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The Right or Palestine

How Netanyahu counts as too soft in Israel’s election campaign

On 27 October Israel elects the Knesset (Hebrew for “assembly”) for the 26th time. The dispute is about 7 October, the conscription of the ultra-Orthodox and prices. About a Palestinian state there is no dispute, because nobody who sits at the table wants one anyway. All the more fiercely do the camps argue about who concedes too much to the Palestinians. That charge is levelled even at the man against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant.


On Friday, 23 October, four days before the election, two Palestinians from Hebron in the occupied West Bank opened fire on an Israeli army checkpoint. They killed two IDF soldiers and wounded three more before being shot dead after a firefight lasting more than twenty minutes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the same day that the gunmen’s entire neighbourhood would be destroyed: residents would be evacuated, soldiers would go from house to house, and the operation would follow the pattern used in the refugee camps; the army was moreover preparing the largest military operation in the West Bank since 1967.[1] Bulldozers tore down buildings that same Friday, and soldiers pulled residents of the Farsh al-Hawa district out of their homes.[2] Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, Netanyahu’s ministers for national security and for finance and heads of two far-right coalition parties, demanded that the Palestinian Authority – regarded by many as Israel’s compradors – be smashed, although of course nothing pointed to its involvement (Hamas praised the attack as “heroic” but did not claim it).[1] For Smotrich there is now no way around a comprehensive campaign in the West Bank.[3] What Smotrich demands there, the making-consistent of Israel’s reason of state, is no longer an irrelevant fringe phenomenon off to the side of the political status quo: for large parts of the Israeli population the extinction, or at least the expulsion, of this opposing caste of humanity is, despite three years of genocide, going a good deal too slowly.

A current election poster of the Likud, Netanyahu’s party, shows Netanyahu beside the leaders of the opposition under the slogan “The Right or Palestine”.[4] On the “Palestine” side stand people like Gadi Eisenkot, former chief of staff of the army and favourite of this election, who says of himself: “I believe very much in the settlement of Judea and Samaria” – meaning the West Bank.[5] Or Naftali Bennett, himself prime minister in 2021/22 and formerly director-general of the Yesha Council, the umbrella body of the West Bank settlements,[6] who accuses Netanyahu of having “given the Qataris the keys to Gaza”.[7]

Avigdor Lieberman, former finance minister and chairman of Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel Is Our Home”), had already turned the same slogan against Netanyahu: on 30 September he published a picture showing Netanyahu next to Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader who died in 2004, with the sentence: “This election will decide: the Right or Palestine.” Netanyahu had “once again agreed to the founding of a Palestinian state”.[8] So it must be clear: Netanyahu is not Israel’s right-hand edge. Nor does the overwhelming bulk of the criticism of Netanyahu that has repeatedly driven tens of thousands onto the streets of Tel Aviv concern the genocide, the settlement policy or the war against Iran – and where it does, it does so for reasons of internal security. Criticism of the present Israeli government comes down mostly to corruption, the authoritarian restructuring of the state and the dismantling of social systems: concerns that can sound absurd for an apartheid state.

Fit for war

The 25th Knesset dissolved itself on 17 July,[9] the first since 1988 to do so after a full term.[10] In those four years the government has tried to remake the Supreme Court, sat out mass protests, conducted genocide and waged war: against Gaza, Hezbollah, Yemen and Iran.

In the Gaza Strip a “ceasefire” has been in force since October 2025 on the basis of the Trump plan.[11] According to the health ministry in Gaza, 74,389 people had been killed by 13 October 2026, almost 1,500 of them since the ceasefire began.[12] The army still stands at the so-called Yellow Line, to which it withdrew under the ceasefire.[11][13] On 28 February 2026 Israel and the United States illegally attacked Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, and in April a fragile ceasefire followed.[14] On 2 March Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia in Lebanon, resumed its shelling of northern Israel in response to the attack on Iran, and Israel answered with large-scale military operations in Lebanon. A declaration of intent signed in June between Washington and Tehran fell apart within weeks.[15] According to the New York Times, Israeli and American agencies are planning fresh attacks on Iran after the US midterms.[16] A fair amount has happened, then, since Netanyahu took office as prime minister for the third time in 2022.

