on representation, but seek to deepen the conversation by asking: What structures continue to shape outcomes for marginalized communities, even when political offices are held by individuals from those communities? This isn’t to deny the significance of Harris ascending to high office, but to inquire whether representation alone is sufficient for material transformation. The focus would be on gently denaturalizing the assumption that institutional inclusion necessarily equates to structural change. For instance, the organizer might explore how certain institutional roles—such as a district attorney or vice president—constrain individual agency and reproduce broader systems of power, regardless of who holds the position. The point is not to attack the figure of Harris, but to illuminate how regimes of truth in liberal democracy tie moral legitimacy to procedural participation, often masking deeper continuities in economic and social power. Through this approach, the goal is to foster a more expansive view of justice—one that honors the importance of representation but also questions how systems of power function beneath it.

A Trump supporter may be situated within a regime of truth that emphasizes personal responsibility, national sovereignty, cultural tradition, and economic freedom. Their “therefore I submit” might be: “Because hard work should be rewarded and the government should not interfere; I support Trump’s defense of the free market and strong borders.” Here, political submission is linked to a belief in rugged individualism and a mistrust of “big government,” framed through narratives of loss—of jobs, identity, and control.

The Marxist armed with Foucault’s concepts approach would begin not by branding this person as ignorant or racist, but by exploring the historical construction of these values. An organizer might invite the individual to reflect on their lived economic anxieties—stagnant wages, job precarity, or the opioid crisis in their community. They could trace how these problems are not caused by immigrants or regulations per se, but by corporate outsourcing, deregulated labor markets, and a political class that has abandoned working people.

For example, the value of “personal responsibility” can be examined as a regime of subjectivity: Who benefits from making workers believe that their suffering is a personal failure rather than a systemic condition? Conversations might introduce the idea that both elite liberal and conservative politicians reinforce a regime of truth that masks exploitation under the guise of freedom. By connecting their anger to structural analysis and showing how ruling-class interests have manipulated cultural values, the aim is not to displace their beliefs, but to redirect their critique—from scapegoats to systems.

This denaturalization could be paired with exposure to forms of community-based solidarity—e.g., labor unions or mutual aid projects—that demonstrate cooperation, not competition, as a source of dignity. The point is to create an opening. Does lecturing you about your privileged status as a straight white male actually persuade you to take up the liberation struggle, or talking about how you lost your job to an AI bot? What if the “America First” they want is actually a corporate-first policy? What if protecting your family requires not border walls, but breaking the grip of corporate landlords and predatory employers? My point is Foucault’s distinction between games of truth and regimes of truth allow us to see these sorts of questions and problems for the Trump supporter or American democrat more clearly.

Foucault and the Possibility of Class Consciousness

Foucault’s focus on subjectivity and dispersed power is often seen as leading to fragmented struggles, potentially undermining the Marxist project of unified class struggle. Critics worry that his anti-foundationalism leaves no basis for a shared emancipatory goal. However, I hope to offer a different perspective.

Firstly, Foucault’s analysis doesn’t negate class politics but complements it. The anti-capitalist struggle can be seen as transversal to diverse social conflicts, overdetermined by anti-racist, anti-sexist, and other struggles. Building class consciousness in this context isn’t about subsuming these diverse struggles under a single class identity but about promoting an anti-capitalist standpoint within each conflict. This requires understanding the “regimes of truth” that operate within these different sites of struggle.

Secondly, Foucault’s genealogy⁶, while highlighting discontinuity and difference, also reveals a history of resistance and counter-conduct (Lorenzini 105). By showing how individuals in the past fought against governmental mechanisms and regimes of truth, genealogy reveals a multiplicity of possibilities for resistance that are “normatively significant” because they embody the possibility of being, doing, and thinking differently. This creates a “transhistorical, open, and mobile ‘we'” that constitutes a framework for collective social experimentation and political transformation (Lorenzini 124). This “we” is not a unified, pre-existing class subject, but one forged through shared experiences of subjection and resistance across different contexts and historical periods.

Therefore, Foucault’s framework allows Marxists to approach the task of building collective consciousness not as awakening a sleeping giant with the “truth,” but as fostering connections between different individuals by helping them critically question the “therefore” that binds them to their current subject positions⁷ and regimes of truth. This process of denaturalization, enabled by genealogical analysis, opens up the possibility for recognizing shared experiences of being governed by arbitrary (non-necessary) links between truth and submission, creating the potential for solidarity and collective action. The “politics of ourselves” involves understanding how we are constituted by power and capable of self-transformation (Allen 174-175). Foucault’s analysis provides tools to engage with both sides of this equation.

Considering Objections

One significant objection to this argument is the perceived fundamental incompatibility between Foucault and Marxism. Critics argue that Foucault’s rejection of a universal, foundational truth and his focus on dispersed power conflicts with Marxist concepts like historical materialism, the centrality of class struggle, and the idea of uncovering objective economic truths. For instance, Steven Lukes argues that Foucault’s framework of knowledge-power and regimes of truth prevents the unveiling of erroneous ideologies and the analysis of people’s “real interests,” unlike the concept of false consciousness. He claims that for Foucault, there is no liberation from power and no way to judge between ways of life (Harcourt 171).