Around three dozen lists are standing in the election on 27 October; the threshold is 3.25 per cent, that is four seats.[9] In the last permitted polls, from 23 October, Eisenkot’s Yashar! stands at 21 to 23 seats, the Likud at 19 to 21, Bennett’s B’Yachad (“Together”) at 14 to 15, the Democrats at 8 to 10. The Arab Joint List comes to 9. Netanyahu’s bloc, that is the Likud and its previous coalition partners, thus comes to 48 to 50 seats, the “Zionist opposition” around Eisenkot, Bennett, Lieberman and the Democrats to 52 to 56, the two Arab lists to 14 to 16.[17][18] A majority requires 61. Because both Jewish camps rule out a coalition with Arab parties, both results would be minority governments.[9]

What is being voted on is not hard to see: in a poll by the public broadcaster Kan, 34 per cent name the economy and 32 per cent security as the most important issue.[19] For 68 per cent of Jewish Israelis, according to the Israel Democracy Institute, 7 October is a central factor in their voting decision; for 53.5 per cent of Arab voters, violent crime in their towns is among the two most important issues.[9] The future of the Palestinians in the occupied territories appears on none of these lists: according to the Peace Index of Tel Aviv University, in July only 29 per cent of the entire Jewish public still favoured negotiations with the Palestinian Authority at all.[20]

High costs

Since its founding the Israeli state has pursued two purposes: it wants to control the land between the Jordan and the Mediterranean and to secure a permanent Jewish majority on it. And it wants to be a successful business location on the world market, with credit from investors, access to Western technology and an army superior to its neighbours’. These purposes make administering this location probably the most expensive in the world:

In July the finance ministry warned that the defence ministry’s full demand for 2026 – 188 instead of 144 billion shekels – could be paid for only with 4.5 percentage points more value added tax.[21] Nine days before the election the government cut every ministry, including education, health and welfare, by 4.9 per cent in order to pay for arms purchases; the funds of the coalition parties were left untouched. Shortly before that it had financed Apache helicopters largely with cuts to a development plan for the Arab municipalities.[22]

The whole thing is carried by a layer that keeps getting thinner: in 2021, 36 per cent of income tax came from the high-tech sector, and almost 97 per cent of the income tax from high-tech firms was paid by non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish employees.[23] It is precisely this group that is emigrating in growing numbers, above all skilled workers between 20 and 40; the tax authority reckons with shortfalls of 3.5 billion shekels a year within five years.[24] From it come most of the reservists as well, because the ultra-Orthodox are barely conscripted and Arab citizens as a rule not at all. More than 67,000 ultra-Orthodox men are evading the call-up, according to the attorney general. When the military police arrested 42 of them at the airport on 20 October, Netanyahu came out against the arrests, because he needs their parties in order to govern.[25]

On top of that comes mounting pressure from outside. How tight things are getting is shown by an interview Netanyahu gave on the day of the firefight near Hebron: Israel must prepare for banking sanctions and ready an economy that can circumvent them, via cryptocurrencies for instance, and military aid from Washington would end sooner or later.[26] Shortly before, Britain and eleven other Western states had announced sanctions on goods from the settlements. As the extended arm of American interests in the region, the Netanyahu government knew how to play Israel’s free pass to the utmost. Now that pro-Israeli hegemony has been broken for many in the West by digital routes to knowledge, it looks as though the hitherto unbroken support for Israel really will take damage. How to deal with that is the question of this campaign. Let us look at the camps.

First a note: secular and religious parties certainly can be distinguished in Israel, only the line runs across the blocs. Religious parties in the narrower sense are the two ultra-Orthodox lists and Smotrich’s Religious Zionists; on the Arab side, Ra’am has Islamist roots.[9] Explicitly secular are Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid (today part of Bennett’s B’Yachad) and the Democrats.[9][27] Lieberman demands civil marriage and conscription for Talmud students and rules out the ultra-Orthodox as partners, but stands on the right.[9] Likud and Yashar! are not religious parties, but they have religious voters and candidates; Eisenkot’s list includes politicians of the national-religious right such as Matan Kahana.[6] The question “religious or secular” decides conscription, civil marriage and money for Torah schools. On the Palestinian question it does not divide the camps.

The prime minister’s camp

Likud: periphery and privatisation

The Likud goes back to the Herut movement that Menachem Begin founded in 1948 out of the underground militia Irgun, and to Ze’ev Jabotinsky, whose programme of 1923 was called “The Iron Wall”: the settlement of the land could succeed only behind a wall of force. After almost three decades of government by the social-democratic Labour Party, Begin won in 1977 with the votes of the Mizrahim, the Jews from Arab countries whom the state had sorted into development towns on the periphery and into the lower wage brackets. Netanyahu, party leader first in 1993 and again since 2005, added social cuts and privatisations as finance minister from 2003. The “party of the little people” has since been the party of the market as well.

Likud’s campaign is built on war: Netanyahu advertises his record against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran – and Trump, who publicly declared his support for him on 18 October.[22] He rejects a Palestinian state as he rejects any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.[9] A Likud poster in Tel Aviv shows Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, Turkish president Erdoğan, Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem and New York’s mayor Zohran Mamdani: they want Netanyahu to lose (would one kindly prevent that).[28] The Likud, still at 32 seats in 2022, stands at 19 to 21.

Otzma Yehudit: Kahane’s heirs

Itamar Ben-Gvir comes out of the Kach movement of Rabbi Meir Kahane, which demanded the expulsion of all Arabs and was banned in 1994 after the Kahane follower Baruch Goldstein shot dead 29 praying Muslims in Hebron. A picture of Goldstein hung in Ben-Gvir’s living room for years; courts convicted him of incitement to racism and support for a terrorist organisation.[29] Today, as minister for national security, he is responsible for the police and the prisons.

Otzma Yehudit (“Jewish Power”) demands full sovereignty over the West Bank, the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and the use of all state means for the “voluntary emigration” of the Palestinians.[30] Gaza, Ben-Gvir wants to conquer and settle.[29] In January 2025 he left the government in protest at the de jure ceasefire in Gaza and returned in March;[10] before that he had boasted of having prevented hostage deals several times.[31] Netanyahu has declared that Ben-Gvir will be neither defence minister nor again minister for national security[32] – his cartoonish, psychopathic manner, especially in the wake of the harassment of the activists of the Global Sumud Flotilla, is not in line with the purpose Netanyahu and his sort pursue (protecting Israel from growing isolation at the international level). The flotilla had set out in May 2026 to bring aid to Gaza; after the navy intercepted it, Ben-Gvir published a video in which he taunted around 430 detained activists in the port of Ashdod. Even Netanyahu declared that this did not correspond to Israel’s values.[33] The former Sephardic chief rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas party,[9] has forbidden his followers to vote for Otzma, because Ben-Gvir has set foot on the Temple Mount, the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[34] The party stands at 7 to 8 seats.

Religious Zionism: annexation by administration

Smotrich’s list, this time together with the Zehut party of the former Likud member of the Knesset Moshe Feiglin,[9] stands in the tradition of the settler movement Gush Emunim, for which the conquest of the land is a stage of redemption. As finance minister and as a minister within the defence ministry, Smotrich has built up a civilian settlement administration that has taken from the military its competences for land, planning and infrastructure in the West Bank: civil administration for half a million settlers, military law for more than three million Palestinians.[29] The party stands at 6 to 8 seats.[17][18]

Shas and United Torah Judaism: loyalty to the budget

The ultra-Orthodox (or Haredi) parties live off an arrangement dating from the founding period: David Ben-Gurion exempted around 400 Talmud students from military service. Today there are tens of thousands, financed through grants to Torah schools, child benefit and housing construction. Today there are two parties that claim to represent them: Shas (short for “Sephardic Guardians of the Torah”), founded in 1984 by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and led by Aryeh Deri, represents the poorer ultra-Orthodox; United Torah Judaism represents the Ashkenazi Hasidim, organised around rabbinical dynasties, and the “Lithuanians”, who group themselves around the large Talmud schools.[27] Both are bound up with the occupation in very material ways: Modi’in Illit and Beitar Illit, the two largest settlements in the West Bank, are ultra-Orthodox towns.