A second objection might question the practical efficacy of this Foucauldian approach for political persuasion. Understanding someone’s “regime of truth” seems like an intellectual exercise. How does analyzing the “therefore I submit” actually translate into concrete political action and unity, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched beliefs and interests? Critics like N. Hartsock have charged Foucault with failing to provide concrete examples of what resistance looks like in practice (Harstock 157). Laclau, engaging with Foucauldian-influenced theory, also grappled with the tension between diverse particularisms and the need for universal discourse and collective fronts (Laclau and Mouffe 167).

Addressing the Objections

The rejection of a single, objective truth in Foucault does not necessarily mean there is no truth at all, but rather that truth is produced and contested within specific practices and power relations (Reply to the Circle of Epistemology 9-40 and Lorenzini 42-43). Foucault himself resisted the idea that his work reduced knowledge to power or negated the possibility of a subject. “To depict this kind of research as an attempt to reduce knowledge (savoir) to power, to make it the mask of power and structures, where there is no place for a subject, is purely and simply a caricature” (The Courage of Truth 9). Likewise, his focus on regimes of truth aims to question the obligation individuals have with regard to truth, not to dismiss truth itself.

Furthermore, Foucault’s critique of ideology is not a claim that all beliefs are equally valid or that power simply dictates what is true. Instead, he challenges the idea that critique relies on unmasking a hidden, underlying truth (Lorenzini 24). His genealogical approach aims to denaturalize seemingly obvious categories and rationalities, showing their historical contingency and how they became conditions of possibility for our present. This denaturalization creates the condition of possibility for critique. It does not replace the need for analyzing economic structures but offers a way to understand how these structures are lived, reproduced, and potentially contested at the level of individual subjectivation⁸ and collective practices. The idea of transversal anti-capitalism allows for the retention of a focus on capital while engaging with diverse struggles, mediated through an understanding of how subjects are constituted across these sites.

Addressing the practical efficacy objection requires shifting the understanding of persuasion. It is not seen as a purely rational transfer of information, but as a challenge to the deeply embedded practices and relationships that constitute subjectivity within a regime of truth. Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia (meaning truth-telling) provides an example of a concrete practice of critique as a form of resistance (Lorenzini 118). Parrhesia is an ethico-political force operating in a perlocutionary battlefield, meaning its effects depend on context and reception, not just the truth content itself. Persuasion, in this sense, is not about forcing assent but creating the possibility for individuals to question the “therefore I submit” in their own lives and join a history of resistance. While Foucault may not have provided a manual for revolution, his analysis highlights that resistance is inherent in power relations and occurs at multiple points, offering a more complex understanding of how political change might occur than a simple model of ideological awakening. His work encourages experimentation with new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.

Overall Evaluation

The argument that Foucault’s truth concepts can aid Marxists in building collective class consciousness has significant strengths. It moves beyond a potentially simplistic model of “false consciousness” by recognizing the complex ways individuals are constituted as subjects within specific regimes of truth. This provides a more nuanced understanding of why different groups adhere to particular beliefs and practices, offering pathways for persuasion that target the mechanisms of truth production and submission rather than just the content of beliefs. By focusing on the contingent link between “it is true” and “I submit,” it highlights the possibility of resistance and self-transformation as ethico-political acts rooted in the refusal to be governed in a particular way. The argument also successfully reinterprets Foucault’s perceived fragmentation of struggles into a positive resource for building a transversal, anti-capitalist front across diverse subjectivities.

However, the argument also has weaknesses, some inherited from Foucault’s own work. While it proposes a method for persuasion, the concrete how-to remains somewhat abstract. Applying the analysis of “regimes of truth” and “therefore I submit” in actual political organizing requires significant translation and practical experimentation. The connection between this micro-level analysis of subjectivation and the macro-level dynamics of capital accumulation and class structure, while suggested as complementary, is not fully elaborated in this argument. The objection regarding the lack of a clear normative foundation for resistance in Foucault is addressed by framing resistance as an immanent aspect of power relations and a history of counter-conduct, but this may not fully satisfy those seeking universal justifications for revolutionary struggle. The “we” of critique and transformation remains open and mobile, which might be perceived by some as lacking the necessary unity and direction for a successful revolution. The “we” is admittedly vague. I address the issue of specific, anti-foundationalist praxis for Foucauldians elsewhere.

Despite these weaknesses, the dialectic developed here between the Foucauldian framework and Marxist aims offers a richer perspective on the challenges and possibilities of contemporary emancipatory politics. The objections highlight valid concerns about compatibility and practicality, pushing us to clarify how Foucault’s concepts complement, rather than replace, core Marxist analysis and to acknowledge the ongoing challenge of translating theoretical insights into concrete collective action. The strength of the Foucauldian perspective lies in its ability to make visible the subtle but powerful ways truth and power shape who we are, offering new levers for critique and transformation that can potentially invigorate the pursuit of collective class consciousness in our fragmented world.