A distinction must also be drawn between Shas and United Torah Judaism in that the latter understands itself as “non-Zionist”. “Non-Zionist” expressly does not mean “anti-Zionist”. Eitan Chikli, father of the Likud minister Amichai Chikli, writes on United Torah Judaism’s understanding of Zionism in the Times of Israel:

“In theory, many of its leaders and voters still deny that the State of Israel possesses any intrinsic religious value, even though they have participated fully in its institutions for decades. Today, this non-Zionism is largely a doctrinal position rather than a practical barrier to joining a government.”[27]

In the latest polls Shas and United Torah Judaism each come to 7 to 8 seats, 14 to 16 together; in 2022 it was 11 and 7.[9][17][18] Their electorate is reckoned the most solid in the country. Hasidim vote Agudat Yisrael, “Lithuanians” Degel HaTorah, the two together as United Torah Judaism; ultra-Orthodox Jews of oriental origin vote Shas.[35][36] At the 2021 election, 91 per cent of Torah Judaism voters were ultra-Orthodox, at Shas only 60 per cent, plus 23 per cent traditional and 16 per cent national-religious.[37] What is voted for is what the rabbis declare a religious duty: 36 per cent of the ultra-Orthodox say they vote for the same party as always anyway; the national average is 7 per cent.[36] But: after the failed conscription law only 28 per cent of the ultra-Orthodox give their political leadership good marks, and the rabbis are divided.[36] HaTzibur HaCharedi (“The Ultra-Orthodox Public”), a party for “modern” ultra-Orthodox, is also standing, though the polls put it at around one per cent.[9]

In July 2025 both parties left the government in the dispute over conscription, but they continue to support it; a law they will accept only without sanctions and quotas.[9] They have not ruled out an Eisenkot government.[9][10] Their loyalty is not to Netanyahu but to the conditions under which their community reproduces itself.

On the right-hand edge, Amcha Yisrael (“People of Israel”) of the former brigadier general Ofer Winter is also fighting on, in support of Netanyahu; Smotrich offered him a ministerial post if he would give up.[38] In the polls the party falls just short of the threshold.[17]

The “camp of change”

On 26 September, Yashar!, B’Yachad, Yisrael Beiteinu and the Democrats signed a joint declaration: not to attack one another, a state commission of inquiry into 7 October, a common position on the conscription of the ultra-Orthodox, a limit on the prime minister’s term of office and a constitution (yes, the State of Israel has no constitution).[9][10] About the Arab parties it says nothing.

Yashar!: moderation for the sake of the world market

Gadi Eisenkot, son of Moroccan immigrants and raised in Eilat, worked his way up through the army; that makes him electable for Likud voters on the periphery. As commander of the army’s Northern Command he formulated the Dahiya doctrine in 2008: every village from which Israel is fired upon will be answered with disproportionate force and massive destruction, as the Beirut district of Dahiya was in 2006. From 2015 to 2019 he was chief of the general staff, and after 7 October an observer in the war cabinet. In December 2023 his son Gal fell in Gaza; in June 2024 he left the government, and in 2025 he founded Yashar!.[9]

His programme: a commission of inquiry looking ten years back, which means at his own term as well, a limit on terms of office and a general duty of service.[9][10] Anyone who still thinks of two states after 7 October is out of touch with reality.[39] The settlements he wants to keep and to go on building in, only not outside Israeli law. The Palestinian Authority should remain in place so that Israel is not itself responsible for some three million Palestinians in the West Bank. More than autonomy the Palestinians could not get, says Yoram Cohen, former head of the domestic intelligence service Shin Bet and one of the party’s leading figures. Matan Kahana, reckoned the number two of Yashar!, puts it precisely: Eisenkot stands “to the right of Netanyahu on every question touching the conflict”.[6] He is against building in the E1 area near Jerusalem, which would cut the West Bank into a northern and a southern part, on the grounds: “Not now. That is a mistake that costs us an international price.”[39]

The violence of the settlers during the olive harvest Eisenkot calls “Jewish terror under the patronage of the Israeli government”, because it burns up the little legitimacy Israel still has.[20] The Israeli human rights organisation Yesh Din has counted more than 670 attacks since the end of September.[2] The damage Eisenkot laments, however, arises not in the villages whose harvest is stolen but in Washington and Brussels. It fits that Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress and once a confidant of Netanyahu, would in case of doubt support Eisenkot, because otherwise Israel loses the support of the United States and of the diaspora.[40] On Arab votes Eisenkot does not wish to rely.[9]

B’Yachad: settlers’ council and middle class

In April, Naftali Bennett’s new party and Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid joined together as B’Yachad (“Together”).[41] Bennett, who grew rich as a high-tech entrepreneur, was director-general of the Yesha Council and in 2021/22 prime minister of a coalition that, with Ra’am, included an Arab party for the first time.[6][9] He wants to annex Area C, around 62 per cent of the West Bank, which has been entirely under Israeli control since the Oslo Accords, and to leave the Palestinians in Areas A and B, administered wholly or partly by the Palestinian Authority, an autonomy.[6] Lapid, formerly a television journalist and the voice of the secular middle class, holds a Palestinian state to be postponed since 7 October.[20] Bennett accuses the government of wanting to “accustom Israel to a life next to Hamas”; the army should stay at the Yellow Line and Qatar should be declared an enemy state.[42] A repeat of the coalition with Ra’am he rules out.[9]

Yisrael Beiteinu: the defector of 1999

Lieberman, born in 1958 in Kishinev (today Chișinău, Moldova) and a resident of the settlement of Nokdim, was director-general of the Likud and of Netanyahu’s office in the nineties. In 1999 he founded Yisrael Beiteinu because Netanyahu’s stance on the Palestinian question was too soft for him.[43] He demands civil marriage, conscription for Talmud students and “decisive results” against Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.[9] After the firefight near Hebron he demanded an end to the policy of containment.[3] His representatives on the election committee announced that they would vote to exclude both Arab lists.[44] Even Tzachi Hanegbi, a long-standing Likud politician and former ally of Netanyahu, intends to vote Lieberman this time.[45]

The Democrats: what is left of the state party

The Labour Party is the heir of Ben-Gurion’s Mapai. It founded the state, fought the war of 1948 in which around 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled, built the first settlements after 1967 and signed the Oslo Accords in 1993 under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In 2024, after a historic low, it merged with the left-wing Meretz to form the Democrats under the former deputy chief of the general staff Yair Golan.

Golan wants to roll back the judicial reform[9] and to separate from the Palestinians by a regional route, but he hardly speaks about it in the campaign.[20] In May 2025 he said that a sane country does not kill babies as a hobby; government and opposition condemned him, Lapid included.[46] Sanctions he wants to avert by having Israel act against the Jewish terror that is destroying its standing.[26] The exclusion of Sami Abu Shehadeh, head of the Arab party Balad, he too supported.[47] The Democrats stand at 8 to 10 seats.

The votes that do not count

About a fifth of Israel’s population are Palestinians.[47] Until 1966 they lived under military administration; the Nation-State Law of 2018 lays down that the right to national self-determination in Israel belongs to the Jewish people alone.

The Joint List under Yosef Jabareen unites three parties: the communist, Jewish-Arab Hadash, the Ta’al of the long-serving member of the Knesset Ahmad Tibi, and the nationalist Balad, which demands a state with equal rights for all citizens.[9][47] It demands a Palestinian state and would at most support a government without Netanyahu from the outside.[9] Ra’am under Mansour Abbas, a party with Islamist roots, in 2021 became the first Arab party to join a government;[9] in December of the same year Abbas said that Israel had come into being as a Jewish state and would remain one.[48]

On 23 September the Central Elections Committee, in which the Knesset parties vote, excluded both lists by 18 votes to 5 in each case, although the attorney general held the evidence to be insufficient.[49] Among those who had applied for this were the Likud and Otzma Yehudit.[50] Otzma itself the same committee admitted a day later.[49] The Supreme Court overturned the exclusions unanimously on 2 October; Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh withdrew after his personal exclusion had become likely.[50] Abbas has recognised Israel as a Jewish state, and his list was supposed to go all the same. After the exclusion by the election committee, Abu Shehadeh told The New Arab:

“These different Zionist factions are trying to impose a single narrative that allows no dissent. They cannot tolerate voices opposing the war or platforms that speak about genocide, apartheid, occupation, state violence and the ongoing ethnic cleansing of our people in the West Bank. Any voice challenging the official narrative meets unified Zionist opposition.”[51]

The polls predict 14 to 16 seats for the two lists together.[17] They are the only parties that demand a Palestinian state,[10] and none of the Jewish camps will form a coalition with them.[9] When there is talk in Israel of 61 seats, what is meant is quite explicitly 61 Jewish seats.