If Marxists, or frankly, anyone else, want to win hearts as well as minds, they’ll need more than economic charts—they’ll need tools for understanding why people fight for systems that allegedly harm them. Foucault can help us see not only how people are governed, but how they might become free. Why? Because with Foucault, you can understand how you and others have been shaped into the people that you are. Not only that, but how you participate in your own subjectification.

Works Cited:

Allen, Amy. The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory. New Directions in Critical Theory, Columbia University Press, 2008

Callinicos, Alex, Stathis Kouvelakis, and Lucia Pradella. Routledge Handbook Of Marxism And Post-Marxism, edited by Alex Callinicos, Stathis Kouvelakis, and Lucia Pradella, Routledge, 2021.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 8

Foucault, Michel. “Truth and Power.” Translated by Colin Gordon et al., The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow, Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 51-75.

Foucault, Michel. “Afterword: The Subject and Power.” Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 210

Foucault, Michel. “The Courage of Truth.” First Lecture 1 February 1984 In Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984, translated by G. Burchell, 1-22. Picador, 1984. See https://foucault.info/documents/foucault.courageOfTruth/

Foucault, Michel. “Reply to the Circle of Epistemology.” The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith, Pantheon Books, 1972, Appendix II, pp. 197–203.

Foucault, Michel. On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979–1980. Edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, series edited by Arnold I. Davidson, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Gutting, Gary, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007

Harcourt, Bernard E. Critique & Praxis: A Radical Critical Philosophy of Illusions, Values, and Action. Columbia University Press, 2020.

Khlentzos, Drew, “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/realism-sem-challenge/>.

Kippes, Robert A. “Why the Left Needs Foucault.” CounterPunch, 30 Apr. 2021, https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/04/30/why-the-left-needs-foucault/.

Lorenzini, Daniele. The Force of Truth: Critique, Genealogy, and Truth-Telling in Michel Foucault. The University of Chicago Press, 2023.

Oksala, Johanna. Foucault, Politics, and Violence. Northwestern University Press, 2012.

1. The proletarian is the producer who has (literally or in effect) nothing to sell but his own labor power. ↩︎
2. Intersectionality is the interconnected nature of social categorizations such as race, ethnicity, social class, age, and sexuality as they apply to individuals or groups, revealing how identity-based systems of oppression and privilege connect, overlap, and influence one another. This concept, first defined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), emphasizes that people experience multiple aspects of identity simultaneously, and the meanings of these aspects are shaped by one another. ↩︎
3. What exactly “postmodernism” means is contested. For the purposes of this discussion, I will treat it as a theoretical and cultural orientation marked by skepticism toward universal “grand narratives,” totalizing systems, and foundationalist claims about truth and identity. One of its defining features is its incorporation of anti-realist tendencies—namely, the view that reality is not wholly independent of our linguistic, perceptual, or conceptual schemes. In contemporary metaphysics, anti-realism is exemplified by philosophers such as Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam, who challenge the idea of truth as correspondence to a mind-independent world (Khlentzos). While anti-realism is a specific philosophical position within epistemology and metaphysics, postmodernism (if there is such a thing) extends such skepticism into cultural critique, targeting the social construction of knowledge, identity, and power.
   Michel Foucault is often associated with postmodern and anti-realist perspectives, though his relationship to these labels is complex and contested. His work resists metaphysical realism, particularly in its claims to objective or universal knowledge, but it does not straightforwardly deny the existence of truth or knowledge per se (this may seem surprising). Eg Colin Koopman has persuasively argued Foucault rejects necessary universals but can accept contingent universals. Regardless, Foucault interrogates how truth claims are produced within historical configurations of discourse and power. Whether Foucault’s position entails a full-blown anti-realism or a strategic nominalism is debated. For the purposes of this analysis, I take no definitive stance on Foucault’s specific metaphysical commitments. Instead, I use the term foundational and anti-foundational to make the distinction between Foucault’s skepticism and necessary universals.  ↩︎
4. This is not to say Foucault is compatible with the realist claims of Marxism. ↩︎
5. Class consciousness is the collective awareness of working people regarding their shared position and interests within the class struggle against the capitalist class ↩︎
6. Foucault’s genealogy is about using history to understand our present by exposing its complicated, power-laden roots, revealing that what seems fixed could actually be changed ↩︎
7. a place or role within a discursive formation or a network of power/knowledge relations that allows for the constitution and expression of subjectivity, enabling individuals to speak, think, and act according to established rules and norms. ↩︎
8. Subjectivation is the complicated, historical process by which people become the kinds of individuals they are, shaped both by the systems of power, rules, and ideas they live within and by their own active ways of forming themselves (like how we present ourselves or claim an identity), revealing that how we are isn’t fixed but is a result of specific historical conditions that can potentially be changed or resisted ↩︎