Netanyahu the soft

To the uninformed observer Netanyahu readily counts as the embodiment of evil, the right-hand edge of Israeli politics. To many in Israel his record looks different: in 1997 he handed over most of Hebron to the Palestinian Authority; in 1998 he signed the Wye Agreement with Arafat on further withdrawals from the West Bank, whereupon Lieberman left the Likud.[43] In 2009, in a speech at Bar-Ilan University, he came out for a demilitarised Palestinian state and imposed a ten-month freeze on building in the settlements. In 2011 he released 1,027 prisoners for one soldier, among them Yahya Sinwar, later Hamas chief and planner of 7 October; from 2018 he let Qatari money flow into Gaza.

In January 2025 he agreed to a ceasefire and Ben-Gvir resigned.[10] In September 2025 he apologised to the Qatari prime minister for the Israeli air strike on Hamas representatives in Doha; Smotrich compared this to the policy of appeasement towards Hitler.[52] On the same day he agreed to Trump’s Gaza plan, which holds out, under conditions, a “credible path” to Palestinian statehood.[11] In mid-October his ambassador in Washington let it be known that Netanyahu wanted a broad unity government.[53]

None of these concessions has given the Palestinians anything that comes closer to a state power of their own, let alone to self-determination in some other form. The building freeze ran out, the state of the Bar-Ilan speech never came, and in Hebron Netanyahu has just announced the destruction of an entire neighbourhood.[1] The concessions were addressed to Washington and to the cohorts on which Israel’s army, credit and high-tech depend. That this support will not hold forever he has said himself.[26] What his opponents call “soft” is the making-possible of an apartheid while preserving the means of the state’s survival.

The right no longer wants to do this sum: Israel is isolated only when it is weak, says Ben-Gvir.[29] The opposition holds against Netanyahu that he has miscalculated. That he has made no peace, nobody holds against him. The neighbouring Arab states expect in any case that hardliners will govern after the election, one way or the other.[54]

What could change

The official result must be in by 4 November; after that President Herzog charges a member of the Knesset with forming a government.[9] Arithmetically, three routes remain.

The first is an Eisenkot government, which according to the polls is five to nine seats short. Shas could deliver them, but Lieberman will not govern with the ultra-Orthodox; toleration by the Arab lists is rejected by several of his partners, Lieberman first among them.[9] The second is a unity government of Likud and Yashar!, which 60 per cent of those polled want if neither camp has a majority.[18] The third is deadlock: Netanyahu would remain in office as caretaker and Israel would vote again, as it already did five times between 2019 and 2022.[9]

Under Eisenkot there would be a commission of inquiry into 7 October and a conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox, and the judicial reform would be withdrawn.[9] Settler violence would probably be prosecuted more harshly, because it burdens relations with Washington and Amman; even US Secretary of State Rubio demands it.[10][22] For the layer that finances the state and provides its reservists, that is not nothing.

What would stay the same is what is not disputed: no Palestinian state, the settlements would remain and grow. In Gaza genocide remains, towards Lebanon and Iran the swamp as before. The candidate Eisenkot, inventor of the Dahiya doctrine, is after all no pacifist. The election decides who distributes the burdens of the project and how much international support may be spent on it. About the project itself it does not decide.

The Right or Palestine

Here in Germany the election counts as a referendum on Netanyahu and as a chance to return Israel to a normality that is supposed to have existed before him. That normality produced the Dahiya doctrine, the Labour Party’s settlements and the military administration over the state’s own Arab citizens. Whoever takes a chief of the general staff who believes in settlement for the moderate alternative is measuring the change by how much standing it wins Israel back in the West, and not by whether anything changes for the people in Gaza, in Hebron and in Umm al-Fahm, an Arab town in Israel.

The Likud’s slogan is more honest than its authors suspect. “The Right or Palestine” describes exactly how narrow the space has become. The Right is everything that stands for election. Palestine is what is left over: the people who still live on the land that is wanted. In a political system in which Netanyahu counts as too yielding, a party that wanted to give them equal rights would no longer be an opposition but a case for the election committee. That is precisely what the committee attempted in September.

Whoever wins on Tuesday will negotiate with the West about the costs of the occupation, with the ultra-Orthodox about the costs of the war, and with his own voters about prices. With the Palestinians he will not negotiate.

Notes

[1] Emanuel Fabian, Nurit Yohanan et al., “2 soldiers killed in West Bank shooting; IDF believes Palestinian gunmen planned larger attack”, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2026.

[2] Emanuel Fabian et al., “IDF launches major op in Hebron after soldiers killed in shooting attack”, The Times of Israel, 24 October 2026.

[3] Tzvi Jasper, “Netanyahu vows to hunt Hamas terrorists as ministers demand major West Bank military operation”, The Jerusalem Post, 23 October 2026.

[4] Photo caption (AP/Oded Balilty) to Ben Sales, “Israel is primed for unrest around election day. Is there a way out?”, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2026.

[5] “6 Things to Know About Yashar Party Leader Gadi Eisenkot”, Institute for Middle East Understanding, 2026, drawing on an Eisenkot interview from June 2026.

[6] Salih Al-Naami, “What Will Change When Netanyahu Falls?”, Vision for Political Development, 27 August 2026.

[7] “Bennett: Netanyahu gave up on defeating Hamas, ‘gave the Qataris the keys to Gaza’”, The Times of Israel, 4 August 2026.

[8] “Israeli opposition criticise Netanyahu for being ‘too pro-Palestine’”, The London Economic, 3 October 2026, with Lieberman’s X post of 30 September 2026 (translation from the Hebrew by the author); Jared Hillel, “In Israel, Peace Is a Losing Proposition”, The Progressive, 24 October 2026.

[9] AIJAC, “Fact Sheet: The 2026 Israeli Election”, 21 October 2026.

[10] Ezra Hess, Ittai Ronen, “Israel’s Election: Understanding Who’s Who and What’s at Stake”, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 October 2026.

[11] “Full text: Trump’s ‘Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict’”, JNS, 29 September 2025, point 19.

[12] “Death Toll From The Aggression On Gaza Rises To 74,389 Fatalities, 175,423 Injured”, Bernama/WAFA, 13 October 2026, citing the health ministry in Gaza.

[13] “Report: Israel tells US Hamas doesn’t plan to disarm and is rebuilding its forces”, The Times of Israel, 22 October 2026.

[14] House of Commons Library, “Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Background and UK response”, 2026; ibid., “US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026”, 2026.

[15] Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Conflict with Iran”, R48887, September 2026.

[16] “US, Israel said to draft plans for resumed strikes on Iran after midterm elections”, The Times of Israel, 22 October 2026, citing the New York Times.

[17] “Final Israeli election polls: Eisenkot leads, neither bloc secures majority”, Israel National News, 23 October 2026 (Kan 11, Channel 12, Channel 13); “Final polls before election show both blocs short of majority, small parties out of Knesset”, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2026.

[18] “Poll: 60% of Israelis want a unity government”, Israel National News, 23 October 2026 (Maariv/Lazar).

[19] “Some 30% of Israeli voters are undecided, while 39% say nothing could change their mind – poll”, The Jerusalem Post, 19 October 2026.

[20] Ruth Eglash, “The missing ‘peace’ in Israel’s election campaign”, The Times of Israel (JTA), 22 October 2026.

[21] Gad Lior, “Treasury warns wartime defense spending could force 4.5% VAT hike”, Ynetnews, 2 July 2026.

[22] Liveblog of 18 October 2026, The Times of Israel, entries “Trump gives ‘warrior’ Netanyahu ‘complete and total endorsement’ for reelection”, “Government approves NIS 2.6 billion in budget cuts for defense, leaving coalition funds untouched” and ”Rubio says he is ‘very disturbed’ by scenes of settler violence in West Bank, urges Israeli crackdown“.

[23] “High-tech’s growing influence: 36% of Israel’s income tax comes from tech workers”, Ynetnews; report on the Israel Innovation Authority study, Calcalist.

[24] Nitzan Cohen, “Affluent Israelis are leaving, at a steep cost to Israel”, Israel Hayom, 6 August 2026.

[25] Jeremy Sharon, “AG: Over 67,000 Haredi men are dodging draft, High Court must weigh more sanctions”, The Times of Israel, 22 October 2026; “Netanyahu comes out against arrest of Haredi draft dodgers as 42 detained at airport”, The Times of Israel, 20 October 2026.

[26] “Netanyahu: Israel should ready for global sanctions, use blockchain to circumvent them”, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2026.

[27] Eitan Chikli, “United Torah Judaism: Lithuanian and Hasidic Judaism at the Heart of Israeli Politics”, The Times of Israel (Blogs), 23 August 2026.

[28] Corinne Baum, “Likud election billboard puts Mamdani alongside Erdogan, Khamenei, and Qassem as Israel’s enemies”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 August 2026.

[29] Eric Cortellessa, “Exclusive: Ben-Gvir’s Plan to Push Netanyahu Further Right”, TIME, 22 October 2026.

[30] “Annexation, settlements or separation: where Israel’s parties stand on the West Bank”, Ynetnews, 2026.

[31] “Ben Gvir says he repeatedly foiled hostage deals, urges Smotrich to help him stop this one”, The Times of Israel, January 2025.

[32] “PM says Ben Gvir can’t be defense or police minister after election, angering Otzma Yehudit”, The Times of Israel, October 2026.

[33] JTA, “Ben-Gvir under fire, including from Netanyahu, over video taunting flotilla detainees”, SA Jewish Report, May 2026.

[34] Noam Lehmann, Stav Levaton, Ariela Karmel, “Ben Gvir says Netanyahu has promised EU to exclude him from next government”, The Times of Israel, 19 October 2026.

[35] “Israel’s political parties explained: Shas and United Torah Judaism”, JNS, 2026.

[36] Avraham Lafair, Gilad Malach, “What Motivates Haredi Voters?”, Israel Democracy Institute, 3 August 2026.

[37] “Voting Patterns of Jewish Israelis in the March 2021 Elections by Religious Affiliation”, Israel Democracy Institute.

[38] Ariela Karmel, Stav Levaton, “Winter says may have erred pledging support for PM; Smotrich offers him minister role to quit”, The Times of Israel, 2026.

[39] “Eisenkot: E1 construction would be a mistake”, Israel National News, 27 August 2026, citing an interview with Israel Hayom.

[40] “Ex-Netanyahu confidant Lauder breaks years of silence, warns against PM’s reelection”, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2026.

[41] Adi Nirman, Eli Zilberberg, “Bennett, Lapid to unite parties ahead of elections”, Israel Hayom, 26 April 2026.

[42] “Bennett pledges to maintain Yellow Line in Gaza, declare Qatar enemy state, redirect national funds”, The Jerusalem Post, October 2026.

[43] “‘He has no strategy’: Liberman says PM placing ego above national interest”, The Times of Israel, 2024.

[44] Yuval Karni, “Yisrael Beiteinu: We’ll vote to disqualify Ra’am, Joint List, Balad chair and Cassif”, Ynetnews, 23 September 2026.

[45] “Ex-Netanyahu ally Hanegbi, longtime Likud stalwart, announces he’s voting for Liberman”, The Times of Israel, 2026.

[46] Report on Golan’s interview with Kan Reshet Bet, The Jerusalem Post, 20 May 2025.

[47] Caolán Magee, “Israel bans Arab parties from election: Who they are, why it matters”, Al Jazeera, 26 September 2026.

[48] “Mansour Abbas: Israel was born Jewish and will remain so”, Globes, December 2021.

[49] Sarah Ben-Nun, “Election panel clears Otzma Yehudit for October vote after barring Arab slates day earlier”, The Jerusalem Post, 24 September 2026.

[50] Sarah Ben-Nun, “Abu Shehadeh withdraws after Supreme Court signals disqualification”, The Jerusalem Post, 2 October 2026.

[51] Abed Abou Shhadeh, Rabeea Eid, “Exclusive: Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh on Israel’s ‘dangerous’ anti-Arab voter exclusion”, The New Arab, 30 September 2026.

[52] Marc Rod, “During Trump meeting, Netanyahu apologized to Qatari leader for Doha strike”, Jewish Insider, 29 September 2025.

[53] “Amb. Leiter: Ben Gvir won’t be National Security Minister”, Israel National News, October 2026.

[54] Nava Freiberg, “Arab states see hawks ruling Israel no matter who wins vote, but still sense room for change”, The Times of Israel, 18 October 2026.

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